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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EGYPTIAN EXPERT REVIEWS STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS OF RED SEA

London AL-BAHITH AL-'ARABI in Arabic, No 10, Jan-Mar 87, pp 10-26

[Article by Muhammad Hafiz Isma'il: "The Strategic Outlook for the Red Sea Region"]

[Text] Our study acquires its importance in light of the delicate nature of the period we are going through, interconnected considerations and the proliferation of the challenges we face, in our confrontation with international and regional forces which aim at paralyzing our political will through polarization, political and economic pressures, the threat of the use of force, then the creation of justifications for the use of it or the effort to sabotage our domestic front.

Events in our region are following one another at a rapid pace, and it is difficult for us to follow up on them. Their sudden development almost challenges logic of analysis and objectivity of evaluation, making us the captives of a reaction to what goes on around us and also weakening our ability to confront challenges or realize cooperation among ourselves in the absence of the Arab solidarity needed to clarify our goals, define our priorities, arrange our means of resistance and organize the institutions by which we may pursue our objectives.

While the proliferation of our political and social premises and the differences in our orientations are a matter that can to some extent be held responsible for our deficiencies, we may find, in the proliferation and differences, the causes for our strength as well, if we will only bend them to the service of our goals, without adopting this conception of ours as a point of departure for our study; that would become an unjustifiable folly, as we are living in one of the least stable and most vulnerable areas of the world.

The Framework for the Study of the Red Sea Region

2 [sic]. It may appear, from our treatment of the Bab El Mandeb issue, that we are intending to deal with one particular issue of our national security. However, on looking deeply, we will find ourselves in confrontation with an area where a large part of our national problems are reflected, since the interests of the great powers, not to speak of the regional ones, meet and collide there.

The Bab El Mandeb is one of the most important straits of the world and the most sensitive in terms of stability, commerce and progress. Through the strait, which it is easy to close, by sinking a large ship in it, pass great requirements of the wherewithal of life and civilization, security and safety, to and from our countries and via them to the various areas of the world.

To the south, the strait opens out to the Gulf of Aden and the Afro-Asian world with its services and human resources. To the north, the Red Sea extends for more than 2,400 kilometers and ends up at the Suez Canal in an environment which opens out to Europe, with its scientific and industrial resources. Thus, the stretch from Aden to Port Said lies within a single integrated context, and the entire Red Sea becomes a single strait and a bridge between East and West.

In the context of the Arab world, the Red Sea is considered an internal lake and part of the system of communications among those which share it. Over it also passes a significant portion of the oil of the Gulf countries and Egypt, which provides them with 70 to 100 percent of their national income, the requirements of their economic and social development and the attainment of their security.

Seven Arab countries look out on the Red Sea. For more than a quarter century, Ethiopia has been fighting Eritrea in order to lodge itself on its coasts and in its harbors. To the north, Israel, through the port of Eilat, looks out on the Gulf of al-'Aqabah, which has assumed an important position in the Arab-Israeli struggle, and has designs on the area beyond the Bab El Mandeb.

A look at the "Red Sea region" must take into account the strategic bloc, the Middle East, which extends from the eastern Mediterranean to the western Indian Ocean and the area beyond the Arab Gulf (Table One). The examination is complete only in the context of its deployment among three continents, its penetration of the shortest communication route and its possession of 56 percent of the world oil reserves, which provide 42 percent of the energy the world consumes.

Thus, this region became a cradle, or target, for the aspirations of all the empires of the world, and it became well known, among the rulers of Europe at the end of the 19th century, that "whoever controls the Red Sea controls the world." Therefore, as it enhances the welfare of the region through which it passes, it increases its vulnerability to threats, to the point where no intelligent foreign policy can be permitted to ignore it.

3. Commercial wealth was the historic point of departure for the Red Sea's modern role, when the European countries coursed about the Cape of Good Hope in the direction of the Orient until England took it over at the end of the 18th century.

Since the struggle began, Bab El Mandeb has occupied an important position in England's plans. In 1799, it occupied Perim island, then Socotra and Aden in the third decade of the 19th century, when "Egypt became Suez, Suez India, and India England" (1).

When the Suez Canal was dug, the Red Sea became an international waterway eliminating 40 percent of the distance separating London from Bombay. For that reason, in 1882 England decided to occupy Egypt in order to guarantee its route to India.

The discovery of oil in Iran at the beginning of this century intensified England's tenacious adherence to its position in Egypt, its neglect of its promises to the leaders of the Arab revolution and its dividing up of control of the Orient with France and international Zionism in the wake of the great war.

However, the route of the Red Sea and the canal continued to be plagued by threats, when the status of the colonial powers became a target of the Arab nationalist current and the flow of oil through the canal or the system of pipelines across the eastern Arab world became a hostage to the realization of Arab political goals.

In 1956, England and France withdrew from the center of the struggle in Egypt to the flanks of the Arab world, and laid the groundwork for the two superpowers to begin the stage of competition in a region where ideological boundaries and areas of influence had not been defined.

Over the period of 30 years, the course of events in the region was dominated by:

- A. The increase in the intensity of competition between the two great powers.
- B. The absorption of the Arab world in local struggles which had the goal of affirming the dominance of Israel, building an Ethiopian power center and strengthening the hegemony of Iran.
- C. The pursuit by the region, and the world, of three struggles over oil which had political, economic and security repercussions in every region.
- D. The decline of the Arab solidarity which had been unleashed by the October war, in the absence of effective participation by Egypt.

The Front of the Two Superpowers

4. From the beginning, Egypt's control of the Suez Canal, then the deployment of its forces in Yemen at the beginning of the sixties, were considered a direct threat to shipping in the Bab El Mandeb and the oil production centers in the Gulf and to the stability of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, and, in the light of special Egyptian-Soviet relationship, a disruption of the balance between the two superpowers.

In our estimation, one of the targets of Israel's strike in 1967 was to deprive Egypt of the monopoly of control of the Suez Canal and compel it to withdraw from Yemen. However, Egypt refused to surrender to the Israeli victory and settlement of the revolution in the southern Arabian Peninsula, in order to prevent the Western powers from realizing their goals in full.

The Soviet Union strengthened Arab perseverance through the deployment of its fleets in the eastern Mediterranean and the western Indian Ocean. On that subject, Admiral Gorshikov said "The growth of our naval forces will guarantee the successful administration of foreign policy" (2). Therefore, the collapse of the traditional regimes in Khartoum, Tripoli and Mogadishu in 1969, to be replaced by regimes sympathetic to Egypt, was not a surprise.

A. The Eastern Mediterranean

When Israel launched its attack in June 1967, Egypt closed the Suez Canal to shipping. For some years it rejected every proposal for realization of a phased agreement aimed at a reopening, since that was considered an infringement on Egyptian sovereignty. Until June 1975, ships and tankers followed the route of the Cape of Good Hope.

The deployment of the Soviet fleet brought about the neutralization of the American Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, and the revolution in Libya, which managed to liquidate the Anglo-American bases there, strengthened this position and thus created a disruption of the balance in the eastern Mediterranean basin.

The October war did not resolve the situation in the region. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Sinai began in 1974, the Suez Canal was reopened to shipping and control was re-established over the Gulf of Suez oilfields in 1975. As a result of the adjustment in the relationship between the powers, Egypt terminated the treaty of friendship and cooperation and the agreement on the naval facilities in Spring 1976. Thus, the Soviets lost their distinctive position after 20 years, while the Fifth Fleet withdrew to the ports of Libya.

Ten years later, the United States took the initiative of rolling back the successes the Soviets had achieved in the seventies. In applying the Reagan Doctrine (3), calling for the strengthening of the "democratic" forces in the third world through the use of force to support diplomacy, the American Sixth Fleet, supported by jet fighters, launched a series of raids against Libya in March-April 1986 with the goal of bringing down the regime there and restoring dominance over it.

In confronting the American aggression, Comrade Gorbachev proposed the withdrawal of Soviet and American fleets from the Mediterranean (4). However, the United States rejected the proposal, which would disrupt the strategic balance in Europe and the Middle East.

B. The Indian Ocean

Since 1968, the Soviet fleet has had a permanent presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean, whereas Britain withdrew from its missions "east of Suez" and the French fleet in Djibouti was restricted to the realization of defense missions. The Soviet deployment was aimed at restricting the freedom of action of the American fleet and its use of the Indian Ocean as a platform for launching its submarine missiles, through a presence on the flank and a threat to the Western world's naval communications with the Arab Gulf.

In 1970, the naval presence of the two great powers furnished a provocation to the nonaligned countries, which directed an appeal for establishment of a "region of peace" in the Indian Ocean. The attempt of this group in the United Nations to compel the Soviet Union and the United States to respond to this appeal was not a success. In 1977-78, the Soviets did not succeed in compelling the United States to negotiate, owing to the deterioration of relations between them in the light of the Soviet "penetration" of the African continent.

In 1979, the center of gravity of events shifted to the Arab Gulf. In January, the Shah of Iran left his country, to be succeeded by Ayatollah Khomeini in the administration of the country, the Central Treaty Organization collapsed, and Soviet forces entered Kabul to support the regime there in December. In September 1980, the Iraqi-Iranian war broke out, and expectations that it would end in weeks, if not in a few days, did not hold true.

In January 1980 the American president (5) declared the United States' determination to use all necessary means, perhaps including military ones, to prevent any hostile attempt to take over the Gulf region. The announcement of the Carter Doctrine was accompanied by the strengthening of the American fleet in the Indian Ocean and the formation of the rapid deployment force and the central command, which were assigned the tasks of protecting American interests from Egypt to Pakistan by helping the countries of the region develop their regional defense, with support to be provided to them as far as matters which exceeded their abilities were concerned.

In confronting the American initiative, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev (6) declared principles which were aimed at neutralizing the Indian Ocean before the Indian parliament in December 1980:

Avoidance of the establishment of military bases in the Arab Gulf and adjacent islands.

Avoidance of the spread of nuclear weapons in the region.

Abstention from the use of force or the threat of using it.

Abstention from interference in the domestic affairs of the countries of the Gulf.

Abstention from the obstruction of shipping in the waterways in the region.

The Balance of Regional Powers

5. In the middle of the sixties, Britain's conception with respect to the Middle East (7) was that its withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula would not result in the disruption of balance in the region in favor of the Arab countries, since Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, in participation with Israel, could preserve the regional balance.

In the course of 20 years, an essential change has occurred in this strategic "structure." While Turkey today assumes a neutral stance, Israel has

reaffirmed its Western affiliation, Ethiopia has moved over to the socialist camp and Iran has been converted into an Islamic republic. They have all continued to contain the Arab world, although their objectives have changed.

A. The front of Israel:

The change in the relations of powers in the eastern Mediterranean in the middle of the seventies led to the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, prompting a radical change in Egypt's Arab relations which resulted in the decline of Arab solidarity. In spring 1982, the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai occurred and the multinational forces took up positions.

However, Israel adamantly clung to control over the Taba area for political considerations and in hope of extending the coastline of the port of Eilat for a distance of 700 meters which could contribute to development of the facilities of the port in a manner that would realize Ben Gurion's notion of reviving the Negev by providing water, directing youth vanguards and settlers to it and allocating funds, and of developing the port area for housing up to a million citizens (8).

Thus the port of Eilat at the head of the Gulf of al-'Aqabah has become a base for movement toward the west, to Suez and its gulf's oil, east via the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah, which is open to both the east and the north of the Arab Gulf, and south via the Gulf of al-'Aqabah, over which pass 25 percent of Israel's oil, 9 percent of its raw materials and 30 percent of its exports to the Bab El Mandeb, east Africa and south Asia.

All this is achieved from the premise of the "strategic understanding" with the United States (9), in affirmation of its role in the Western camp, which has the status of an alliance and makes it, with its traditional and nuclear combat capabilities, a hostile base concentrated on all the territories of Palestine to dominate the Arab region within the range of its jet fighters, as far as Tunisia, Musqat and Aden.

B. The front of Ethiopia:

The Bab El Mandeb lies in the heart of a region which is distinguished by the features of instability of its internal fronts and the escalation of the possibilities of a clash among the countries in it, adding to the risks of foreign intervention in its affairs.

In 1974, the fall of the emperor of Ethiopia triggered Soviet expansion in east Africa. In December 1976 and May 1977, the Soviets concluded two arms agreements with the new regime in Addis Ababa, supporting its stability in its theaters of confrontation.

In Ogaden, Ethiopia managed to stop the invasion the forces of Somalia had launched and forced them to withdraw in March 1978. As a result of the Soviet position of sympathy with Ethiopia and some Arab countries' encouragement of it, Somalia abrogated the treaty of friendship and cooperation and terminated the Soviet fleet's naval facilities.

In Eritrea, the forces of Ethiopia realized ongoing progress in spite of Egyptian aid and Sudanese facilities for the rebels. However, they have

failed so far to breach the last of their strongholds in Nakifa. The explanation for Ethiopia's tenacious hold over the region is that it provides it with an outlet which extends for 1,000 kilometers along the Red Sea and contains the ports of Assab and Massawa.

In the southern Sudan, the civil war continued during the sixties with the support of Ethiopia and the guidance of Israel, with the objective of creating circumstances of instability in the Nile Valley basin. In 1983, the rebels, after a letup of 10 years, resumed their activity, having irrigation and oil exploration projects as their targets. Starting in the early part of this year, they have had the towns of the south as their targets, while 2 million citizens have been suffering from famine.

In February 1986, Sudan redoubled its political and diplomatic efforts in the direction of halting the rebellion. The foreign minister stated that Eritrea was "an integral part of Ethiopia" (10). The Sudan also froze the economic integration agreement with Egypt and heightened its contacts with the Soviet Union. Egypt bolstered these efforts through its contacts with Ethiopia, although noticeable results were not realized, while the rebels continued the escalation of their activities.

Finally, on the other side of the Bab El Mandeb Strait, the situation in the southern Arabian Peninsula has continued to be dominated by tension and involve the potential for an explosion, since several thousand opponents of the current government in Aden are present on the territory of North Yemen, where their concentration at three centers along the borders between the two parts of Yemen and the outbreak of skirmishes between forces of the two countries have occurred repeatedly (11).

C. The Arab Gulf:

The Iraqi-Iranian war broke out in September 1980. In this clash we can discern something that goes beyond the two countries' goals and represents an international strategic dimension.

During the years of the Shah's rule, Iran amassed a copious amount of the most modern weapons to carry out the task of "protecting" the Gulf area. With the assumption of the reins of power by the revolution, it was no longer permissible, in the view of the West, for Iran to maintain the weapons arsenal, which might encourage it to become a base of operations aimed at dominance of the whole region.

It was also beneficial to draw Iraq into a destructive struggle in order to crush the Baghdad-Damascus axis which had fought the 1973 war and led the opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement and therefore to neutralize the land bridge which links the Mediterranean to the Arab Gulf and represents the route of the Soviet approach to the heart of the region.

The Gulf war has lasted 6 years so far, reflecting the balance between the two parties to the war, the failure of regional and international organizations to achieve a just settlement and the indifference of the major powers as long as their oil supplies continue to be guaranteed. Meanwhile the two

parties' losses have been estimated at 1 million killed in combat, 3 million people uprooted and \$416 million (12).

Richard Murphy, assistant American secretary of state, discussed that by saying, "Any victory won by either party is to be considered something unattainable militarily and undesirable strategically, because victory by either of the two parties will have its effects which will shake the stability of the entire region" (13).

In March 1984, the range of operations expanded when Iraq began the war of the tankers with the objective of suppressing Iran's exports and paralyzing its abilities to continue the war. Iran directed its reaction to the paralysis of Arab and international shipping in the Gulf through the Gulf of Hormoz. In July and August, the war extended to the challenge of shipping in the Red Sea.

In early 1986, the United States' anxiety over the security of the Gulf countries and the regular flow of oil increased. For this reason, George Bush, the American vice president, made a trip to the region in April, asserting his country's commitment to keeping the Gulf of Hormoz open and to stability in the Gulf countries, adding that his country would not wait for an "invitation" before deciding to intervene (14).

In July and August, Iranian officials revealed preparations to launch a broad attack and rejected the Iraqi peace initiative. For this reason, the United States decided to raise its oil reserves by 50 percent and store additional arms, equipment and provisions in its forward bases in Oman, in preparation for intervention in the region.

In early August, the American secretary of defense declared that the two superpowers had begun seriously to discuss a "joint effort" to halt the Gulf war "soon," that there was "great concurrence in their views," and they had a total conviction that they "had a number of things" by which they could halt the war (15).

In recent weeks, the Gulf war has come to have a new dimension, with the possibility being added to it of the breakout of a domestic power struggle in preparation for Ayatollah Khomeyni's demise. In spite of the choice of Ayatollah Montazari as his successor, it is well known that he cannot yet assert his power, in light of his "liberated" ideas (16), which Khomeyni and the extremists are not satisfied with.

Thus the tension in this vital region is escalating, since control of Iran is considered in effect control over the Gulf. Therefore, the American rapprochement is taking the interests of the Soviet Union and its recent diplomatic and political initiatives through the establishment of diplomatic relations with Oman and the Emirates and the resumption of commercial activity with Iran into account and it is striving for avoidance of a direct clash between the two great powers.

The Energy Front (Table One)

6. Over the course of three quarters of a century, the oil of the Gulf has played a vital role in strengthening the Western world's material progress

and guiding the world struggle. Thus it has in an essential manner contributed to defining the status of the Middle East on the world map.

The Gulf countries have more than half the world's oil reserves; these are estimated at about 370 billion barrels, as compared with 310 billion barrels outside the region.

Saudi Arabia plays a dominant role since its share comes to 170 billion barrels, accounting for 25 percent of the world's reserves. That will last it for 100 years on the basis of 1984 production.

Oil plays a dominant role in the economies of most of the Arab countries that export it. It accounts for 70 percent of Egypt's exports and 100 percent of Saudi Arabia and Libya's exports.

The world relies on oil to generate 42 percent of its energy requirements, while Europe's reliance on it comes to 48 percent. Thus the Western world's destiny is linked to the guarantee of oil sources and lines of communication.

In 1969 tension dominated the energy front when the government of Libya decided to raise its prices. Between 1973 and 1986 the world experienced three successive "oil shocks" which had extremely important political and social consequences:

A. During the October war, the OPEC organization, in what is considered the "first shock," decided to raise the per-barrel price by 70 percent, so that it would be more expressive of its real value. The Arab countries dropped their production by 5 to 10 percent and prohibited exports to America and The Netherlands, in support of the Arab military struggle.

The Western countries did not face this situation with their hands tied. Dr Henry Kissinger, the American secretary of state at that time, expressed that by saying "How can the industrial democracies regain control over their common destiny once again?"

In the following years, the Western countries embraced policies which were aimed at reducing their consumption of oil in general and reducing their reliance on the Gulf countries by developing new energy sources, as OPEC's share had come to 55 percent of the world's production in 1974.

B. In 1979, the world experienced the "second shock," as a result of the fall of the Shah of Iran and assumption by Ayatollah Khomeyni of power, the 40 percent decline in Iran's production and the rise in the per barrel price of oil to \$25. At the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war, Iraq's production dropped by 70 percent and the per-barrel price reached \$34.

The following year, the decline in world demand for oil began because of the decline of the economic growth of the industrial countries and the entry into effect of the measures these countries had planned at the beginning of the first shock. At the beginning of 1985, the OPEC organization's share had become 30 percent of world production, while the per-barrel price had dropped to \$28.

C. The third, countervailing "oil shock" came in December 1985, when Saudi Arabia decided to relinquish the role of "swing producer" by giving its production free rein in order to regain its share in the world market. This led to a collapse of prices to below \$10 per barrel; the OPEC countries lost \$100 million a day in the first 6 months of 1986.

In the face of this situation, the countries of the region arrived at a temporary agreement by virtue of which they set the organization's maximum production and each country's share, which would be in effect in the months of September and October, in the hope of raising the price to \$15 per barrel. Thus the organization passed through a crisis which almost eliminated the organization and international stability. At their current meeting, the countries of the organization have not been able to arrive at a long-range agreement.

7. These developments came to have their long-range results. With the drop in production, starting in 1981, the oil countries' income declined and a large portion of the reserves which had accumulated in the 1973-1982 period were depleted.

This resulted in a constriction in their abilities to finance their economic projects and social development plans, and their defense expenditures declined. Above and beyond that, their foreign aid and support to allied countries and combative organizations declined, and their reliance on skilled labor coming from outside the countries, which began to find their way back to their places of origin, also declined.

People's views differ over the likelihoods for the future. Some people estimate that the OPEC members will give their production free rein once again and increase the current world surplus, which is estimated at 200 million barrels, leading to a collapse in prices, especially in the circumstances of the current world economic recession. This is supported by a report presented to the governors of Arab central banks estimating that the Arab world has entered a stage of "permanent recession," characterized by the accumulation of their debts, which had reached \$60 million in 1985, and the period will be characterized, up to 2000, by a decline in the prices of raw materials and therefore average per capita income along with a 40 percent rise in population and an increase in food commodity imports (17).

In other assessments, the Western world's resumed increase in its energy consumption and reliance on Gulf oil by the mid-90's is affirmed. It is expected that the American market will derive 55 percent (instead of 30 percent) of its requirements from the Gulf, and the Soviet Union will import in order to satisfy its requirements. Thus the region's output will rise to 23 to 30 million barrels a day.

Underlining this approach is a statement by Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, former Saudi petroleum minister, which included his estimate that world demand would come to 50.9 million barrels a day in 1992 and the OPEC countries' production would rise to 20 million barrels, yielding an annual income of \$146 billion (18).

Arab Solidarity and Red Sea Security (Tables Two and Three)

8. At the beginning of the seventies, Arab attention to Red Sea security grew as a result of increased Israeli activity in the islands of Ethiopia facing the coast of Eritrea. In a series of conferences under the aegis of the League of Arab States, the decision was reaffirmed to arrive at a joint stand for countries of the Red Sea region which would realize cooperation and coordination among them and work to prevent the extension of the two superpowers' conflict to this region.

In 1975, the reopening of the Suez Canal helped reaffirm the interest of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in providing security for the Bab El Mandeb. In March 1977, the Arab countries concerned reaffirmed their interest in the realization of security and the exploitation of the resources of the Red Sea. Therefore, the League of Arab States, in September, affirmed the formation of a joint force of 6,000 troops directly subordinate to the military secretariat with the goal of maintaining the Red Sea as a zone of peace (19).

However, Arab anxiety declined as of 1978-79 because of the development of the Egyptian-Israeli political settlement process and socialist Ethiopia's termination of its cooperation with Israel. Thus the forms of Arab cooperation in this regard ended.

Since the fall of the Shah of Iran, since the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war in particular, the security of production and shipping in the Arab Gulf has become the object of the interest of the Arab Gulf countries, and in subsequent years this led to the planning and construction of a system of pipelines transmitting some Gulf and Iraq oil to the ports of the Red Sea, in an attempt to avoid passage through the Strait of Hormoz -- reducing reliance on the Bab El Mandeb (Table Two).

In July 1981, the Saudi pipeline connected to the port of Yanbu' began operating at a capacity of 1.6 million barrels a day alongside a natural gas line. Iraq, for its part, laid a line connecting the al-Rumaylah and al-Zubayr fields to tie into the Saudi line, with a capacity of half a million barrels a day. It is expected that the second stage of the project will be completed before the end of 1987 with the construction of a line to Yanbu' parallel to the Saudi line, with a capacity of 1.6 million barrels a day.

The suspension of pumping in the line crossing Syria in the summer of 1986 strengthened plans to upgrade the line constructed on Turkish territory and planning to construct a line extending to the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah. At present, a fleet of tankers is operating for this purpose, to transport cargoes, and this will, now and in the long range, increase the importance of the port, through which 1 million passengers passed between Egypt and the East in the course of a year, and will increase the burdens on Jordan.

9. In the middle of 1984, the subject of Red Sea security was raised in a practical manner, although that was in a limited context (20).

In June, in response to the inception of the war of the tankers in March, Rafsanjani, the head of Iranian parliament, declared that if the war of the

tankers in the Gulf continued, the war would move over to opposition to the oil countries' interests in the Red Sea.

In the months of July and August, a series of underwater explosions occurred, resulting in damage to seven ships in the Gulf of Suez and 18 ships in the Bab El Mandeb area. One of the tankers was sunk by an explosion, most likely internal.

In spite of the Islamic Jihad Organization's declaration of responsibility for it, America was accused of aiming at creating circumstances for intensifying its presence in the Red Sea along the lines of its presence in the Arab Gulf with the purpose of turning it into an "American lake" (21).

As a result of these incidents, and the possibility of their escalation, Egypt invited a number of Western countries to contribute their specialized units to an international effort aimed at clearing the Red Sea of mines. The United States and Britain, then France and Italy, responded to this invitation and embarked on their activities in the Gulf of Suez and the Bab El Mandeb in the direction of the Saudi coast.

On 22 August, the Soviet aircraft carrier Leningrad entered the Bab El Mandeb area, accompanied by a destroyer and preceded by two minesweepers. The following day, it was decided that an American aircraft carrier from the Indian Ocean fleet would go into the Red Sea, in a demonstration that was more political than military.

10. In the middle of August 1984, Egypt's foreign minister expressed the hope that an Arab conference would be held to carry out a unified action with the goal of guaranteeing the security of the Red Sea region, and he stated that Egypt was making contacts with some Arab countries situated on the sea for this purpose.

The Foreign Relations Committee of the People's Assembly expressed its assessment that "the time has come to set out a clear Arab strategy to protect this sensitive area from schemes to threaten its security and risks of disruptions to its stability."

In his latest speech on the occasion of the July 1952 revolution, the Egyptian minister of defense stated that one of the goals of the Egyptian armed forces was to guarantee shipping in the Red Sea, on grounds that it is "an artery vital to the Egyptian economy" [(22)].

At the end of September, the chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces, on the occasion of his visit to Yemen, declared that Egypt was not seeking to dominate the Red Sea and that it laid emphasis only on the provision of security in the Red Sea for international shipping. Egypt has commercial interests in the Red Sea, and threats to shipping in the Strait of Bab El Mandeb are to be considered threats to Egypt (23).

Egypt's interest in the Red Sea can be attributed to the consideration that it is the artery which feeds the Suez Canal. Therefore, upon the reopening of the canal in 1975, the authority concerned with carrying out the two

plans to develop it was established, and the canal is now able to accommodate all the ships in the world empty and 65 percent of them with their full cargo. Meanwhile its revenues came to \$1 billion in 1985-6.

The Sumed line between Suez and Alexandria adds 50 million tons of oil a year to the canal's capacity. The Gulf of Suez fields yielded 44.9 million tons in 1985-6. The oil reserves were estimated at the equivalent of 11 times production in 1984, requiring that much thought be given to protection of the future unless new sources of production become available.

Therefore, Red Sea security will remain a goal which it will be worth the while of the Arab countries looking out on it to realize, so that they may respond to the development of the course of shipping and the growth and prosperity of the new economic and industrial areas along its coasts.

This can be enhanced if peace is realized in the southern Sudan and the pumping of its oil to the Red Sea ports begins, and also if the discovery of oil along the extension of the African coast between Ethiopia and Mozambique and within the zone of the "valley" that comprises all of East Africa is realized -- above and beyond the start of oil production in commercial quantities and the increased potential for the discovery of oil in abundant quantities in southern Jordan.

Summary

11. In concluding my discussion of the Red Sea region, I would like to present a summary of it:

A. We are dealing with one of the most important and sensitive and least stable regions in the world. Therefore, security requires that we watch it closely, deal with its problems with concern, and always preserve freedom of action and flexibility of confrontation for ourselves.

B. In all circumstances, the Red Sea will retain its importance as an international passageway for security and commercial requirements, and this will emphasize the need to organize the security of the new economic areas within it and guarantee the freedom of shipping in it between Bab El Mandeb and Port Said, as a long-term strategic goal for the countries of the Red Sea region.

C. In order to bring this about, we must seek to neutralize the international struggle and competition in the region by devoting effort to political and diplomatic methods. In spite of the mediocre results of the Reykjavik summit conference, the recent signs of relaxation in East-West relations in general encourage confidence in us in the possibility of bringing about a reduction of the naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the western Indian Ocean, without disrupting the balance of the two great powers, by failing to provide them with new facilities and terminating the current agreements concerning them when their terms elapse.

D. The Red Sea region will for an extensive period remain central to the regional struggles over the Arab Gulf and in the Bab El Mandeb and the eastern Mediterranean.

With the need for the realization of a greater amount of solidarity and coordination among the Arab countries of the region in terms of their goals, international cooperation will be an important element in the liquidation of the causes for tension and struggle and the attainment of settlements which will guarantee people's legitimate rights and nations' essential interests in a manner which will guarantee the enhancement of progress and welfare.

E. It is difficult for us accurately to predict possible trends in the world oil market and the degree of stability inherent in it to allow for sound planning for the future.

Therefore, we must not go to excess in one direction or another; when we embrace one of the two approaches to action, we must take the possibility of shifting to the other into consideration.

F. Finally, it is true that solidarity among the countries of the region is unavoidable, in order that their tasks may firmly be assumed and cooperation organized among them.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in the Red Sea region, bear special responsibility for the realization of Arab goals, in view of the indisputable interests they possess and the complementary nature of their innate powers. Let conciliation between them be a foundation whose scope can expand to apply in general to the various regions of the area they bring together. On this subject, the Saudi monarch stated, "It is necessary that our efforts be joined in order that benefit may be derived from our possibilities and abilities and they may be put to use in the sound direction which will express the common will" (24).

Gentlemen:

While once again expressing my thanks and appreciation for attending this symposium, and your good reception, I hope sincerely that our efforts will conclude with a study of the issues which concern our Arab world, will provide officials with the distillation of free, objective thought and will be offering our masses new views concerning their issues.

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings.

Footnotes

(1) "Muhammad 'Ali and Europe," George and Rene Qatawi.

(2) "The Strategic Importance of the Red Sea," M. Sterner.

(3) It is useful to read the analytical articles included in TIME magazine, 7 April, 1986, L'EXPRESS, Paris, 18 April, and NEWSWEEK, 28 April, concerning new American policy vis-a-vis the struggles in the third world.

(4) Speech by Comrade Gorbachev, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 27 March 1986.

(5) President Jimmy Carter's memoirs, "Keeping Faith."

- (6) "The Gulf and Palestine in Soviet Policy," R. Khalidi.
- (7) Meeting between Egypt's ambassador in London and Mr Gordon Walker, British foreign minister, 1964.
- (8) "Israel's Policy in the Red Sea," "The Red Sea," Noah Lucas.
- (9) The Kuwaiti magazine AL-QABAS, 25 July 1986, on a study by Heritage House.
- (10) AL-HAWADITH magazine, 14 February 1986, and INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 20 January 1986.
- (11) AL-AHRAM, Cairo, from international news agencies, September 1986.
- (12) AL-AHRAM, Cairo, 30 July 1986, from M.E. Economic Service.
- (13) AL-TALI'AH magazine, No 50, 22 April 1984.
- (14) US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT magazine, 21 April 1986.
- (15) AL-AHRAM, Cairo, 8, 10 August 1986.
- (16) LE MONDE, Paris, 21-22 September 1986, Jean Gueyras.
- (17) AL-AHRAM, Cairo, 3 September 1986, and INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 19-20 July 1986.
- (18) AL-AHRAM, Cairo, 6 September 1986, Hobart Rowen.
- (19) Official Egyptian report.
- (20) AL-AHRAM, Cairo, July-August 1984.
- (21) Russian commentator, NOVOSTI agency, 12 August 1984, and AP agency.
- (22) Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, AL-AHRAM, Cairo, 22 July 1986.
- (23) Lt Gen Ibrahim al-'Urabi, AL-AHRAM, Cairo, 26 September 1986.
- (24) AL-AHRAM, Cairo, 7 July 1986.

Table One

Oil Reserves:

A. The world's oil reserves	680 billion barrels
Middle East reserves	370 billion barrels
Saudi Arabia's reserves	170 billion barrels
Kuwait's reserves	67 billion barrels

B. Estimates of the life of oil reserves (on the basis of 1984 production):

Kuwait	227 years
Saudi Arabia and Iraq	101 years
The Arab Emirates	80 years
Qatar and Oman	24 years
Egypt and Bahrain	11 years

C. The percentage of energy produced from oil, worldwide:

1960	43 percent
1973	56 percent
1980	50.6 percent
1986	42 percent
1990 (estimated)	43.4 percent
2000	24.6 percent

Sources:

ECONOMIST (July 1984, special issue)

US NEWS (December 1985, April 1986)

INTERNATIONAL POLICY (April, July 1986)

AL-AHRAM, Cairo (August, September 1986)

NEWSWEEK (December 1985)

D. OPEC production as a percentage of world production (millions of barrels a day)

Year	World Production	OPEC Production	Arab OPEC Production
1973	100	56	
1974	55.9	30.7	
1979	62.5	30.9	21
1981	56.8	22.7	15.7
1985	53.0	16.0	10.0
1986 (February)		17.7	
(July)		20.5	
(September-October)		16.7	
1992	50.9	20.0	(estimate)

Note:

Saudi Arabia's production came to 10.3 million barrels a day in 1981;

To 2.0 million barrels a day in 1985;

To 5.0-5.5 million barrels a day in 1986.

Oil Revenues (Billions of dollars)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Saudi Arabia	102.2	113.2	76.6	47.6	39.4
Arabs of the Gulf	171.6	160.0	112.5	78.8	71.2
Arabs of OPEC	206.7	186.7	134.9	99.3	89.8

Note:

The OPEC Arabs' revenues in 1950-1979 have been estimated at about \$500 billion; of this, three quarters of the overall income was in 1973-79.

Oil income accounts for 70 percent of Egypt's exports, 80 percent of the exports of Algeria and Kuwait, 90 percent of the exports of Qatar and the Emirates, 100 percent of the exports of Saudi Arabia and Libya and 98.5 percent of the exports of Iraq (1983 census).

Table Two: Development of Shipping Movement in the Red Sea via the Suez Canal

Data	1966	1976	1979	1983	1984	January 1985	January 1986
1. Number of ships in both directions	21,250	16,806	20,363	22,224	21,361	1,703	1,640
2. Volume of car- goes (thousand tons)	241,893	117,653	160,649	256,705	263,728	23,017	21,914
3. Northbound (thousand tons)							
Total	194,168	72,020	78,730	141,002	154,237	13,935	14,051
Oil	166,718	29,855	27,284	81,223	86,628	7,353	7,566
4. Southbound (thousand tons)							
Total	47,725	45,633	81,919	115,703	109,491	9,082	7,873
Oil	8,953	3,969	8,970	17,010	11,056	1,212	1,088

Observations:

Source, Suez Canal Bulletins. The 1985 annual bulletin has not been issued.

In the years 1982-83 to 1985-86, the volume of throughput in the Sumed line came to 50.5 million tons a year on the average.

A decline can be noted in the number of ships in transit in 1984, as a result of the July-August mining activities.

The rise in the volume of southbound transit reflects the increasing economic development process and projects in the Gulf region.

Table Three: Analysis of Transit Movement in the Suez Canal by Regions, January, 1986

	Volume (Thousand Tons)	Percent of Total
1. Volume of cargo in both directions	21,914	--
2. To and from Red Sea ports	6,486	29.6
To and from Arab Gulf ports	4,914	22.4
3. Saudi ports' share	4,567	20.8
Egyptian ports' share	1,510	6.9
Jordan's share	926	4.2
4. Volume of southbound cargo	7,873	
5. To Red Sea ports	2,360	30
To Arab Gulf ports	1,025	13
6. Volume of northbound cargo	14,041	
7. From Red Sea ports	2,126	29.4
From Arab Gulf ports	3,889	27.7

Source: Suez Canal Authority Bulletin, January 1986.

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WESTERN CONCERNS OVER BAB EL MANDEB REVIEWED

London AL-BAHITH AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 10, Jan-Mar 87, pp 27-32

[Article by Dr William Hale: "The Bab El Mandeb: Western Interests and Policies"]

[Text] The brief, bloody, destructive disturbances which occurred in January 1986 attracted the world's attention to the international political importance inherent in South Yemen and the neighboring Strait of Bab El Mandeb for a short period. However, hardly any time passed until it seemed as if everything had ended, and quickly Aden and the future of the Red Sea passageways disappeared from the limelight, even in the specialized press which concentrates on Middle East affairs. This chapter seeks to answer a question on whether there is some justification for such renewed neglect or whether the international importance of the strait and the countries adjacent to it is at a level which calls for the pursuit of an active policy regarding them on the part of the Western countries. Herewith is a brief summary of Western interests and benefits in the neighboring region, followed by a brief discussion of possible political options.

In the first place, it might be superfluous to say that direct Western interests in the five countries bordering on the Bab El Mandeb (that is, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and the northern and southern parts of Yemen) are strategic more than economic or political in any other sense of the word. There is oil in North Yemen, and there might be some oil reserves in South Yemen which are open to commercial exploitation, but neither of the two countries appears to be an important likely source of oil supply for Western markets. The oil discoveries might create striking changes in economic possibilities for the future for the two countries, but they will not have the same effect on the Western consumers, especially if the state of international oil abundance continues as it is now (1).

On the African side of the strait, the recent terrible drought has proved that countries like Ethiopia and Somalia are examples of cases open to international alms and not sources of wealth. With the probable exception of the role of Ethiopia in black Africa (which is a role subject to question in itself), none of the five countries exercises a degree of influence worth considering in its own geographical cultural context, as is the situation

with the two Yemens in the Arab world or Somalia and Djibouti in the African continent. No Western country has any non-strategic interests in the five countries which would make them a source of special attention (on a par, for example, with America's interest in the security of Israel). In other words, Western interests in these countries, like Soviet interests, are almost restricted in their strategic status to the northwestern corner of the Indian Ocean and the entrance to the Red Sea (2).

The Strait of Bab El Mandeb provides any country or countries dominating either of its two sides the probable ability to oppose the course of naval activity within the Red Sea and therefore cut off the main naval route passing through the Suez Canal to Western Europe from the Gulf, south Asia, the continent of Australia and its surroundings and the Far East. Unless passage through this route is open, the maritime routes will be much longer in some cases. For example, sailing from London to Abadan would require a voyage of 21,000 kilometers via the Cape of Good Hope rather than 12,000 kilometers via the Red Sea. About 30 percent of the oil shipments from the Gulf to Western Europe and North America rely on the Red Sea-Suez Canal route. The closure of the canal could mean a change in the patterns of marine shipment which would be somewhat expensive with the weakening of the commercial status of the oil producers in the Gulf. Non-oil trade would also be affected, because about 6 percent of the world's total trade moving by sea passes through the strait (3).

Ships must pass through the international territorial waters of North and South Yemen, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which are 12 miles in width. They are all countries which are signatories of the 1982 United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 17 of this convention allows the ships of all countries the right of innocent passage via territorial waters, although the countries situated on the coast can restrict the freedom of passage of warships (4). More important than that, regardless of the legal situation, there is an actual possibility of the closure of the Suez canal through the sinking of ships or the threat to sink them. Aside from probable control of this bottleneck, countries adjacent to the strait provide ground facilities for naval and air operations in the whole Indian Ocean for both the two great powers, and thus play an important role in the issues of the broader-scale security of east Africa, south Asia and so forth.

Primarily, the status of the Western countries in the adjacent region depends on the freedom available to them to reach the facilities in Somalia and Diego Garcia, as well as the firm relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In August 1986, Somalia signed an agreement with the United States giving the forces of the United States freedom to go to the ports of Berbera and Mogadishu. The most important American base in the region is the small island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, leased from Britain, which Mauritius claims. In addition to that, France has the right to go to the naval facilities in Djibouti, in numerous, though not permanent, circumstances. The firm relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia represent a benefit to the West, since the closest main Saudi air base lies in Khamis Mushayt, close to the borders with North Yemen. These benefits result in a countervailing situation analogous to that which the Soviet Union enjoys, the most prominent of which is its freedom to go to the facilities of

the port of Aden and Ethiopian facilities in the islands of Dahlak and Musawwa, in addition to the use of air bases in South Yemen (5).

All in all, the Western naval forces in the Indian Ocean are greater than their Soviet counterpart there. However, it is necessary to recognize the Soviet Union as the dominant foreign power in the area facing the Bab El Mandeb. The main credit for that goes to its strong relationship with Ethiopia and Yemen, in addition to the generally non-aligned position North Yemen assumes. In addition, one must remember that the balance between the two superpowers in this case is not an even one. On the one hand, there is the Soviet Union, supported by its local allies, and on the other hand there is Saudi Arabia, which one can describe as the local superpower, which has strong relations founded on interdependence between itself and the United States. The latter, in cooperation with other countries from the North Atlantic alliance, is active in the Indian Ocean. In other words, it is not likely that the struggles in the region will assume the form of direct face-to-face clashes between the two great powers alone.

Following this, there is a question which arises on whether the Western countries ought to have followed a more active and aggressive policy in the Bab El Mandeb area, in order to preclude the possibility that it might be closed off to them by the Soviet Union or local countries. For instance Nimrod Novik (a specialist in political science at the Center of Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv University) urges them to follow this policy, considers that "Moscow's colonies" in the area have brought their master abundant benefits and believes that the Arab reaction has not been effective. Novik says that the Diego Garcia base is too distant to permit the West to respond and intervene at the right time, and ends with the conclusion that a direct American presence "is no longer possible to avoid" (6). In a similar tone, Shimshon Zelnicker, professor of politics in the University of California at Los Angeles, criticizes what he considers is a negative American position vis-a-vis the Soviet presence in the region and the grant of permission to the Soviets "to dig their graves by their own hands in the Horn of Africa or any other place they choose in Africa" (7).

The fact is that this position was apparently dominant in the American reactions to the January 1986 crisis in Aden. It appears that the American administration, instead of intervening, preferred to stand by as an observer, listening to the testimony of embarrassment that had afflicted the Soviet Union as a result of the disturbances which befell the country, which was supposed to be its strongest ally in the Middle East. As an American diplomatic source said in a special interview, South Yemen "did not occupy a high position in our scale of priorities" (8).

Is this position one of excessive negativism and accommodation? Certainly, because it is not wise for the role in the Indian Ocean of the Western countries and their friends in the region to be allowed to disappear as a result of neglect and diffidence. On the other hand, it is wrong to exaggerate the Soviet Union's strength in the Strait of Bab El Mandeb or ignore the risks which the West might face from a more aggressive policy. In an area which is suffering from a high degree of instability, the policy of "watching and waiting" may have been the best one to follow, and events and probabilities

suggest that the Soviet Union's ability to inflict mortal harm on the West by closing the Strait of Bab El Mandeb might have been exaggerated by some commentators.

Events in South Yemen, to start with, prove that the Soviet Union's status there might indeed be subject to harm. In the view of Stephen Page (a specialist in political science at Sheridan collage in the city of Ontario, Canada), Soviet influence in Aden has been determined by the extremely factional character of politics in South Yemen. Page says, "Moscow was not able to influence Aden's policy to manipulate it in the direction of its interests when a large faction of the ruling group considered that these interests were not in keeping with those of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen" (9). The political instability in South Yemen could result in exposing the Soviet position in the region to mortal dangers in times of crisis. At the peak of the struggle which broke out in Aden in 1986, Moscow was able to maintain contact with its technical and diplomatic missions in South Yemen and the vessels in its fleets in the Indian Ocean only through the royal yacht Britannia, which carried out an impressive operation of rescuing foreigners from Aden. Even if the Soviet position is not shaken by crises of this sort, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is much smaller than that of the United States and its allies, and this might divert Soviet planners from the pursuit of policies which might provoke the West into carrying out retaliatory naval operations.

On the other hand, a careful study of the nature of the threat closing the Strait of Bab El Mandeb would impose is essential. Except for the size of the relatively small fleet which passes from the Indian Ocean to its final stations in the Red Sea, the freedom of passage through the Bab El Mandeb is of no value without a guarantee of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean pipeline, which has been proved in practice to be more lacking in certainty. The closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1974 showed that the Western countries and the oil producers in the Middle East could live without this route if they were so compelled. The fact is that the cost of the closure for the countries of the Red Sea themselves and the countries of east Africa and Asia are much greater than what the West will pay (10). The Soviet Union is also more dependent on this route than the Western countries for commercial and strategic reasons. This route has been described as of equal importance, for the Soviet Union, as the Panama Canal for the United States, since it provides a direct year-round connecting link between the eastern and western parts of the Soviet Union itself, as well as a route that is much shorter than circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope for the sake of contact among Soviet naval bases in the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean (11). If we take this into account, it is possible to view Soviet strategy in the Strait of Bab El Mandeb as defensive in the first place (or aimed at preventing its closure to the Soviet Union by countries hostile to it) more than it is offensive.

Thirdly, we must make careful arrangements if the littoral nations want to close the Bab El Mandeb, whether they actually can or not, and investigate the circumstances in which such a closure is likely to take place. If South Yemen alone, or in cooperation with Ethiopia, closes the Bab El Mandeb, it would be almost certain to face common military opposition from North Yemen

and Saudi Arabia. Since South Yemen withdrew the support it offered to the revolutionaries of the National Democratic Front in North Yemen in 1982, that would indicate that it does not desire to confront this opposition if it does not have complete support from the Soviet Union.

Current Soviet policy indicates that Moscow is anxious to develop better relations with the more conservative governments in the Arabian Peninsula. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan no longer represents the insurmountable obstacle it did in the past, because it appears that the countries of the Gulf are now prepared to agree that the invasion is not an initial Soviet step toward the dominance of the entire region (although these countries still truly oppose Soviet policy in Afghanistan on principle). If we agree that Soviet policy in other areas of the Middle East has the goal of soiling relations between the Arab countries and Washington, the Soviet Union apparently considers that there is a real chance of developing better relations with the countries of the Gulf. In a situation such as this, it would not be likely to encourage South Yemen to pursue hostile policies; rather, to the contrary.

Even if Soviet policy could change, it is not likely that Ethiopia or South Yemen would take the extreme measure of closing the Bab El Mandeb just to satisfy Moscow. On the other hand, it would not be in their power to do so without full support from Moscow.

In other words, we must assume that a strong, broad correlation exists between the interests of the Soviet Union and those of the countries looking out on the coasts of the Red Sea. Such a situation could arise in the event another large Arab-Israeli war broke out, but it is difficult for us to see how the closing of the Bab El Mandeb Strait could seriously influence the United States' ability to offer military support to Israel or invade the Gulf. There are ways by which the West can retaliate without crossing the nuclear threshold, the most simple at hand of which is to effect a kind of quarantine closing the Suez Canal to Soviet shipping (12). To state it succinctly, the picture (or scenario) which presupposes the closing of the strait by the Soviet Union and its local allies is founded on the premise of a major clash between the two great powers in the Middle East in which the freedom of navigation through the Bab El Mandeb would play only a secondary role at best.

Footnotes

(1) North Yemen's production capacity from the Alif field, near Marib, has been variously put at 300-600,000 b/d: it will require the construction of a 250 km. pipeline to the Red Sea, and will thus take several years to bring onstream. Her present consumption is tiny (put at less than 20,000 b/d), but she does not seem likely to become an exporter on the scale of the major Gulf producers. Some on-shore and off-shore exploratory drilling has also been undertaken in South Yemen, but no commercially viable strikes had been reported by the summer of 1986. (MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, 19 October 1985, p 51; 21 December 1985, pp 85-86; FINANCIAL TIMES (26 November 1984, p iv).

(2) For an analysis of Soviet interests, couched in somewhat similar terms, see Stephen Page, "The Soviet Union and the Yemens" (New York, Praeger, 1985), pp 8-10.

(3) Gerald Blake, "The Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf: Strategic and Economic Links," in Abdel Majid Farid, ed., "The Red Sea: Prospects for Stability" (London, Croom Helm, in association with Arab Research Centre, 1984), pp 86-89.

(4) Geoffrey Marston, "Potential Legal Problems in the Red Sea," in *ibid*, pp 58-59. I am very grateful to Dr. Gerald Blake for advice on this point.

(5) Blake, *op. cit.*, pp 90-91; Fred Halliday, "Soviet Relations with South Yemen" in B. R. Pridham, ed., "Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background" (London, Croom Helm for Centre of Arab Gulf Studies, University of Exeter, 1984), pp 216, 224-25.

(6) Nimrod Novik, "Between Two Yemens: the Soviet Challenge and Western Response," in Nimrod Novik and Joyce Starr, eds., "Challenges in the Middle East: Regional Dynamics and Western Security" (New York, Praeger, 1981), pp 39, 48-50.

(7) Shimshon Zellicker, "A Quest for a Foothold: The Big Powers in the Horn of Africa," in *ibid*, p 63.

(8) Quoted, Judith Perera, "The Rise and Fall of Ali Nasser Mohammed," "The Middle East" (London, monthly), March 1986, p. 6.

(9) Page, *op. cit.*, p 210.

(10) Michael Sterner, "The Strategic Importance of the Red Sea; a View from Washington," in Farid, ed., *op. cit.*, p 117.

(11) Fred Halliday, "The USSR and the Red Sea: Moscow's 'Panama Canal,'" in *ibid.*, pp 124-25.

(12) Admittedly, this would be a clear contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, governing access to the Suez Canal. However, this scenario assumes that the USSR and/or its local allies had already broken the UN convention on the Law of the Sea -- in other words, that the moral onus for the conflict was on their side.

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SOVIET SCHOLAR REVIEWS NATION'S STRATEGY IN BAB EL MANDEB AREA

London AL-BAHITH AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 10, Jan-Mar 87 pp 33-40

[Article by Dr Robert Markarian: "The Strategic Role of the Strait of Bab El Mandeb and the Soviet Union's Policy in This Area"]

[Text] The Center of Arabic Studies in London often presents a number of political studies on current problems in the region. This study presented to you, which sheds light on the importance of the Bab El Mandeb Strait, is not alien to this context.

Since the beginning of time, marine passages and routes have played a very important role in commercial and economic relations among various countries. Of course, the geographic location and natural circumstances of these passages determine their importance as strategic routes, since they assume basic status in linking oceans and seas and for the most part represent the shortest routes between two objectives. Indeed they might be the only route. Thus the Bab El Mandeb is one of the most important of these strategic straits, commercially and militarily.

The Strait of Bab El Mandeb, for long periods of time, was under the colonial dominance of the British and French imperialists. Now, the countries surrounding the strait, which lies within the territorial waters of North Yemen, South Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia, have of course come to control it. Because the strait lies in the southern Arabian Peninsula, where the entrance to the Red Sea is located, it thus connects the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, on the one hand, to the Mediterranean on the other. Thus, the important route from Europe to the Orient and south Asia, and also Australia, extends through this strait. Alongside the Strait of Hormoz, the Strait of the Bab El Mandeb is also used for the transport of oil from the oilwells in the Persian (Arab) Gulf area to its consumers in Western Europe, Japan, Europe and a number of other countries.

Perhaps a review of some facts and figures on this vital strait will show us the particular importance of continued organized, secure shipping in it to the interests of all the countries benefitting from it and also the countries indirectly surrounding it such as the Mediterranean region, the Red Sea basin, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean.

In this strategic area where the Strait of Bab El Mandeb is situated, a basic rule is in effect, freedom of shipping and also freedom of air navigation for all countries of the world, on an important condition, which is that no harm be inflicted on the countries directly surrounding it. Therefore, it was of utmost importance that all the countries directly surrounding the strait sign the joint agreement of 1982 which the third United Nations conference bearing on navigation approved.

The fact is that the result of the political situation in this extensive many-sided area which surrounds the strait is that shipping in it certainly does not depend just on respect for the rules and bases regulating its use, since the increase in political tension and military clashes among the countries surrounding the strait subject the freedom of shipping to a threat which could lead to a point where this important water artery which connects the destiny of many peoples is severed. Perhaps we have not forgotten the tremendous magnitude of the losses caused by the closure of the Suez Canal and the suspension of international shipping in it for a period of 8 years due to of the Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1967.

A number of problems and crises in the area of the Strait of Bab El Mandeb, some of which are directly connected to the countries of the region and others of which are connected to the international political balance of power, may have the effect of setting off the situation in this strategic area of the world.

In order for us to describe the Soviet Union's position on the problems of this region and means of resolving them, we must make an in-depth analysis on two levels, the international and regional level. As regards the former level, this densely-populated strategically-situated area has been turned into an arena of struggle and military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, a conflict which might not just take place by means of traditional arms but could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The fact is that the cause of this tense situation is the natural consequence of the American administration's attempt to impose the policy of an iron fist not just on direct American-Soviet relations but also by alleging what they call vital American interests in all the areas of the world. In light of the relative strategic military balance between the two great powers, the threat of an outbreak of a nuclear conflict on the international and regional levels has become possible. Nonetheless, the leaders of Washington are tirelessly trying to escalate matters, especially on the regional level. Thus this theory known as the new globalism, whose essence is restricted to America's attempts by various means, especially through military pressure, to expand its scope of influence in the various areas of the world and help the regimes subservient to it and at the same time eliminate regimes whose policies are hostile, has made its appearance.

These notions and theories, with respect to the Bab El Mandeb area, have led to an expansion in the American military presence, embodied in tremendous maneuvers and training exercises close to the coasts of independent countries, their provocation and the threat of the use of the force of arms on other countries in the area if they do not cease pursuing their independent policies. Another example which is not far at hand is the American military

assault on Libya, and many examples could be listed to describe this policy, which does not just oppose the stability of conditions in the region, but, more than that, complicates every solution to its problems. This may be sufficiently clear.

With respect to the Soviet Union, it has played and still is playing a prominent role to prevent this area of the world from being used in a confrontation between the two great powers, in addition to its concern for the stability of conditions in it and maintenance of its economic growth. In addition, the route holds special significance for the Soviet Union in the area of its domestic economy, as this region is situated close to its southern borders and the only ice-free naval route connecting the Soviet European region to the Far East passes through it.

The Soviet Union, at the 27th conference of the Communist Party, proposed a comprehensive international security system including support for the stability of conditions in the Mediterranean and the Persian (Arab) Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union has always, indefatigably, stated that it considers that there are no important reasons for the permanent presence of its military fleets in this region and therefore the current presence of its fleets is only a response to the presence of the American Sixth Fleet, armed with nuclear missiles, which threatens the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. Therefore in the event of the withdrawal of this American fleet, the Soviet Union will withdraw at once.

These proposals were reaffirmed in the Soviet Union's letters to the secretary general of the United Nations with respect to the withdrawal of the American and Soviet fleets from the Mediterranean basin and an agreement on mutual trust between the two countries, the reduction of armaments and the withdrawal of ships bearing nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, in addition, encourages the policy of the governments of the Indian Ocean area on the establishment of a zone of peace in it.

It is well known that in the years 1977 and 1978 American-Soviet discussions were held concerning the reduction and limitation of arms in the Indian Ocean area as a prelude to the termination of the military presence there. However, America deliberately broke off the negotiations in February 1978 when the Soviet Union replied that it had asked that they be continued; on each occasion there was a rejection from the American side. The United States is still trying to obstruct the holding of an international conference "under the supervision of the United Nations" regarding the Indian Ocean, because it knows in advance that this conference's resolutions will be against its policy in this region.

In addition, the proposals the Soviet Union presented in December 1980 on the conversion of the Persian (Arab) Gulf area into a demilitarized neutral zone, which would constitute a solution for improving the situation in this explosive region and help play a beneficial role to turn the Arab Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea into a zone of peace, as was stated in the proposal of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, are well known.

The instability of conditions in this region could lead to the closure of the Strait of Bab El Mandeb, which would lead to a negative situation in the international context.

This study now comes to the second, "regional" level, in order that we may view the region's problems in the light of its international relations and aspire to understand some of the dangerous crises, such as the Arab-Israeli war and the Iraqi-Iranian war. In my opinion, it is necessary to arrive at an agreement in principle among ourselves on classifying these crises as local ones limited in form, because we cannot view them without giving thought to the role of foreign forces which influence events.

In my view, the Arab-Israeli and Iraqi-Iranian crises have a direct link to the subject of the research paper and ways of our understanding it.

Who, for example, can guarantee that the Strait of Bab El Mandeb and the region surrounding it will not become an object of an Israeli attack?

The bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the outskirts of the Tunisian capital, and Israel's declaration that it has the right to strike any Arab country when it sees a need to do so -- at a time when it is carrying out a propaganda campaign in the American style to bring about the conviction that it is seeking the stability of the region and the guarantee of the right of all its peoples to live in peace -- all this leads us to the conclusion that the question we set out in advance is not to be considered just purely academic or theoretical.

The Iraqi-Iranian war represents another unstable situation, since it is likely that the arena of the struggle and the oil tanker war will expand to include the whole Persian (Arab) Gulf area and become an overall war, which will result in the closure of the Strait of Hormoz to international shipping. What is happening in the area is taking place near the Strait of Bab El Mandeb and has the effect of negatively influencing the use of this important naval artery.

In addition to that, the Arab-Israeli crises and the Iraqi-Iranian war, without exaggeration, affect the international interests not just of the peoples of the Middle East region but of the majority of the countries of the world, and the widening gap in the disputes among the belligerent powers increases the danger of an expanded outbreak of fighting outside the region. Therefore it is necessary to pause to consider these crises in detail.

Although the Arab-Israeli crisis is now passing through a period of "quiescence" and does not threaten the outbreak of an extensive war, this "quiescence" harbors the danger of a future war which will be more dangerous than any other war the region has gone through, in the event of the failure to reach agreement on a resolution among the countries involved in the crisis, and this will of course lead to the spread of this danger to encompass other countries. On the other hand, in the event of the failure to settle the crisis, and a continuation in the increasing arms supply and development, that will lead to the possession by the countries of the region of nuclear weapons -- although we assume that Israel, as is well known to all, actually

has such weapons, which will prompt some Arab countries with a leading role to proceed to acquire nuclear arms.

In addition, the Arab-Israeli crisis has resulted in the outbreak of crises in other countries such as the Lebanese tragedy, the increase in terrorist ideologies and so forth. It is well known to all that the main reason for the failure to settle the Middle East crisis is Israel's refusal to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967 and also the rejection of the Palestinians' legitimate right to self-determination.

In addition to that, the policy of the ruling circles in Israel is based on settlement on the occupied territories and prevention of any efforts which will have the effect of solving the crisis and trying to arrive at a "solution" through them.

This firm policy which Israel is adopting is still continuing in spite of the attempts of the Arab countries and the Palestine Liberation organization to arrive at a resolution of the crisis and work to restore stability to the region.

Israel's aggressive policy is to a great extent dependent on American support and backing -- support and backing which lie behind all the aggressive Israeli behavior which is shaking the region. Washington's objective through its policy is not just to work to guarantee Israeli military supremacy over the neighboring Arab countries but also to support American influence through exploitation of the situation of growing crisis in this vital region, and indeed exploitation of Israel itself in confronting the Soviet Union. The strategic cooperation agreement between it and Israel and the grooming of Israel for a role which it will perform in the star wars program are evidence of this.

The experience of recent years and the events that occurred during them have affirmed that the policy of separate solutions which America embraces for the normalization of relations in the region have not just proved their failure but indeed have led to the expansion in Israel's aggressive policy and preparation for the Lebanese tragedy. In addition, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, which was abrogated awhile ago, helped make the situation in Lebanon more explosive than it had been.

Washington and Tel Aviv have not ceased encouraging the policy of separate solutions; rather, they are trying to draw Jordan into it by terrorizing it with the prospect of an Israeli aggression against it and enticing it with economic "aid" such as a Marshall Plan for the Middle East, by virtue of which a tremendous amount of money would be offered in the form of "economic aid" to Israel and Arab governments which express a readiness to normalize their relations with Tel Aviv. However, such a Marshall plan has not been fated to succeed; even America's allies in Western Europe have not seemed enthusiastic over it, expressing their belief that such a plan has no future.

As an alternative to the policy of separate solutions, collective cooperation is necessary on the part of all the countries concerned to solve the

crisis on the basis of the legitimate rights of each. That is what the Soviet Union has been calling for for many years, and continues to call for, in order that a comprehensive peace may be reached in the Middle East, and it is the appeal which was reaffirmed in the Soviet peace plan announced on 29 July 1984.

It is very clear that there will be no settlement to the struggle without a just resolution to the Palestinian problem, which is the basis of the Arab-Israeli crisis, and that the majority of the Palestinian people, who are demanding all their national rights, including their right to establish their national government, after which the Palestinians can then determine the form of their relations with the neighboring countries, among them the possibility of a confederation with Jordan, are not in accord with the road Israel is trying to follow, with support from America, to "resolve" this crisis.

Even if we imagine that the Israeli-American "solution" to the problem will be imposed on the Palestinian people, we can say that it is a "remedy" which will lead to an increase in extremist ideologies and thus will make the Middle East region remote from stability.

The Soviet Union believes that the best way of solving all the problems which are related to the crisis is the call for an international conference under the supervision of the United Nations with the participation of all the countries concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization. We of course are speaking about an acceptable long range development, not a single action; this would require full preparation on the part of all entities and the Soviet Union, the United States and the countries with permanent membership in the Security Council would have a special role in it in preparing for the holding of this conference. The Soviet recommendation considers that the composition of the bodies of this conference should be flexible, so that cooperation will take place in the context of working groups which will deal with the problems of principles and, in emergency situations, with the maintenance of contacts within the conference on a bilateral basis, provided that agreement take place gradually so that measures related to a specific point will not begin before an agreement on it is reached. Thus, the Soviet Union is calling for an effective formula for the discussion of the problems of the crisis and at the same time is giving a period of time for agreement among the parties concerned.

The importance of arriving at a resolution to the Middle East crisis is the object of understanding of the majority of the countries of the world. When Israel and America understand this fact, it will be easy to achieve peace and security in the Middle East, and this will help the amelioration of the international situation.

With respect to the Iraqi-Iranian war, it is distinguished by a special character with respect to the regional crises at the present time in terms of the scope and ferocity of war operations, the magnitude of losses in the military struggles, the magnitude of tremendous human and material losses and the minor international attention devoted to this problem and the creation of a solution to it.

The main reason for the continuation of this war is Iran's rejection of any compromise solution. At the same time, there is evidence that the government of Israel and some governments of the West are not intervening to resolve the crisis and more than that are readying the conditions to help its continuation. Here we must note that the continuation of this war will lead to nothing but the fanaticism of the regime. America's interest in the continuation of this war may be ascribed to the following causes:

First, it will weaken all potential for an Arab confrontation of Israel.

Second, it will revive American hopes regarding the spread of American influence among the countries of the region.

Third, it will add to the American military presence in the region.

With respect to the peoples of Iran and Iraq, they do not want this war, which is producing nothing but losses.

The rapid termination of this war is a preoccupation of everyone who is concerned with peace, stability and security, and the Soviet Union, which from the beginning was against this war when war operations were inside the borders of Iran and also when these war operations were then inside the borders of Iraq, encourages these.

Let us resume discussing the Bab El Mandeb in terms of the importance of the events of January 1986 in South Yemen, which have not greatly affected its security. A military clash occurred which led to the killing of large numbers of people and economic losses, but this did not affect the course of shipping in the strait and it did not lead, either, to the exacerbation of instability in adjacent countries. In addition to that, the leaders of South Yemen took the proper decision for emerging from the predicament; at present, the republic is trying to repair the damage which was inflicted on its economy during this tragedy. However, some imperialist countries, headed by the United States, tried in the course of the crisis to exploit the opportunity to intervene in Yemen's domestic affairs in the hope of changing its independent foreign policy of hostility to imperialism which had striven to restrict the American presence in the region.

These schemes were not fated to succeed, although they affirmed once again that this strategic region is considered an important one for the imperialist circles which are still hoping to dominate it. The Soviet Union, during the Yemen events, took a position of principle not to intervene, thereby inviting other countries to follow its example.

I had wanted to state that the Soviet Union, with respect to the countries surrounding the Bab El Mandeb, is proceeding with its strategic policy, which rejects intervention in internal affairs and calls for encouragement of the establishment of normal relations among the governments of the region and guarantee of their nonintervention in one another's affairs. Attesting to that are the conclusions of the visit of the Soviet Communist Party central committee delegation in July 1986 to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia and the Yemen Arab Republic and the Soviet Union's desire

to normalize its relations with Djibouti, Somalia and all the countries surrounding the area, including Saudi Arabia, with the thought that the development of Soviet-Saudi relations can occur through the concurrence of major international views, including of course a just settlement to the Middle East crisis and the situation in the Persian (Arab) Gulf. There are of course people obstructing the development of these relations, but that is not the case with respect to the Soviet side, which is anxious to reduce difficulties. As we see it, Soviet relations with the countries of the region are progressing. In September 1985, diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Emirates. This progress in diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the countries of the region has led to emphasis on the negation of imperialist propaganda which has sought to keep the Soviet Union from taking part in solving the problems of the region and at the same time to expand the imperialist monopolies and control of these rich oil countries, which occupy an important strategic position in this region of the world.

Now, will the Strait of Bab El Mandeb retain its importance?

Assertions have been made by some observers that the decline in the price of oil on the world market will lead to a decline in the quantities of oil transported via the Strait, but I am not in agreement with this view or enthusiastic about this idea, for the following reasons:

First, because the slack demand for oil will not continue for a long time. In accordance with International Energy Agency forecasts, demand for oil will increase in the latter part of 1986 over the 1985 level by about 700,000 barrels (TIMES, 9 April 1986). Also, there are long-range assertions and forecasts of an increase in demand and consequently an increase in production. The English National Westminster Bank expects that a barrel of oil will increase in 1991 to \$22 (GUARDIAN, 20 April 1986, p 20). The American Department of Energy also expects that the per-barrel price will rise in the mid-nineties to a price ranging from \$22 to \$23 (FINANCIAL TIMES, 25 April 1986, p 3).

Secondly, the strategic importance of the Bab El Mandeb is not just to be reckoned by the volume of oil passing through it; this importance is also reckoned by the increase in exports and imports in the world, prompting us to believe that the importance of the Bab El Mandeb with respect to the international community will increase.

As the countries of the world view the development of events in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea basin, the Persian (Arab) Gulf and the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union believes that collective cooperation, good will and respect for the interests of all can impose stability and security in this region, and this will assuredly support world peace.

SUDANESE SCHOLAR DISCUSSES CIRCUMSTANCES IN STRAIT, HORN OF AFRICA

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[Article by Dr Muhammad Bashir Hamid: "The Struggle in the Horn of Africa and the Security of the Bab El Mandeb"]

[Text] One

The Horn of Africa derives its strategic importance from its unique geopolitical position. It controls the southern entrances to the Red Sea at the gate of Bab El Mandeb and looks out over the northwestern shores of the Indian Ocean. It is close to the sources of oil in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, and also is adjacent to the areas of conflict in the Middle East and the Nile Valley basin.

The roots of the current crisis in the Horn of Africa lie in the conflicting notions of national identity and national unity among the countries of the Horn and the countries adjacent to it and the major countries' attempts to control its strategic locations, thereby exploiting the regional contradictions among the countries looking out on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. These countries, which are striving to realize their national interests, have found themselves linked with the regional and international powers by temporary alliances and relations which are at times intertwined and at other times contentious. The development of the struggle from one of differing nationalities with contradictory interests into a regional struggle has in turn led to the intervention of international powers.

In Ethiopia, attention is concentrated on preservation of the territory which historically has lain under Ethiopian dominance and guarantee of the Ethiopian entity (the "Ethiopia" of the past) in the face of the geographic expansion of the Arab nation in the Horn of Africa (represented by the Arab and Islamic affiliation of Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea). On the other hand, Somalia has deliberately unified and annexed territories whose inhabitants speak Somali under the banner of "Greater Somalia."

While the national objectives and security motives of both Ethiopia and Somalia have been easy to define, that is not simple and clear with respect to the other regional powers connected in one form or another to the struggle

in the Horn of Africa. The Arab countries have not acted in accordance with a unified Arab strategy based on the principle of joint Arab action. The inconsistency in Arab behavior is a natural result of Arab policies, which are founded on the basis of an inadequate understanding of national security, built on the realization of their narrow interests, indeed sometimes on the interests of the ruling regimes in them (which are not of necessity in correspondence with their national security requirements). Plainly, therefore, it is not strange that the policies of the various Arab countries should contradict in varying degrees not just one another's policies but also their domestic and national interests and the interests of the countries of the Horn of Africa, which are essentially in conflict. (For example, the security of the Red Sea, in the case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and South Yemen.) There often is a confusion in the notion of national security, and a connection is made between national security and national interests and policies. National interests rise gradually in importance in a pyramidal manner. At the apex of the pyramid are centered higher interests, which do not admit of negotiation or indifference. In this case, national security motives require the guarantee of these interests, even if that leads to the outbreak of war (Ethiopia's interests in Eritrea, Somalia's interests in the Ogaden region, the Sudan's interests in preserving its geographic boundaries and Egypt's interests in guaranteeing the waters of the Nile). There are interests which have their national importance although the effort to realize them might cause extreme harm to the country's national security if they conflict with the higher interests of another country (the Sudan's interests in the establishment of an independent country in Eritrea, which conflicts with Ethiopia's national interests), and there might be important national interests which the country does not have the military, economic or political ability to realize. In this case, the attempt to achieve them will constitute national folly which could have harmful effects on national security (Egyptian intervention in the war of Yemen and its role in the setback of the June 1967 war).

These contradictory conceptions of the notion of national security have in their turn led to the deepening and complication of the problem of nationalities in the Horn of Africa and have given the struggle underway there new dimensions which have gone beyond the national nature of the problem to a regional character in the struggle, and therefore to its internationalization.

Two

The regional struggle and international intervention have been characterized by two unique phenomena. The first of them is that change in domestic regimes in a number of countries that are parties to the struggle has not changed their fundamental notions of the bases of their national interests. The socialist regime in Ethiopia is trying to realize some of the goals which the feudal regime of Haile Selassie itself paved the way toward realizing. That has led to the appearance of constants and variables in its policies regarding regional and international dealings. On the one hand, it has oriented itself to alliance with the Eastern bloc and Cuba (and with Libya and South Yemen), and on the other it has retained the ties that link Ethiopia to Israel. National interests embodied in challenging what is

called "Islamic encirclement" have led to the maintenance by Ethiopia (under two different regimes) of contacts with Israel, which has had an interest in finding a route into the extension of the Red Sea for itself in order to dissipate what it has called the "Arab blockade" mounted on it.

The second phenomenon is that the actual source of the national alliances on the regional and international levels, while on some occasions assuming an ideological character, has been self-interest, regional balances and strategic considerations. Therefore, these relations have been characterized by drastic fluctuations and the rearrangement and redistribution of roles in a manner strengthening the positions of the countries in alliance. These variables and conflicting or intertwined alliances have deepened the Balkanization of the struggle in the Horn of Africa and, alongside the diverse changes which have determined the position of the Soviet Union and the United States concerning both Ethiopia and Somalia, the regional powers which are connected by international alliances to one of the two blocs have also rearranged their regional roles. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which had been afraid of the socialist orientation Siad Barre's regime posited in its initial years, has become more afraid of the Marxist regime in Ethiopia and its alliance with the Soviets. Therefore, it has become prepared to support Somalia, on condition it relinquish its socialist slogans (1). With respect to Kenya, with its capitalist system and its Arab leanings, it has found that its interests in resisting Somalia's expansionist ambitions have caused it to grow closer to Marxist Ethiopia. This ideological contradiction has not created any perceptible change in the Kenyan position, although the situation, from the Kenyan point of view, would have been more congenial and comfortable if the regime loyal to the West had survived in power in Ethiopia. In the northeast of the continent, Egypt has shifted from enmity to alliance with the Western camp, especially the United States, and the Cairo-Riyadh axis, to which the Sudan became subordinate after the change in its political orientation (not its ruling regime) in the middle of the seventies, was formed to revolve in turn in this orbit of America influence. (In view of the strong ties which linked the two regimes, one can say that the shift in the Sudan's position after the change in the Egyptian position was not merely a coincidence.) Perhaps the complexities of the situation in the Middle East following the Camp David agreements, which have politically isolated Egypt in the Arab world, have weakened the axis of alliance with the West in the Middle East and consequently have weakened the possibility of an effective Arab challenge to the course of events in the Horn of Africa. One contradiction might be that at the time the diplomatic exchange and normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel began, the African countries were requested to continue their boycott of Israel in the name of Arab-African solidarity. It is not strange in this situation that many African countries did not rebuke Ethiopia for restoring its dealings with Israel; indeed, the African countries have started to review the severance of relations with Israel, and the early signs of this have appeared with the resumption of the Israeli infiltration of Africa, first through the back door and later directly, especially in the African countries loyal to the West (beginning with Zaire).

On the other hand, across the Bab El Mandeb from the Republic of Djibouti, which received its independence under the protection of the French military

umbrella (2), South Yemen, after the failure of the plan of federation with North Yemen, oriented itself toward alliance with the Soviet bloc, and the port of Aden became a bridge for the transmission of Soviet aid to Ethiopia, while North Yemen retreated to put itself under Saudi protection.

Something close to Arab consensus existed regarding support for the Eritrea liberation movement for a number of reasons, perhaps among the most important of which was the provision of security for the only part of the Red Sea coast which a non-Arab country (Ethiopia) controls and containment of the effects arising from the firm relationship between Ethiopia and Israel. There also is the feeling of sympathy that the Eritrean cause is part of Arab national concerns (which is part of what is repeated about the Arabhood of the Red Sea). However, the elimination of the feudal imperial regime and the establishment of the Marxist regime in Ethiopia unleashed many contradictions within the Eritrean liberation movement and the Arab view of the Eritrean cause. The Marxist leadership of the Eritrea Front (EPLM) found itself fighting a regime which raised the same revolutionary slogans it had promoted in order to attract the support of the movements and countries resisting colonial influence and its "reactionary" agents (3). This led to the occurrence of a rift and fragmentation within the Eritrean liberation movements, which weakened their combat effectiveness and the magnitude of their capacity for political movement, and the change in the position of some Arab countries hostile to the Western camp vis-a-vis the Eritrean cause. Libya and South Yemen shifted from a position of support for the liberation of Eritrea to an attempt to play the role of an intermediary to find a peaceful solution to the problem of Eritrea which in reality is a liquidation and sellout of the right of self-determination the Eritrean groups are demanding.

It is worth referring here to the negative role the Eritrean cause has continued to play in Sudanese-Ethiopian relations. The Sudan, by virtue of its contiguity to Eritrean territory, has become a basic rear base for the Eritrean struggle and its territories have become a place of refuge for massive numbers of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. The Sudan started to open up its territories to the Eritrean liberation front as part of Arab national action which classified the Eritrean causes as part of the causes of the Arab struggle raging at that time under the leadership of Nasirist Egypt. Perhaps imperial Ethiopia's sensitivity toward what was repeatedly stated in the Arab media concerning the Arabhood of the Red Sea increased because of the statement being reiterated that the Sudan supported the establishment of an independent state of Eritrea to deprive the secessionist Anya Nya forces in the south of their most important points of provisioning and arms supply and the automatic resolution of the struggle of the borders with Ethiopia following the establishment of the new country. After the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement bearing on the southern Sudan in 1972, relations between the two countries witnessed an improvement of sorts, which occurred in conjunction with the rift between the Soviet Union and the Sudanese regime. However, after the outbreak of the revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 and the eruption of the problem of nationalities and the internal struggle for power, relations deteriorated once again and their flames proceeded to disappear at times and flare up at other times. At times the ruling regime in the Sudan suspended Eritrean activities within Sudanese territory, at times it

accused Ethiopia of interference in its domestic affairs, and at times it threatened the use of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees to shake the Ethiopian regime. The mutual defense agreement of 1976 between Egypt and the Sudan, which was basically oriented against Ethiopia and Libya, may represent a true index of the deterioration which Sudanese-Ethiopian relations had come to (4).

In the wake of the Ethiopian revolution in 1974, a short time before the outbreak of the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977, the Soviets found that they had to choose between Ethiopia and Somalia after the impossibility of reconciliation had become apparent through the continuation of parallel relations with two countries whose interests clashed to the point of war. The Soviets laid their bet on the lion of Ethiopia, and as events proved subsequently, it was a successful bet, although it was hedged about by risks when it was taken. The Ethiopian option with respect to the Soviet Union was based on a number of considerations, among the most important of which were:

First, Ethiopia's strategic situation was more important than Somalia's, and possible acquisition of naval facilities in Massawa and Asab greatly exceeded the facilities they had in Berbera in Somalia.

Second, the Soviets had the fear that their presence in Somalia would result in their being militarily implicated in Somalia's regional ambitions (an attempt to annex the regions of the Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya and realize the dream of a greater Somalia).

Third, the Soviets estimated that their presence in Ethiopia would give them the initiative in extending their influence in the adjacent strategic areas (the oilfields in the Gulf).

Fourth, from the ideological standpoint, Somalia's socialist experiment did not go beyond the mere raising of socialist slogans, in comparison with Ethiopia, where it appears the Soviets were convinced of the possibility of establishing an influential Marxist party. The appearance of the importance of the party's role in guaranteeing Soviet strategy and implanting scientific socialism is concentrated on the Soviet Union's previous experiences in its dealings with the countries of the third world, and the Soviets' bitter experiences in Egypt and the Sudan showed that reliance on rulers who raise socialist slogans does not constitute an adequate guarantee that a revolution will not occur and these rulers will not turn away from the Soviet Union if they decide suddenly to renounce the socialist orientation (Egypt) or to renounce the socialist transformation because of their rebellion against the Soviets (the Sudan).

The importance of the Soviet alliance as far as Addis Ababa is concerned lies in its being able to restore control over the Ogaden and attempt to extend its sovereignty over the Red Sea coast looking out over the Bab El Mandeb. Perhaps it is important for us to remember that the Ethiopians did not have scope for a better option than the Soviet one, at a time when instability was the major feature of the internal situation after the bloody struggle for power, in a situation in which Somalia (whose army, anomalously, was armed and trained by the Soviets themselves) had mobilized to move,

seizing the appropriate opportunity by which to invade Ogaden. The urgent military need for alliance with the Soviets was not just for the sake of protecting the new regime; rather, it had its ideological justification, in appearance at least, in implanting the socialist notions the new rulers of Ethiopia were promoting (5). The Soviet and Cuban interventions were a basic factor in the resolution of the Ethiopian-Somali struggle in Ogaden. Somalia found that the Western countries and their allies in the countries hostile to the Eastern camp, which had encouraged it to make a rift with Moscow, were not totally ready to offer enough military support for it to be able to take over Ogaden in the face of the Ethiopian counterattack supported by the Soviet Union and its allies among countries hostile to the West (Cuba, Democratic Yemen and Libya). The Somali regime had expectations that support would flow to it from an axis consisting of Saudi Arabia, Iran (the Shah) and the West; however, these expectations were not supported by a proper interpretation of the political and military situation in the regional and international contexts. The Soviets' alignment with Ethiopia has achieved some of their strategic goals. They have taken the initiative in the Horn of Africa and now have a strategic bridge extending from Mussawa via the Bab El Mandeb to Aden in South Yemen. The Soviet leadership has also proved the seriousness of its commitment to its allies and has managed to put the West in a position where it can take countervailing action only if it treats the Soviet presence in the area as constituting a basic disruption in the universal strategic balance between the two blocs in a manner which makes it necessary to challenge it. It appears that the United States has arrived at a conviction that the linkage between Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa and sensitive East-West issues might not lead to the complication of bilateral relations and consequently obstruct the course of the policies of detente and agreements to limit international strategic armaments (SALT).

While foreign intervention has been a decisive element in the rearrangement of regional and international balances, the political map which has been derived from it has not been in the interests of Somalia and the countries allied with it. More important than that, the African position has for the most part turned out to be supportive of the Ethiopian party and a large number of African countries have not accepted Somalia's argument that the Somali-Ethiopian borders were not drawn up internationally in the period of colonialism but arose as a result of imperial Ethiopian expansion. One can interpret the Ethiopian position in isolation from the Ethiopian-Somali struggle. The border issue constitutes a sensitive state of affairs for a number of African countries which are enduring regional struggles or secessionist movements. As a consequence, any change in the borders the African countries inherited at independence will constitute a regional precedent which might have negative consequences as far as other countries go. Therefore, it has been the African view that Somalia, through its invasion of Ogaden, committed aggression against Ethiopia's international borders, giving Ethiopia the right to counterattack with the aid of its allies in order to defend its territories. This thinking has imparted a sort of regional legitimacy to the Soviet-Cuban intervention. The same cause may have prompted the Western camp to hesitate to support Somalia militarily (or at least find justification not to intervene). Also, Somalia has not met with support from the block of Islamic countries which are connected to the West by military, political and economic relations (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Sudan and

Iran), while it has met with some from Arab countries which have relations with the Eastern bloc (Iraq and Syria). This aid has all in all been minor in comparison with the intensive Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia (6).

At the same time, the Soviets and their allies have accused the Western camp of provoking its agents who are regional neighboring forces to establish a regional security system in the Red Sea and the Gulf so that the West will thereby be able to dominate the region. What cannot be doubted is that the roots of the Soviet Union's fear of the establishment of any hostile bloc in the Red Sea may be attributed to the permanent preoccupation of Russian strategy, since the time of the Czars, to guarantee the attainment of warm water outlets. The Red Sea, to the Soviets, means guaranteeing the route connecting their fleets situated in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

Four

Ethiopia, in Soviet strategy, is considered a key to the realization of their goals in Africa, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. These may be summarized by four main points:

First, the spread of the Soviet Union's political and economic influence in ways which are in keeping with its magnitude as a great power with a global strategy.

Second, The effort to reduce Western influence.

Third, The realization of the Soviet Union's security and political interests.

Fourth, resistance to the theoretical ideological and political challenge China poses to Russian influence in the region (7).

The question whose answer remains dependent on the factor of time is, can the Soviets maintain their alliance with Ethiopia in the desire to realize Soviet strategic goals? There are a number of major factors which must play an important role in this regard. There is the composition of the ruling party, on which there is a conflict in views between the two sides. The Soviets want a strong vehicle which can accommodate the Marxist elements and lead to the strengthening of their influence in the region, while the leaders of the ruling "Dergue" in Addis Ababa want an organization that is subordinate to the Ethiopian leadership rather than controlling the composition of this leadership. There also is the question of military supplies and the need for further military support, which will remain as long as the tense relations between Ethiopia and its neighbors, and its mutually antagonistic minorities, remain, leading to the accumulation of debts owed to Russia by Ethiopia, with its fragile economy, with the result that it becomes a heavy burden the Soviets cannot bear. Whatever the circumstances may be, it is difficult to classify the Ethiopian president as a "puppet" in the hands of the Russians which they can manipulate as they want. Events have proved that he can stand up to the Soviets and the Cubans (8). Studies which try to analyze Soviet activities are based on two theories. The first is called the

theory of the grand design; this holds that Soviet intervention has changed the balance of power in its favor in the area of the Horn, which is considered the artery of Western economic interests, and that Soviet movement has occurred in accordance with a comprehensive plan which is being carried out in a firm, stage by stage manner. The second is the theory of opportunism, which considers that the record of Soviet activity does not indicate that such a grand design exists but is opportunistic and acts in reaction to events, especially when Arab schemes fail and deficiency and confusion in them is apparent (9). In any event, the Soviet Union has become a real power in the Horn of Africa possessing real interests in the Bab El Mandeb.

On the other hand, we find that the basic points of emphasis of the United States' policy are no less opportunistic and that it does not lack a "grand design." The containment policy has been the United States' major concern and it has established a group of military alliances to contain the Soviet presence in various areas of the world. There is no doubt that its goals, as embodied in the defense of Israel and the guarantee of the flow of oil to its allies in the West, drew it to the Red Sea region and strengthened its connection to the imperial regime in Ethiopia in support of its oil interests in the Arab Gulf countries. After the rupture with the new regime in Ethiopia, the American administration considered it appropriate to follow a wary policy vis-a-vis Somalia as regards the struggle in the Horn of Africa. Perhaps one of the most conspicuous reasons for this is that the American administration did not want to become drowned in the sea of Somali regional aspirations. It also was clear that American thinking has been governed by an earlier conviction that the relationship between Moscow and Addis Ababa is based on flimsy ground (10). In addition to this, a strong connection with the Mogadishu regime may expose American-Kenyan relations to danger. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan came as the turning point in American policy in the region; in the United States' view it is aimed at wrecking the Western presence in the region of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula (11). It decided, in accordance with what was called the Carter Doctrine, to establish a rapid deployment force to protect the region and deal with any hostile Soviet activities with the requisite speed.

The countries allied with the Western camp started to coordinate militarily to look after their interests under the umbrella of American protection. In this context, the United States, in participation with forces from Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia and Oman, has held what are called the Bright Star maneuvers and supplied Saudi Arabia with early warning (AWACS) airplanes. The American aggression against the Libyan Jamahiriya and the constant provocation of it in the Gulf of Sirt have occurred as part of the American scheme to shake the Ethiopia-Libya-South Yemen alliance. Although these activities have not transcended gunboat diplomacy, they show the anxiety over Soviet activities to which the American government started to succumb in the wake of the Russian intervention in Afghanistan. During the period of President Reagan's administration, the United States has started to view the struggle in the Horn of Africa in the context of the comprehensive nature of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the essence of American strategy can be viewed in conjunction between the United States' international policy of containing the Soviet Union (and the military alliances which were established for this purpose) and the eruption of

regional crises in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, northwestern Africa and southern Africa. One of the effects of this linkage might be that the United States deals with regional problems as part of a grand international strategy (undifferentiated globalism).

The Arab countries' interest in the area of the Horn of Africa and the Bab El Mandeb arises from their struggle with Israel in the first place, the regional struggles in the second and competition in the Arab arena itself in the third. Nasirist Egypt may have been the first Arab country to be aware of the importance of the Red Sea and the Bab El Mandeb, not just in the confrontation with Israel but also in the resolution of certain Arab struggles as well (intervention in Yemen). That brought Egypt into struggles with a number of countries looking out on the coasts of the Red Sea. While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's policy has been to work to eliminate and remove the communist threat from the Red Sea and Gulf area, the development of the struggles in the Horn of Africa has assumed a countervailing trend and created a strong Soviet presence in Ethiopia. The Soviets and the Cubans culminated their victory in Angola and Mozambique with rapid movement in the Horn of Africa and have become an influential factor in African policy and the regional balance. Even in the Arabian Peninsula itself the Soviets have managed to strengthen their position in South Yemen, especially in the strategic port of Aden. With the formation of a tripartite alliance among Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, an axis of alliance with the Soviets came into being from North Africa across the Horn to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The explanation for the contradiction in Saudi policy may be that its alliance with the United States has not succeeded in creating a peaceful resolution to the Palestine cause, with which the Soviets are in sympathy, while their fear of the Soviet presence in the region of the Horn, which the United States shares with them, has become realized. As regards Iraq and Syria, their position reflects the basic contradictions in Arab policy and the blatant enmity between them has increased in severity instead of having their domestic conditions and foreign orientations reduce them. Internally, each of them raises united ideological slogans and externally each of them is linked to varying degrees of alliance with the Soviet Union (12). These internal conditions and foreign orientations have not alleviated the asperity of the blatant enmity between them; to the contrary, they have increased its heated nature. Like most Arab countries, as far as the struggle in the Horn of Africa goes, Iraq and Syria support the Eritrean cause but their position departs [sic] from the context of moral support. Iraq, which could have played an influential role on the stage of Arab action, especially with the absence of Egypt due to the peace treaty with Israel, has found itself engaged in a destructive war with Iran which has preoccupied it and alienated it from carrying out any effective role on the Arab and international levels. As for Syria, it has intervened in the political and regional struggles in Lebanon which, for its part, has assumed a form of Balkanization which is no less complicated and contradictory than the situation that pertains in the Horn of Africa.

As for Israel, although it occupies a narrow space in the Gulf of al-'Aqabah, it considers the Red Sea a vital passageway from the security and commercial standpoints (oil supplies) (13).

The Israeli role now operates in two main directions:

First, escalation of the struggle in the area of the Red Sea and the effort to internationalize the Strait of Bab El Mandeb.

Second, support for its relations with Ethiopia, to prevent the success of the Eritrean revolution, and exploitation of the Red Sea to break the political and economic boycott the Arab countries are trying to impose on Israel in Africa and Asia (14).

With respect to Egypt, the isolation which has befallen it since the signing of the Camp David agreements has limited its leading role and political activity, but as far as its geographical and political position is concerned, the struggle in the Horn of Africa, which infringes on Egypt's basic interests directly, [verb missing]; any threat to the sources of Nile water constitutes in reality a direct threat to the artery of life in Egypt. While the Strait of Bab El Mandeb is the southern gateway to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal is its northern entrance, and in addition there is the security importance of the Strait of Tiran and the Sharm al-Shaykh area. There is an Egyptian conception, which the Western camp encourages, that considers that the scope of Soviet strategy and [that of] its two local allies (Ethiopia and Libya) is aimed at containing Egypt and striking it through its southern wing in the Sudan, and this conception views the Sudan as Egypt's security and strategic dimension. With respect to the Sudan itself, it has problems and interests in common with Ethiopia which make it inevitable that it reach a suitable formula for peaceful coexistence. The relationship between the two countries for the most part has depended on a negative policy which is founded on the theory of mutual deterrence through mutual blackmail. (Ethiopia's support for movements resisting the ruling regime in the Sudan and the Sudan's support of Ethiopian and Eritrean movements resisting Addis Ababa.)

When the people's upheaval took place in the Sudan in March-April 1986, the Sudanese government tried to improve its country's relations with Ethiopia, driven by three considerations:

First, containing the effects arising from the war in the Sudan from the political, economic and social standpoints.

Second, alienating the Sudan from the struggles of the Horn of Africa.

Third, limiting the flow of refugees who play a negative role from the social, economic and security standpoints. In another area, Sudanese-Libyan relations have improved while Egyptian-Sudanese relations have been suffering from apathy and that has not been matched by any perceptible improvement in the Sudan's Ethiopian relations. Ethiopia has continued its support for the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement, which has not arrived at a permanent agreement with the new authorities.

The failure to come up with a suitable formula for solving the endemic problems in the Sudan and the escalation of military operations in the south have had the effect of leading to a review of the Sudan's current orientations. On the one hand, the Egyptian "option" could be more attractive, in the sense that Khartoum will return to firm alliance with Cairo. On the other hand, the Sudan could bet on Libya's playing the role of intermediary

to improve its relations with Ethiopia. Whatever the situation might be, the orientation, whether it is toward Ethiopia or Egypt, must be linked to the policy of setting the Sudanese house back in order and arriving at a kind of national consensus which will be acceptable to all the conflicting parties in the Sudan.

Five

The effort to realize the national interests of all the parties concerned in the Horn of Africa means of necessity thwarting the interests of some other party. No change in the political map in the region can take place except at the expense of some other party or parties in the regional and international contexts. Therefore, there has been a competition to win over allies, and this in turn has led to the internationalization of the struggle. In the context of this explosive situation, whose contradictions have been increased by the radical changes in the countries of the Horn of Africa itself, the processes of breaking the bonds, relinquishing the old alliance and attempting to create new balances are going on.

The Horn of Africa's location has come to have major importance in the great powers' strategic thinking, and a re-evaluation of their ability to defend their interests in the regions of the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and create new priorities for the developments in the Horn of Africa has resulted from that. Dealing with these developments through the policy of challenge and a corresponding response leads in turn to a change in the essence of the struggle from one of ethnic groups to a war by proxy, which could drag all the parties into an overall war in which the security of the areas of the belligerent nationalities and the area concerned would become a marginal matter. This portends that war by proxy will be a characteristic of the struggle in the area of the Horn of Africa for generations to come. They will seek refuge in the hopes and dreams of struggling national groups on behalf of independence or the creation of the national empire, and the whole region will stand waiting for a new Yalta to redraw the areas of world influence and the international boundaries of nations, as the Berlin Conference did a century ago.

Footnotes

(1) Bereket Habte Selassie: "Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa" (Monthly Review Press, London, 1980), p 129.

(2) Djibouti constitutes an important port for Ethiopia, since 60 percent of the imports and 40 percent of the exports pass through this port, causing the Ethiopians to view Djibouti as a passageway to the Red Sea of maximum strategic importance. See: "The Horn of Africa," INDEPENDENT JOURNAL (Vol 5, No 1, 1982). From the standpoint of Somalia, its interests in Djibouti are political in the first place, since any Somali government, however its political and economic ideology might differ, must devise the necessary means and guarantees for preserving the rights of the Somalis, who account for 60 percent of the people of Djibouti, as compared with the Afar minority. This is what has caused Somalia always to ask that the Somalis be given the right of self-determination.

(3) In the view of a number of Ethiopian intellectuals, the revolutionary transformation in Ethiopia has revealed the falsity of the Marxist mask some Eritrean leaders have worn, since after the end of the feudal regime loyal to the West, the cause was no longer an issue of nationalities (Ethiopia or Eritrea) but became an issue of the common class transformation of the Ethiopian and Eritrean peoples on the road to socialist transformation.

(4) The Sudan's position on the Ethiopian-Somali struggle, which has reflected the position of the Arab countries, aside from Libya and South Yemen, has had negative repercussions in Arab-African relations, as some African media view it. FRISCOPE, in its editorial in September 1977, wrote "Among all the outsiders to the Ethiopian-Somali struggle, the intervention of the Arabs is the most influential and serious. Some Arab countries, those enflaming the fire of regional conflict, claim that they are part of Africa. The Sudan, in a meaningless phrase, boasts that it is the 'bridge' that links the African and Arab worlds, but the Sudan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries aid Somalia in its imperialist scheme against Ethiopia and the Sudan claims officially that the problem of Eritrea differs from the other secessionist movements in Africa, without stating how and why it is different. It appears that with respect to the Arab countries African unity begins where Arab brotherhood ends."

(5) There may be more than one similarity between the situation in Ethiopia before the revolution (a feudal regime) and after the revolution (regional ideologies and an armed invasion) and that in Russia before the Bolshevik revolution (a quasi-feudal regime) and after the revolution (a civil war and foreign intervention). A similarity also exists in the position of the church relative to the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie and with respect to Russia under the rule of Czar Nicholas the Second.

(6) Egypt has moved some units of its armed forces to Somalia and Iran (under the Shah) declared its readiness to send air units. However, the Organization of African Unity asked the Shah not to intervene in the African struggle. The fact is that the position of Iran (under the Shah) stirred up sensitive feelings among many African countries due to Iran's relations with the racist regime in South Africa and its status as the main source of oil shipped to South Africa. Colin Legum and Bill Lee, "Crisis in the Horn of Africa," CONTEMPORARY RECORD, Vol 10, 1978, p A38.

(7) Colin Legum, "The Africa Environment," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, Vol 27, January-February 1978, pp 1,2.

(8) Paul Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, May-June 1981, pp 58-61.

(9) See B. H. Selasse, Op cit., p 133.

(10) Perhaps the American view that Ethiopia will become the Soviet Vietnam is expressive of this conviction.

(11) Godfrey Morrison, "Zone of Contention," AFRICA GUIDE, 1980 p 75.

(12) Although Iraq has started moving to improve its relations with Egypt and the Western camp, that is one of the effects arising from the Iraqi-Iranian war.

(13) Israel's interest in the waterway of the Bab El Mandeb may have been clear when it insisted that Egypt remove the blockade it had imposed on the Bab El Mandeb after the 1973 war before signing the separation of forces agreement. See John Duke Anthony, "The Red Sea and Control of Its Southern Entrance," MAGAZINE OF GULF AND ARABIAN PENINSULA STUDIES, January 1976.

(14) Amal al-Shadhili, "Israeli Ambitions in the Horn of Africa," INTERNATIONAL POLICY, No 45, p 53.

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FORMER EGYPTIAN DEFENSE MINISTER REVIEWS PROBLEM OF STRAIT

London AL-BAHITH AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 10, Jan-Mar 87, pp 53-61

[Article by Amin Huwaydi: "The Bab El Mandeb and Arab National Security"]

[Text] Issues of Security and Reality

1. In discussing the subjects of national security, there are two basic factors one must observe:

A. Dealing with pure facts and actual abilities. Here the discussion must express what exists and not what we wish would exist. Utopia is politically fatal.

B. While the map of actual conditions is the determinant of security evaluations, one must not rule out the ability to change it through creative concepts and exploitation of the various circumstances of change in our favor, even if they are not propitious. The understanding and evaluation of the balance of forces and the effort to change it are the vital heart of the national security process.

Therefore, we may pause before the title of the subject we have dealt with in past times: it is not possible to treat the Bab El Mandeb in isolation from its surroundings, and there is no doubt that there has always been general agreement over this fact. That is the core of what one could call the "strategic bloc." This has been apparent in my writings, which include the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arab Gulf and the territory around them, constituting the Arab strategic hinterland, in this form -- the shape of a Z, whose upper horizontal line is the Mediterranean (an enclosed sea whose gates are Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and the Bosphorus) and lower horizontal line is the Gulf of Aden and the Arab Sea (which is connected to the Arab Gulf, and whose gateways are the Bab El Mandeb and the Strait of Hormoz) with a slanting vertical line connecting the two horizontal lines which is the Red Sea (whose gateways are the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, the Strait of Tiran to the Gulf of al-'Aqabah, and the Bab El Mandeb or Gate of Tears, as the ancient mariners called it, to the open sea in the Indian Ocean). Therefore, it has special importance with respect to the security of the following:

The security of the Arab countries as a whole.

The security of the Red Sea Arab countries in particular.

The security of the Red Sea countries, that is, the non-Arab Red Sea countries as well as the Arab countries.

The security of the world powers.

These circles of security are connected and intertwined, their center of gravity is the Horn of Africa and their focal point is the Bab El Mandeb, on which maximum attention to security for all the parties is focused. The world powers are trying to guarantee this through a presence in the focal point, along with control of the open seas, since whoever controls those can control the enclosed sea and dry land at the same time.

The region or strategic bloc is as similar as can be to the Nile Valley area, since there are two points which one cannot separate, indeed, which require precise rules governing the pace of movement throughout their length -- the region of the sources of the Nile, which is the region of the great lakes and the tributaries, and the region of the Nile's course, to the point where it flows into the Mediterranean. It is not possible to separate the two regions in any way and our lives, that is, those of the countries situated on the Nile, are interconnected by a single thread. The region of the sources, as far as oil is concerned, is located in the area of the Gulf and its surroundings, but the region of the waterway crosses over the Arab Gulf to the Strait of Hormoz then to the Far East or the Arab Sea and the Bab El Mandeb to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, and is what we have called the communication zone. Therefore the region of the sources is a strategic unit that is integrated with the communication zone, requiring a single strategic conception regulating the laws of production and the laws of the movement of production through the communications zone. One should remember that if any power wants to cause disruption in the sources, it would be best for it to cut the communication zone completely, as happens in the canal. Action against the fronts is best taken through the severance of its lines of communication.

As a result of this importance, Robert MacNamara pointed out, "The Maghreb and the Horn of Africa will be considered those areas of Africa which most provoke our attention from the strategic standpoint, because North Africa covers the southern wing of the Atlantic treaty while the Horn of Africa stands at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean." (Sazzini Uman-shin), Italy's foreign minister in the early 19th century, pointed out that the key to the Mediterranean lies in the Horn of Africa, since during the extension of colonialist competition, especially among Britain, France and Italy, in the 19th century, France challenged Italy in Tunisia and Italy, with the aid of Britain, and occupied Mussawa in order to adopt it as a base for extending its influence in Ethiopia and Darfur in the Sudan to Tripoli on the Mediterranean, which Mussolini in the forties of this century tried to do, and which we call the one-armed Manshen strategy.

Therefore it is not permissible to discuss the Bab El Mandeb in isolation from the strategic bloc of which it is the focus. From the standpoint of the

treatment of facts, we might also wonder what the title "symposium on Arab national security" means. Is it something that exists or is it a hope that is sought after? Is it out of the question or something that is possible? Does the signing by eight [sic] member countries of the Arab League automatically become a cause for the realization of these countries' collective security? (The countries we are talking about are Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the two Yemens, Somalia and Djibouti.) Is it because the total population of these Red Sea Arab countries is close to 100 million and their general view might perhaps be the same regarding the Red Sea they look out over? Is that enough for us to determine that they have a unified national security strategy? There is a very strong motive for this. Israel looks out on the Red Sea for 7 miles, which is the entire width of its coast on the Red Sea, and there is Ethiopia, which looks out over 400 of the total 2,000 kilometers of length of the west coast of the Red Sea (the whole east coast is Arab). That is, there are three different nationalities and we cannot say that their view of this sea is the same. These are the Arab, Ethiopian and Zionist nationalities. Moreover, there are three different religions -- Islam, Christianity and Judaism.

Islam in the region is a great raging sea surrounding a Judaism of limited numbers and a Christianity which, throughout its history, has felt that it is a small island in the midst of a broad sea of Islam. This creates a rapprochement, for which a cause and basis exist, between Israel and Ethiopia, whether in the time of Haile Selassie or Maryam. Moreover, there is a conflict of interests and there are hot spots.

The Arab-Israeli struggle.

The Ethiopian-Somali struggle.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean struggle.

The serious, indeed extremely dangerous events in the southern Sudan.

Moreover, in the far east, there is the Iranian-Iraqi struggle.

In the context of the worldwide struggle, there is a race between the two superpowers for control of all the outlets in the region. There are two great reserves, one being the reserve of petroleum in the Gulf in the communication zone, then the reserve of raw materials in Africa, especially South Africa, in its communication zone. Attempts are underway to become concentrated not just in the Bab El Mandeb but also in the north and the south of it, where the nuclear and traditional fleets exist along with the bases, facilities and establishment of rapid deployment or central command forces, as they have come to be called now, which they require.

Although the two superpowers' goals are clear, obvious and specific, and although Israel has defined and declared its strategy, one cannot say that there is a single, defined Arab strategy in general or in the context of the Red Sea Arab countries in particular. Polarizations in the international context are not one and the enemies on the regional levels are not specified and not given the same priority as far as the parties are concerned.

Moreover, more serious than all that, Arab political decisionmaking is absent, and that is the basis of national security, which has many facets and which some people might consider out of the question in the light of the current circumstances, for a substantial period of time.

This point specifically raises a large subject of which mention has been made in connection with the Arab League.

Some people have pointed out that the Arab League can carry out some measures. That cannot happen in the current circumstances the Arab League is going through, since the league lacks will and the movement of collective action in the most minor contexts, and we cannot assign it what it cannot do; one who is lacking something cannot give it. The Arab League cannot reappear in the form it held in the past. If the Arab League reappears, it will do so in a better form and with different kinds of will. Had we become more modest, it would have been possible for us to deal with the Gulf Cooperation Council or with the current "Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement" as a scenario, provided that we not ignore our ability to develop and rectify international conditions in the near or distant future -- that is, dealings regarding this subject would be in accordance with numerous scenarios:

The scenario which deals with the current reality as it exists.

The scenario which deals with the situation in the short term, as we hope it will be.

The scenario which deals with the situation in the long term as we hope it will become.

The variables:

1. The first of these variables is the continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war for a period of 6 whole years. It is not possible to specify the date of its conclusion or the means by which it will end. That has influenced the magnitude of the dangers to which oil is exposed at its sources, and indeed in its passageways, by the strikes on convoys in the Strait of Hormoz and the mining of the lines of communication, as happened in the Red Sea. A decline in Egypt's revenue from the Suez Canal resulted from that because the oil which transits the Red Sea to the Suez Canal has been small, proving that the situation there is just like the theory concerning vessels granted free passage -- freight shipping rates increased. More dangerous than that, there is Iran's threat of expanding the scope of the war.

Here we have a question:

What is the effect of the method and the form by which the fighting will end on the region's security? What if Iraq wins the war? What will be the effect of that on the situation in the Gulf region? What will be the effect of that on the Gulf Cooperation Council? How will this victory be exploited in behalf of Arab national security?

Another question: What if Iran wins? What will be the effect of that on the balance of forces? What will be the effect of that on security in the oil

sources or the communication zone? What will be the effect of that on the Arab-Israeli struggle?

2. The continuation of the war and the threat to the communication zone in the Strait of Hormoz has created what we have called the strategy of pipelines. Oil pipelines have been laid in the region as if they were waterways or channels across Saudi Arabia, to avoid the "troika of the straits" -- Hormoz, Bab El Mandeb and Suez. Pipes have been laid from the sources in Saudi Arabia to Yanbu' on the Red Sea, and Yanbu' has become a great industrial complex including:

Two oil refineries;

A natural gas processing and liquefaction plant;

A petrochemical complex;

Oil and natural gas export terminals.

This line's capacity will expand subsequently in accordance with a plan that has been set out. Iraq, in view of the impossibility of the passage of its oil through Syria and the inadequacy of the volume of oil which passes in the pipeline through Turkey for meeting the expenses of the war, considered that it should think about laying a pipeline to al-'Aqabah (but the fate of this line is still unknown, and if this line is built it will be at the mercy of Israel, even under the umbrella of international guarantees in general and American ones in particular) and, as an alternative to that, laying a line from the source of oil in the fields of the south to link up to the Saudi pipeline, and thus bring Iraqi oil alongside the Saudi oil to Yanbu' on the Red Sea.

Here, we must remember the following:

A. There is an Egyptian pipeline from 'Ayn al-Sukhnah to Sidi Karir on the Mediterranean to transport oil there (the Sumed line).

B. Yanbu' lies across from Ra's Binas, the Egyptian port on the western side of the Red Sea, where the Egyptian authorities have denied a decision to give any bases or facilities to the United States unless an Arab country so requests.

Here we wonder whether it is possible for the Yanbu' line to be connected to the al-Sukhnah line by an underwater line, with a branch line passing from Ra's al-Sukhnah on the west coast of the Red Sea to Ra's Binas.

On that subject, there is a natural gas line which Algeria has laid to Italy and there are negotiations to extend branches of it to France and Spain. This line was constructed without fanfare to deal with the Siberia gas line, which has caused great anxiety to the United States, in fear that Western Europe would be connected to sources of energy from the Soviet Union to eliminate the dangers of the Arab Gulf and the Strait of Hormoz as a result of the Iraqi-Iranian war.

There is serious thought on the part of the Gulf countries to lay a gas line to Khawr Fakkan on the Arab Sea, a small port that has been readied with piers and infrastructure for this purpose, and Iran is laying a pipeline to the east to new ports to do without transit through the Strait of Hormoz as well.

These variables pose a number of questions:

What is the effect of this pipeline strategy on the security priority of the Bab El Mandeb?

What is the effect of this strategy on Egypt's Suez Canal revenues?

Has the theory of East of Suez which the West adopted, after 'Abd-al-Nasir eliminated the British base in the canal following the Suez aggression of 1956, lapsed and have things returned to their previous state?

Has the Red Sea regained priority in importance, as all signs affirm?

The major question is, what is the position of us Arabs on these variables? Have we made preparations to cope with them?

3. Other variables with respect to the Israeli position:

A. After Camp David, all Egyptian coasts became secured as far as Israel is concerned, and it is being bruited about that Israel has intensified its presence in al-'Aqabah and the Red Sea.

1. It has numerous guard vessels equipped with Davar missiles produced by local industry and also Rishif vessels equipped with domestically manufactured Gabriel missiles.

2. Its air forces are supporting this force from the airports of the Negev; on the basis of the Camp David agreement the United States has built two air bases in the Negev which are considered the most modern of their kind. Anyone who reads the US comptroller general's report for 1983 can learn the details of this subject.

In the absence of the Egyptian navy, the Arab naval forces in the Red Sea have come to need urgent support.

B. Before the October war, Israel succumbed to a false illusion of security with respect to its trade with East Africa, since it dominated the Gulf of al-'Aqabah, and it considered that any infringement of its interests in the Gulf would in effect be the declaration of war against it and would require that it carry out a preventive strike. However, after the October 1973 war it woke up to the importance and danger of the strategic Arab Horn, if used boldly and wisely, and found that even though the Islands of Tiran and Sana-fir dominated the Gulf directly, that would not guarantee the continuation of shipping to it since by effecting the strategy of the indirect approach of the point of passage of the Bab El Mandeb 2,000 kilometers to the south or any point on the Arab coasts which control the sea from the east and west

[rest of sentence missing]. The blockade of the Bab El Mandeb caused the shutdown of the refineries in Haifa and Ashdod and the suspension of the Eilat-Ashdod pipeline, since Israel provides only 10 percent of its oil requirements and Israel reduced its exports of citrus by 30 percent and the volume of its cement and phosphate exports by 50 percent to its markets in East Africa and the Far East.

C. After the Camp David agreement, on the basis of a special annex on oil, Israel was assured its requirements of oil from Egypt and it imports all its requirements of Egyptian oil. Thus, it has assured oil which cannot threaten its lines of communication. We must remember that these lines were not assured even when it occupied Sinai, since we carried out the operation of striking the rig Kintaj in the port of Abidjan in 1970, which it had leased to resume drilling operations in the Gulf of Suez, and our special forces destroyed some oil installations in the Sinai field and Eilat.

D. Israel turned the Eilat area into a free port to take the place of Hong Kong after agreement between China and Britain to shift sovereignty over it to China in the mid-nineties. If to that we add its progression to a new stage to eliminate the effects of the situation after the 1967 aggression by restoring its relations with the African countries and concentrating on exports, we will realize that the Bab El Mandeb accounts for increasing importance as far as Israeli strategy goes.

E. Israel has established itself as a nuclear country. In our book "The Arab-Israeli Struggle between Traditional Deterrence and the Nuclear Deterrent," we previously dealt with the information bearing on nuclear Israel which the SUNDAY TIMES recently published. It is prepared on the one hand to assume its responsibility as a regional great power and at the same time to venture toward normalization with the countries of the region, especially after its steps with Egypt in this direction.

F. This point specifically has prompted it to aspire to participate in joint exploitation of the Red Sea with some country, especially after the signing of the agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Sudan on 16 May 1974 for the joint exploitation of the natural resources in being on the ocean floor in the common area between them. The resources the agreement included are non-organic ones, including hydrocarbon mineral resources, and a joint independent authority was formed to carry out the agreement whose headquarters are Jiddah and whose financing is Saudi, with the provision that the financing be recouped from revenues.

Although information stresses that such investments have yielded no returns, there is no doubt that they will stir up Israel's appetite to establish its presence. As shipping has been opened up to it in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of al-'Aqabah and has become guaranteed in the Red Sea to the point where sources assert that its forces are present in Greater Hinsh and Lesser Hinsh Islands, which are 136 kilometers from the Yemeni coast, it will demand to participate in the exploitation of the Red Sea resources.

We must raise the following questions:

What would happen if Israel made this demand, especially since the current stage which it wants to impose is the one of normalization, to the point

where it has presented the Peres Plan to develop the countries of the region and has prepared a plan for the division of labor among the countries of the region up to 2000?

What would happen if it occupied one of the islands?

What would happen if it imposed restrictions on the presence of F-15 aircraft in the Saudi base of Tabuk?

Can the blockade be reimposed on the Bab El Mandeb? What kind of coordination exists at present between Israel and Ethiopia, especially following the transfer of the Falasha via the Sudan in the time of Ja'far al-Numayri?

(Information indicates the presence of the Ankuda meat company, the Saba agricultural products company, the Amiran trading company, the Solel Boneh contracting company, the ATA agricultural projects company and the Aaron brothers export-import company; how can cooperation between them to supply the southerners in the Sudan with arms be dealt with?)

What Do We Want from the Red Sea?

What do we want from the Red Sea, and from whom should we ask for what we want? To ask from anyone but God is humiliating, but who are we? Are we indeed a single bloc? Does "we" mean everyone, or some? Are our goals the same? Is our enemy the same? Is our friend the same? Who competes with us? What do they compete with us over?

What is the role we are playing in the sea and the Bab El Mandeb?

Is it a religious role?

Is it a political role?

Is it a military role?

Is it an economic role?

I do not believe that disagreement exists among us that the sea is important for us as far as the four roles are concerned. An answer is needed to the question, What is the priority of these roles?

In my opinion, it is the practical economic role which opens the doors and paves the way for the other roles. The shipping route from Nuwaybi' in Egypt to al-'Aqabah in Jordan is a very new step which greatly pleased me because it has brought the Arab countries together after a long separation. We had awaited the execution of the project of the bridge which would connect Egypt to the Arab countries through the construction of a bridge over the Islands of Tiran and Sanafir, which continued to languish for years in the Arab League, and we had awaited the opening of the route of the "causeways" from Sinai to the Arab countries for years. Now this route is being started, in spite of the emergence of trivial problems which I am familiar with, which we need to remedy decisively before they grow and destroy the project, which is considered a gleam in the midst of a bleak darkness.

However, there is a passing question which I will submit to you: What will be the fate of this route, if Jordanian-Egyptian attempts to hold the international conference for peace talks lead to some results? What will become of the land route to Eilat, which the Camp David agreement stipulated, as a serious competitor to the current naval route?

It should be noted that the communications routes which cross the Arab countries are mostly lengthy, that is, pass from sea to sea. Such routes are divisive ones and do not link up the countries among which they pass. We are in the greatest need of lateral routes such as the Nuwaybi'-al-'Aqabah route, because they are connecting routes. Is it possible to construct such sea and land routes and bolster the pipelines? Is it possible to devote attention to the ports, while connecting them to land routes and railways from the regions of domestic production to the export ports on the coast?

These also are routes of attrition, because they carry raw materials from their source to the outside and use them up, so that they may be processed and re-exported to our markets. I say, can our relations with the outer world continue as a relationship between the processor who processes and the market which consumes? It is necessary to rectify this situation through economic and strategic studies so that the communications routes will serve the civil and military aspects jointly.

If we agree among ourselves over what we want, we can ask others what they want. The bases are clear:

- A. The sea is the right of everyone, us and them.
- B. We want it to be a sea devoid of bases and facilities.
- C. We do not want it to be a sea of attraction, drawing the great powers to congregate there.
- D. We do not want it to be a sea in which the Arab role is lacking. The cake exists, and everyone must get his share of it. However, Arab will is lacking, and it is not possible to wait.

The actual fact is that everyone is present and they have achieved their goals. We also are present; we take one foot forward and one foot back. We do not know what we want exactly, and have not yet agreed over it, but the matter that cannot admit of procrastination is:

- A. We should obtain more information about our miscellaneous islands.
- B. We should be present in them, because abandoned territory entices others to take it over, especially since these others are devoted to annexing land and expelling its inhabitants.
- C. Every country should develop the coasts of the Red Sea to the extent of its abilities.
- D. Every country should strengthen its fleets. This is natural as far as coastal countries go.

E. We should redistribute our military forces so that these territories may be developed through armed settlement.

F. It is necessary to establish ports, lighthouses, airports, fishing and tourist locations, silos and refrigeration facilities.

However, none of this will suffice in the medium or long range, because we must remember the following:

A. The Red Sea cannot realize security for any Arab country. Otherwise we will return to the question which Wavell faced in 1915: "Does the canal defend Egypt, or does Egypt defend the canal?"

B. No single Arab country can defend Arab interests in the Red Sea. Our interests are joint ones, and to preserve it joint cooperation is needed.

C. Granting bases and facilities will increase our problems in the long range.

D. We must face the situation now; otherwise, it will be impossible to face it later. A negative stance alone is not enough. It is necessary to deal with the problem individually and bilaterally, or with additional parties.

The important thing is that we not pass beyond the problem, since if we do we will not solve it, because all that will happen is that if the person with the problem passes beyond it he will have changed his position and gone ahead of the problem, and it itself will be functioning behind him.

In face of collective Arab will, there are two solutions for dealing with the other powers that exist.

The first solution is to clash with them, which requires force; the situation does not call for that, and on top of that it is outside of our abilities.

The second solution: free dealings without facilities or bases.

The second solution is the one that is civilized and attainable.

Conclusion

One can envision entering the sea from the Bab El Mandeb or Suez, with ships closely arrayed in the harbors on its coasts, the smoke of factories in the sky, fishermen catching fish, companies exploiting the ocean floor, our production being exported to the markets of the world, our ports receiving what we want from the world, lights brightening the desolate darkness on both sides of it, new societies being built and developed, and armed forces settling down and establishing ports and barracks. Here there is confidence, because that is the real security of the Bab El Mandeb and our other open gates to the outer world which are closed before us. The vision could become fact some day which is not remote; our grandfathers did it.

ECONOMIST REVIEWS ARAB SUBORDINATION TO AMERICAN POLICY, INTERESTS

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[Article by Midhat Ayyub: "Subordination and the Threat to Arab National Security"]

[Text] It has become clear, in following Arab historic economic and political development since the Arab countries' attainment of their political independence (in the sense of the evacuation of foreign occupation forces), that subordination has constituted an independent variable and the threat to Arab national security has represented a variable secondary to that. The relations of subordination have worked to threaten Arab national security by a number of processes, most important of which are the following:

1. The Deepening of Arab Fragmentation

The final phase of the life of the Ottoman Empire, of which the Arab region constituted a part, was distinguished by the presence of a contest among the industrial countries of Western Europe over the areas belonging to this empire, in these countries' effort at capital expansion and their need to provide markets and sources of raw materials and secure communications routes to their distant colonies. The Arab area was one of these areas over which these countries contested. While each of them strove for the military occupation of some Arab portions (for instance, Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 and Aden in 1839, and France's occupation of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria) prior to World War One, these countries sought to give formal expression to their position in the Arab area during this war and in the wake of it.

On the basis of the treaty of London of 26 April 1915 (among Britain, France, Russia and Italy), all the rights and privileges pertaining to the Ottoman sultan in Libya were acknowledged to belong to Italy (1).

On the basis of the Sykes-Picot agreement on 16 May 1916 (among France, Britain and Russia), parts of Syria were acknowledged to belong to France and most of Iraq and Palestine to Britain, and the other areas were subdivided among areas of influence, some French and others English (2).

On the basis of the Clemenceau-Lloyd George agreement in December 1918, the Mosul area was attached to British influence in exchange for the grant to

France of a share of the oil of Iraq (3) and, on the basis of the Balfour declaration of 2 November 1917, Britain acknowledged that the Jews had the right to establish a national home for themselves in Palestine. This ended with the declaration of the establishment of Israel on 15 May 1948 as a non-Arab entity severing the interconnection of the Arab nation to the east and west.

At the peace conference in San Remo on 24 April 1920, agreement was reached on the mandate system; Syria was given to France and Iraq and Palestine to Britain. The conference resolved the division of oil resources in Iraq between Britain and France when the 25 percent share Germany had in the Turkish Petroleum Company (75 percent belonged to Britain and remained with it) was transferred to France, and France also constructed a pipeline to move oil to the Mediterranean via Syria. The Sevres agreement on 10 August 1920 terminated all Turkey's connection with Arab territories.

Thus a new order for the Arab territories began and made its appearance in 1921. The most important feature of it was the formal expression of their subordination to the advanced capitalist European industrial countries. At that time the principle of self-determination also started to penetrate into the Arab region. While this principle, in its surface form, gave every people the right to choose the country in the framework of which they would live, the consummation of this principle in the Arab region following the revival of various religious, tribal, racial and local loyalties had the effect of subjecting the region to an endless series of fragmentations, and none of the countries which were the heirs of the Ottoman Empire in the Arab area were capable of bringing the parts which were under their control together; rather, they sought to make them separate from one another. Thus we found the Arab Gulf region broken down into a number of countries, and the situation in them then concluded with the state of proliferation of small countries, indeed sometimes city states, we see today (Kuwait, Qatar, the Emirates, Bahrain and Oman), with Yemen broken down into Democratic Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic, the Levant into Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan and the Maghreb into Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.

Each of the countries which were the new centers in the Arab area considered also attaining their goals through their occupation or penetration into the region: Britain, the protection of India and the lines of communication between England and the empire, the revival of British trade through direct occupation, indirect rule, unequal treaties and the great role in the establishment of Israel; France, the expansion of the scope of action for French capital through direct occupation, such as the case in Tunisia and Morocco, or annexation as the case of Algeria; Italy, the expansion of the scope of action for Italian capital in an attempt to annex Libya; and the United States, the application of the principle of the open door, especially in the areas subjected to British dominance, such as the flow of American investments into the oil areas (in 1922 the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey arrived at an agreement with Britain by virtue of which it obtained 25 percent of the oil of Iraq itself)(4). They worked to restrict the subordinate party's major dealings to the dominant country and along with that to weaken dealings with the other colonial centers or subordinate parties. The conditions of World War Two led to an increase in the United States' role in the

Arab region, so that, in the new context of conditions in the region which guaranteed the attainment by the colonies of Britain, France and Italy of their political independence, it would assume the role of the main dominant element, in realization of its strategic goals of denying the region to the Soviets, guaranteeing the flow of oil to the West and protecting the security of Israel. The rapidity of the rebuilding of Japan and West Germany, then the emergence of common European action through the European Economic Community, also led to the rearrangement of the names of the centers of dominance while the relationship of subordination and dominance between the Arab area, which had started to consist of a number of countries that were politically independent, and the new centers, the United States, Japan and the industrial countries of Western Europe, especially Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, did not end.

The deepening of the fragmentation in the new framework in the Arab region occurred through the process of what Galtung called the pattern of feudalistic interactions (5) -- that is, the interaction of the subordinate is with its center (vertical interaction), interaction between the subordinate and other subordinates is denied and the subordinate's dealings with the outer world are monopolized. We find the validation of this interaction in the Arab region. Arab "cross-commerce," that is, among Arab countries, did not exceed 5 percent of the total volume of Arab trade in the case of exports and 9 percent in the case of imports in 1977 and in 1981 the rate of exports did not exceed 6 percent and that of imports 9 percent (6). This was the result of the annexation of each Arab country in isolation to the international capitalist economy through the center to which it is subordinate and the result of the similarity among the productive structures of the Arab countries, the similarity in the surplus they have which they try to trade, and at times competition among them in that. The mediocre level of trade has led to the further alienation of Arab countries from one another through the absence of the element of common interests, and the escalation of national loyalties, the loyalty of the new countries, has also led to the weakening of national loyalty and the growth on the other hand of the feeling of loyalty toward symbols inferior to the level of the state, such as factionalism, localism, tribalism and so forth, threatening further fragmentation of the Arab region.

Fragmentation leads to the creation of a number of countries which do not have the wherewithal to guarantee their security through reliance on themselves and no longer have a way to provide this security except through reliance on protection from their center or dependence on a great power. None of the Arab Gulf countries can confront the threat to their security on the part of a strong neighbor like Iran except through dependence on a large local power like Iraq or a great power like the United States, and the countries in confrontation with Israel, especially Syria and Egypt, have been able to confront the threat to their security on the part of Israel only through reliance on the power of Soviet arms. When Egypt's position regarding the interaction with Israel assumed a peaceful orientation, that was in the context of an American guarantee. Thus each Arab country in its effort to realize its security has found itself oriented toward further relations of subordination to the dominant centers and has found that the subordination which initially was economic has, through the process of fragmentation,

begun to turn into other forms of subordination, especially military and political subordination.

2. The Weakening of the Processing Industries Sector

The Arab countries' position in the context of the international subdivision has caused them to act as countries specializing in the production and export of mining or agricultural raw materials. The processing industries sector is weak in these countries; with the exception of Egypt, the processing industries' share of gross national product does not exceed about 16 percent in the Arab countries that have the highest proportion in this. The following figures show the state of the processing industries in the gross national product of some Arab countries compared with the industrial countries in 1981:

The Sudan	7 percent	Mauritania	8 percent	North Yemen	7 percent
Egypt	27 percent	Morocco	16 percent	Tunisia	13 percent
Jordan	14 percent	Algeria	10 percent	Libyan Jamahiriyah	3 percent
Saudi Arabia	4 percent	Kuwait	7 percent	Japan	30 percent
West Germany	35 percent	Italy	29 percent		

World Bank, Report on Development in 1984, Cairo, Al-Ahram Organization, translated text, 1985, pp 260-261.

On top of the mediocre status of the processing industry sector, the predominant share of that belongs to the food and textile industries, petrochemicals and chemicals, while we find that the share of machinery and transportation equipment is low. The following figures also show the relationship between the value added for the machinery and transportation equipment industry and the processing industry as a whole in some Arab countries compared with some industrial countries and Israel:

Egypt	14 percent	Morocco	9 percent	Tunisia	8 percent	Syria	4 percent
Algeria	10 percent	Israel	25 percent	United Kingdom	34 percent	Japan	39 percent
West Germany	37 percent	United States	35 percent	Soviet Union	29 percent	France	33 percent

Source: World Bank, Report on Development in 1984, op. cit., pp 268-269.

As a result of the weakness of the transformation industry sector in general, and the branches related to war manufacture in particular, not to speak of the lack of availability of the necessary technological base for it, the

Arab countries have missed a chance which would lead them to establish a war industry meeting their needs for weapons and accessories, whereas Israel has the potential for war production. Aside from Egypt, there is almost no war industry in the Arab countries (the attempt to establish the Arab War Manufacture Authority which relied on British and French technology did not continue, and ended with the Arab boycott of Egypt in the wake of the two Camp David agreements), while war production in Israel started in the fifties and was not restricted only to small weapons but extended to the manufacture of airplanes, which contains the largest number of technicians in any industry in Israel (22,500), vessels, missiles, electronic weapons, chemical weapons, radar equipment and heavy metal industries such as armor (7).

In view of the absence of an Arab war industry, and the inability of Egyptian production to cope with Arab needs for various arms, it has been necessary to rely on imports. Here we might point out that weapons are different from all other commodities as far as two considerations are concerned:

1. There are limited arms exporting countries and they are all advanced industrial countries. These countries are the leaders of a camp, like the United States and the Soviet Union, or represent that camp, like France and the United Kingdom as far as the Western camp goes, and Czechoslovakia and Poland as far as the Eastern camp goes.

2. Arms exports in most cases are considered an instrument of the exporting country's foreign policy. That is, the Arab countries' flexibility of choice is limited, and to add to its limited nature, changing the source of arms requires a long time as the new weapons are assimilated into the armed forces. The system related to Eastern armaments differs from the system connected to Western armaments. If some country wants to change its arms from Western supplies, it is not just a matter of arms but extends to the system related to their use, which differs and requires new training. The period for the transition from one system to another is considered a point of weakness an adversary can exploit. In addition to that, the source of arms normally links the export of arms to technical and political conditions which serve its goals. The Arab countries have had to accept ties in training, spare parts supply, ammunition and maintenance, sometimes the presence of technicians and advisors tied to the import of arms and the execution of the technical and political conditions the source imposes, that is, military subordination, especially if the weight of imports is great, and this is what has happened. Here we will refer to some figures of significance (8).

The volume of the international trade in arms came to \$9.7 billion in 1975.

The developing countries' share is 75 percent.

In the period from 1965 to 1975, the total imports of arms in the world came to \$70.4 billion, \$51.4 billion of which involved the developing countries.

The breakdown of the value of exports among arms exporting countries was as follows:

United States	\$34.94 billion	Soviet Union	\$20.14 billion
France	\$3.21 billion	United Kingdom	\$2.34 billion
China	\$2.22 billion	West Germany	\$1.37 billion
Czechoslovakia	\$1.21 billion	Canada	\$1.20 billion
Poland	\$1.12 billion	Others	\$2.78 billion
Total	\$70.36 billion		

The value of American arms sales to the Middle East in the period 1946-1975 came to \$23.2 billion, \$7.2 billion of which involved Saudi Arabia and \$7.19 billion Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria and North Yemen, while \$4.9 billion involved Israel and \$10.4 billion Iran (9).

The value of American security aid to the Middle East came to \$7.7 billion in the period 1946-1975, \$4.7 billion of which involved Israel and \$1.6 billion Iran, while \$1.4 billion involved the Arab countries (10).

The value of additional American security aid in 1975 came to \$1.044 billion, 31.1 percent of which involved Israel, 24.2 percent Egypt, 8.4 percent Jordan and 8 percent Syria.

The United States is considered the greatest source of arms, but most of its exports go to the Middle East. While most Arab countries rely to a great extent on the imports of weapons from the United States or its allies, the United States is also considered the greatest source of arms for Israel, which is considered the Arab countries' main adversary. Four wars have taken place with it and it has expansionist aims in the Arab countries. Its existence by itself is a negation of the Palestinian presence, at the least. The United States' major declared goals in the Middle East include the protection of Israel's security, and therefore the supply of weapons to the Arab countries by the United States or its allies is in the context of American policy, which is aimed at preserving Israel. In this regard, the quantities of weapons sent to the Arab countries, their quality, the conditions connected to them, the method of their operation and the monitoring of this operation are taken into consideration. This means that there is a point of contradiction in the Arab countries' subordination to the United States militarily. Israel threatens Arab national security through its continued occupation of the territories of Arab countries, its aggression and its threat to commit aggression against other Arab countries, and the Arab countries rely in weapons imports on the United States, which supports Israel, tries to keep it going and indeed coordinates with its policy on many occasions. How then is it feasible for these Arab countries to realize Arab national security through military subordination to the United States?

Nor can we pretend to ignore the effect of the goals of Soviet foreign policy and Soviet-American relations in determining the timing, quantities and

types of arms for the Arab countries which rely on the acquisition of Soviet arms. This might on some occasions not be in agreement with these Arab countries' desire to obtain specific types of arms at a specific time.

Economic subordination, then, leads, as a consequence of weakness in processing industries, to military subordination. The countries of the industrial centers are also the ones which supply arms and along with them maintenance, ammunition and training, alongside the transfer of individuals (technicians or advisors) to work within the armed forces of the Arab countries importing these arms which this may require. With these arms come the conditions connected to the continued supply and use of these arms, and against whom these arms are to be used. The subordinate Arab countries cannot avoid these conditions, or else they will find themselves lacking in maintenance and lacking in spare parts or ammunition, and their military status will tend to deteriorate until they seek a substitute which also has its conditions. That is, military subordination is reflected in the guidance of the foreign policy of the subordinate countries, including the escalation or reduction of their combat and cooperation dealings in the environment of their regional or international dealings. That is, it consequently extends to political subordination.

3. The Freedom of the Center in Escalating Its Combat Dealings in Exchange for Restricting the Subordinate's Freedom To Escalate These Dealings

While the country of the center has the freedom to escalate its combat dealings and sometimes bring them to the level of military actions and blatant support of the main adversary, Israel, the subordinate Arab countries have not had the possibility of escalating their combat dealings to the level of the dealings of the center. The maximum level combat transactions with the United States reached was the severance of diplomatic relations in 1967 and the imposition of the partial, temporary oil embargo in 1973. Here we will review examples of American military dealings against the Arab countries; it is apparent to us, through them, that the Arab countries' role has been the negative one of reaching agreement and attempting to accommodate, avoid or ignore American dealings. We will present these examples in periods of time, as follows:

A. The period up to 1956 (11):

The United States of America established a consulate for itself in the city of Jerusalem in 1944, and this consulate proceeded to call for the migration of Jews to Palestine.

The American president Wilson supported the Balfour Declaration in 1917.

The United States strove, with Britain and France, to find itself a foothold in the Arab region through the open door policy.

The American president Roosevelt agreed to the Biltmore program on 11 May 1942 (this program included action to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, establish a Jewish army and open the gates of Palestine to unlimited Jewish immigration which the Jewish Agency would supervise).

The American president Truman put pressure on Britain to accept 100,000 Jews in Palestine in 1946 and on 4 October 1946 the American president Truman issued a statement in which he called for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Israel was established in 1948 with the agreement of the United States, which recognized it 10 minutes after its establishment was declared. It supported it militarily and exerted efforts to have it join the United Nations in 1949.

The United States took part, with Britain and France, in issuing the tripartite declaration of 1950, which guaranteed the existence of Israel and a military balance in Israel's favor (the people of Israel would be equal in the provision of arms to all the Arab countries).

France delivered weapons to Israel under the encouragement of the United States.

The United States condemned Egypt's conduct in its abrogation of the 1936 treaty on 14 October 1951 because of Egypt's rejection of the plan for leadership of the joint Middle East command on 13 October 1951.

The attempt to contain the Arab area through the Middle East defense organization plan in 1952 and establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1954.

The United States' attempt to liquidate the issue of the refugees by settling them in Arab countries and controlling the refugee aid agency materially and administratively.

The United States' voting against affirmation of the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem in the General Assembly in 1946.

Opposition to the Arab stand regarding the transit of Israeli ships, or ships bearing war materiel to Israel, in the Suez Canal (the Security Council resolution in 1951), and support of the right of Israeli ships to the Suez Canal and the Gulf of al-'Aqabah.

The United States' refusal to supply arms to Egypt in 1955.

Abstinence from supporting Egypt in financing the High Dam project in 1956.

The United States' freeze on Egyptian deposits in 1956.

The United States gave Israel spoken guarantees regarding the issue of shipping in the Strait of Tiran in the wake of the 1956 war and it continued its support through a joint open declaration with Britain on 1 April 1957. It also took practical measures to prove its total support for Israel on this subject by sending it warships and commercial vessels crossing the strait in the direction of Eilat.

The United States refused to impose economic penalties on Israel in 1956.

The share of capital that went to Israel (most of it American) in the period 1949-1956 has been estimated at 57 percent of Israel's national income.

The United States played a great part in signing the agreement on German reparations for Israel (starting in 1953 and continuing 12 years, at a value of \$822 million).

American aid contributed to the financing of half the Israeli development budget in 1945.

In the period 1948-1955, the value of American aid to the Arab countries came to \$163 million as compared with \$367 million to Israel.

The series of treaties the United States signed with Israel, such as the general technical cooperation agreement in 1951, the economic aid agreement in 1952, and the joint defense aid agreement in 1952.

B. The period from 1956 to 1967 (12):

The Eisenhower plan in January 1975 to assume the legacy of France and Britain in the Arab area.

The United States' resumption of the sale of arms to Israel in 1959.

The United States' affirmation, in its president's statement on 8 May 1963, of support for Israel's security.

The threat to Arab countries (Lebanon and Jordan) that the continuation of the projects to divert water would lead to the threat of war.

The total loans and grants presented to Israel from 1946 to 1971 came to \$1,345,500,000 as compared with \$861.8 million for Egypt.

The flow of German arms to Israel under the pressure of the United States.

The American arms transactions in 1962, 1965 and 1967.

The technological aid in the most modern nuclear fields (the American agreement in 1955) in the construction of nuclear reactors.

The United States' extreme opposition to Egypt's closure of the Gulf of al-'Aqabah to Israeli shipping in 1967 and its threat of the use of American force to open shipping on 31 May 1967.

The United States' opposition to the issuance of a prompt cease fire resolution in the Security Council in 1967, after it had seen Israel's superiority. Also, it did not link the cease fire to the return of the forces to their positions before the start of the fighting, it supplied Israel with the necessary information during the fighting, as the incident of the American spy ship Liberty on 8 June 1967 proved, and it supported Israel's use of the occupation of Arab territories for applying pressure for the sake of a peaceful settlement.

The failure of the Security Council, under American pressure, to condemn the Israeli aggression and request Israel to withdraw its forces from the areas it had occupied as a result of its aggression.

C. The period from 1967 to 1973 (13):

Condemnation of Palestine resistance operations and description of them as terrorism.

The United States' imposition in the wake of the 1967 war of an embargo on the supply of arms to the Middle East. Jordan was affected by that, while Israel was not, because of the supplies that had been accumulated in its possession. The United States then lifted the embargo on Israel on 25 October 1967.

The American plans which were set out in the wake of the 1967 war guaranteed Israel's right to annex Arab lands. In light of this, it supported the draft British resolution by which Security Council Resolution 242 was issued in November 1967. Its interpretation of the resolution was in keeping with Israel's position in terms of the refusal to demand Israel to withdraw from all the territories and the principle of the maintenance of a strong Israel. The Rogers plan also contained a modification of the borders in Israel's favor.

The assertion accompanying the Rogers initiative on 19 June 1970 on the sending of American airplanes to Israel.

The grant of military aid worth \$500 million to Israel in the wake of 'Abd-al-Nasir's death.

President Nixon's declaration on 2 January 1972 on supplying Israel with airplanes to preserve the balance.

In the morning of 14 October 1973, the United States set up a massive air bridge to supply Israel with the most modern weapons and equipment. In the period from 14 October to 15 November 1973, 22,395 tons of arms and equipment were shipped to Israel.

Laxity in putting pressure on Israel following its violation of the cease fire and its continued military activities to realize its goals of surrounding the Egyptian Third Army.

The United States' declaration that it would stand alongside Israel if the fighting resumed in order to expel the Israelis from the west of the canal.

D. The period from 1973 to Camp David in 1978 (14):

On 1 September 1975, the second separation of forces agreement was signed (the first agreement for the separation of forces on the Egyptian front was signed on 18 January 1974 and on the Syrian front on 31 May 1974). It included a significant correspondence between Israeli and American views. In accordance with this agreement, the American material presence began through the operation of the warning stations, Egypt's agreement to the need for settlement of the Middle East conflict by diplomatic means, the prohibition of the use of armed force or recourse to a military blockade and agreement to the passage of non-military Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal. The

United States responded to Israel's demand for military equipment and energy and its other economic requirements.

The United States used the right of the veto against the draft nonaligned countries' resolution which underlined the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, including their right to establish an independent country and the appeal to Israel to withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967 (the draft resolution voted on on 26 January 1976).

The United States used the right of the veto against the draft 25 March 1976 resolution condemning Israel's actions in changing the status of Jerusalem and calling for the elimination of these actions, a halt to Israel's exploitation of occupied Arab territories and the establishment of settlements on them. It also used the same right on 30 June 1976 against a draft resolution affirming the Palestinian people's right to independence and national sovereignty.

The American president Carter (on 12 May 1977) defined the relationship between the United States and Israel as follows: "The United States and Israel have a special relationship and it is necessary that no one in our country or outside it doubt that our first commitment in the Middle East is the protection of Israel's right to a permanent existence in peace. Israel will receive special treatment in the provision of arms and as regards joint production regarding the production of a specific system for handling arms or the sale of advanced arms."

The role the United States played in preparing for direct negotiation between Egypt and Israel and its fervent support for these negotiations and the rift in Arab ranks they led to.

The arms transaction President Carter submitted to Congress in February 1978 included 60 F-15 airplanes for Saudi Arabia, 50 F-5 airplanes for Egypt and 90 F-16 and F-15 airplanes for Israel.

The United States played the role of a full partner in the Camp David agreements of 1978. These agreements included Israel's right to pass through the Gulf of Suez, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, the limitation of Egyptian forces in Sinai and establishment of normal relations between Egypt and Israel.

In spite of the increase in cooperative treatment on the part of the Arab countries vis-a-vis the United States in the wake of Camp David, to this time (1986), the United States has continued to support Israel in every way, including giving this support official form through agreements (the strategic cooperation agreement of 1983). It has also continued to condemn the activities of the Palestinian resistance and has played an obvious role in the drop in oil prices, the main source of income and spending for many Arab countries, has procrastinated in providing arms for the Arab countries which rely on it for the procurement of arms and has imposed technical and political conditions related to the uses of these arms such as the conditions connected to the transactions on the AWACS aircraft with Saudi Arabia in the early eighties and the attempt to use arms transactions in Jordan to put

pressure on it to accept direct negotiations with Israel in 1985. The United States intervened militarily in the events of Lebanon in 1982, it committed aggression against Egyptian sovereignty by hijacking an Egyptian civil passenger airplane and compelling it to land in an Atlantic pact base in October 1985, and it engaged in military aggression against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1986.

Since the subordinate party's need for the center is more intense than the center's need for the subordinate party, it has not been in the power of the Arab countries to respond through their reactions vis-a-vis American acts in a manner which would be in keeping with the level of enmity the American party has evinced, and the United States has continued to control about 14 to 15 percent of Arab trade, while the share of the Arab countries themselves does not exceed 5 percent of this trade.

[Footnotes]

1. Lenczowski, George, "The Middle East in World Affairs," Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1982, p 76.

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3. Ibid, p 79.

4. Ibid, p 793.

5. Galtung, J.A., "Structural Theory of Imperialism," JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, Vol XIII, No 2, 1971, p 87.

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7. Staff Report, Israeli Defense Industries, in JOURNAL OF DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY, September 1984, Vol 2, No 9, pp 14-20.

8. Farley, Philip J., and others, "Arms Across the Sea," Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1978, pp 7-13.

9, 10. Ibid, p 17.

11. Najwa Ibrahim Mahmud, "American Foreign Policy toward Israel (1947-1956)," unpublished master's thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, pp 8-239.

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13. 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Abbas Mahmud, "Comparative International Conduct of the United States and the Soviet Union toward the Arab-Israeli Struggle, 1967-1973," unpublished master's thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1974, pp 41-182.

14. Nabil Mahmud 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, "American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Struggle in the Period from the October 1973 War to the Camp David Agreements," unpublished master's thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1980, pp 104-261.

11887

CSO: 8104/3155

BRIEFS

ISRAEL PROTESTS EGYPTIAN PLAY--A protest has been made by the Israeli Embassy in Cairo to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry because the bureau of censorship of artistic works in Egypt did not prohibit Cairo's Al-Salam Theater from staging the play "Planet of Rats" [kawkab al-fi'ran] for defying the concept of peace and attacking Jewry and "Israel." Participating in the play are many actors playing the roles of "Israeli rats," which have managed to penetrate all parts of Egypt. This has caused the spread of such serious disease that it is decided to call in doctors, symbolizing popular forces opposing the Israeli presence. As the acts of the play unfold, it becomes apparent that the "rats" have been able to steal all that Egypt owns, even the water from the Nile. It also becomes clear in the play that these rats were able to make their attack on Egypt during the era of former president Anwar al-Sadat. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 2 Feb 87 p 4] /6662

CSO: 4504/119

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN INTERVIEWED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 26 Jan 87 p 28

[Interview with Dr Muhammad 'Abdallah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the People's Assembly: "Dr Muhammad 'Abdallah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Egypt's People's Assembly Says, 'Islamic Summit Conference Must Take a Closer Look at Development Problems in the Islamic World; I Propose the Establishment of an Islamic Monetary Fund';" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Dr Muhammad 'Abdallah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Egypt's People's Assembly says, "The fact that the Islamic Summit Conference is being convened on schedule, where and when it was supposed to convene, bodes well for the conference. This is a fundamental point I want to emphasize. The conference was able to meet its first challenge: attempts were made to impede the conference or prevent it from convening and to postpone it or have it convened in another place."

--"A real confrontation in a stronger framework is a must at this conference so that a method can be achieved by means of which the Islamic nation can stop the bloodshed in the Gulf and the bloodshed of Muslims and Arabs in south Lebanon. I believe that that is the principal foundation for the proceedings of the conference."

--"This conference will be an opportunity for Arab leaders to reconsider their method of working with each other in facing challenges, not only the military challenges which are facing this nation from within, but also the foreign challenges which manifest themselves principally in the area of economics, particularly after oil prices fell."

[Question] Do you see any possibility that economic cooperation might be achieved?

[Answer] Unless the conference generates genuine cooperation in this area among the Islamic countries, it will not even come close to solving the problem of development in most countries of the Islamic world. These countries have been facing numerous obstacles in recent years, and revenues in most of them have fallen. By comparison, some Islamic countries have monetary surpluses that are not being invested in the best way so as to guarantee the interests of the

investor's capital or achieve development for the Islamic world. Instead, these funds are still being left in foreign hands; they are deposited in foreign banks where they dwindle as a result of the factors of inflation and as a result of the maneuvers which are carried out around the principal currencies of the world to serve the interests of the advanced countries.

[Question] The question still remains: What are you proposing to the conference as the basis for economic cooperation between Islamic countries?

[Answer] There are in the Islamic world existing financial and economic institutions, but their operating methods and their businesses will have to be looked at and re-evaluated. The way these institutions do business will have to be changed. I believe that these are professional matters which would be easy to do if the political will to do them was there. To put it more precisely, it can be done if we have the political administration to do it.

[Question] Is there any possibility that the idea of establishing an Islamic monetary fund as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund can be proposed? The IMF stands out because of its old economic recipes which cause political disturbances and unrest. But an Islamic fund can offer Islamic countries loans in the context of policies that are compatible with these countries' social directions.

[Answer] Why do you say that an Islamic monetary fund could be an alternative to the IMF? Why not let it complement the IMF? In my opinion, this idea can be put into action. It can strengthen the positions of Islamic countries, and it can strengthen their relations with existing international money changing institutions.

[Question] Do you expect there will be a positive change in Egypt's relations with the Arab countries after this conference?

[Answer] It is obvious to the Arab world today that Egypt's positions on defending the Palestinian cause are based on principles. Egypt opposes intervention in the domestic affairs of any Arab country, and it opposes the slaughter of Arabs by Arabs and the slaughter of Muslims by Muslims. Egypt does not have two policies: one that is public and another that is secret. Consequently, Egypt's position on all matters that have to do with Arab national security is unequivocal. On that basis relations between Egypt and the Arab countries do exist, and cooperation between those countries and Egypt takes on numerous forms. However, matters which have to do with diplomacy are still pending. Although Egypt welcomes relations with Arab countries in any form, it does not seek them. The matter of relations is up to the judgment and circumstances of each Arab country. Let me affirm that the dialogue continues, and channels of communication with our fellow Arabs are open.

[Question] Do you expect this conference to yield an Islamic power with its own clout?

[Answer] We hope so. But that depends on what happens at the conference, and it depends on the conference's ability to overcome current problems in the Islamic world. At any rate the hope for a positive outcome of that conference exists and continues to exist.

EGYPT

PARLIAMENTARIAN DISCUSSES ARAB AFFAIRS

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 26 Jan 87 p 28

[Interview with Muhammad Hamid Mahmud, chairman of Arab Affairs Committee in the People's Assembly: "Muhammad Hamid Mahmud, Chairman of the Arab Affairs Committee in Egypt's People's Assembly Says, 'I Expect Egyptian-Arab Relations To Resume Their Normal and Cordial Course during the Islamic Summit Conference';" date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Muhammad Hamid Mahmud, a former Egyptian minister and chairman of the Arab Affairs Committee in Egypt's People's Assembly said, "Although there are numerous problems throughout the Islamic world, like the Gulf war, the war in Lebanon's camps, and the battles in Chad, we hope that Muslims will be speaking with one voice during the Kuwait conference so that control can be established over these wars which are threatening the Islamic world in its entirety. These wars are incompatible with the lessons which were taught by the messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him salvation. Only the enemies of the Islamic nation are benefiting from these wars. What is surprising is that some of the superpowers are fanning the fires of these strifes and battles in the Islamic world to make the wars more dangerous and the divisions more serious. They do that by goading [those who are fighting] with weapons. That is why Muslims are hoping that the Islamic Summit Conference will find the power within itself to overcome such dissent and stop such conflicts.

"With its clout and prestige and with the wisdom of its political leaders Egypt has made preparations for active participation in this conference. It is hoping that the Islamic nation and fellow Arabs in particular will respond to Egypt's ongoing appeal to Arabs to aim their utterances toward the achievement of the minimum Arab and Islamic solidarity which is required to confront the challenges that are surrounding Arabs and Muslims now."

[Question] How do you envision Egypt's active participation in this conference?

[Answer] Egypt [exercises considerable influence] with its past, its present and its al-Azhar. All the religious scholars of the Islamic nation either studied in the noble al-Azhar, or they were students of those who studied in that noble institution. History has also shown that the Arab nation and the Islamic nation believe that Egypt is the only one among its fraternal Arab countries and Iran that provides leadership. Egypt assumed an unequivocal and

decisive position to stop the endless and uncalled for bloodshed between two major countries in the Islamic nation. Egypt assumed that position to stop the economic drain between those two countries. When war broke out in the camps between Lebanese sects and our brave, fellow Palestinian Arabs, and when that war turned into sectarian wars between the Lebanese people themselves, Egypt made its memorable statement, "Hands off Lebanon!" Egypt made that statement so that events would not become more dangerous as a few colonialist powers and a few parties with personal ambitions intervened in Lebanon. It was those personal ambitions which led to such devastation and destruction in an Arab country that is dear to every Arab and every Muslim.

Because Egypt and its leaders have assumed such positions, Egypt will, God willing, play an outstanding and a major role in reconciling all parties. We pray God Almighty that He crown the business of this conference with success. If this conference does not succeed, the consequences will be grave for the peoples of the Islamic nation.

[Question] Do you think that as a result of this conference Islamic countries will emerge as a major world power?

[Answer] Before this hope which you are suggesting is attained, we have to agree first on the line which we Muslims must not cross when we disagree among ourselves. If we were to agree on how to disagree, and if we were to agree on not exacerbating our differences, then the hope which you are suggesting could be attained. But we are awaiting the decisive word on that hope, and that will be determined by what transpires at the conference. I do believe, however, that the Islamic nation's ordinary, human and material resources can make it the best nation created for people. The problem, however, is that of unification.

[Question] Do you believe that positive results are expected from the meetings which President Mubarak will have with a few Arab leaders in connection with the conference?

[Answer] A clear understanding is evident in every meeting that takes place between President Mubarak and any Arab leader. I recall in this regard President Mubarak's statement mentioning that Egypt would not respond to some of the insulting remarks that are made by some Arab broadcast services. President Mubarak has been following that approach; that is, ever since he came to office, he has not been responding to any Arab media campaign against Egypt. Actually, the Arab world now knows for sure that Egypt is a capable country that understands and loves its fraternal Arab countries. Egypt is the compassionate country which empathizes with everything that any Arab country is subjected to.

This is not bragging; it is a fact. Egypt's position vis a vis Iraq is certain evidence of that. Egypt's stand with the Palestinian people, with the Lebanese people and with the Libyan people when they were subjected to the American raid provides further evidence of that fact. Egypt and its leaders stood by the people of Libya. That is why there is hope that the summit conference will have positive results in giving aim to Arab and Islamic utterances and restoring Egypt to the Arabs, just as the Islamic Conference Organization returned to Egypt at the last summit conference in Rabat in 1984. Despite Arab decisions to boycott Egypt, we did not break our friendly ties with fellow Arabs. Egypt has

relations with the Arab countries in all areas. The only area in which relations with a few Arab countries are still lagging is that of returning ambassadors to their posts which are now being held by individuals heading Arab interests offices in Cairo. Only titles will have to be changed. Egypt can lead and guide its Arab nation; and with Egypt the Arab nation can become a force and a power to contend with. With Egypt the Arab nation can achieve victory. Egypt will always stand by its fellow Arab states in all areas. It will always keep Arab covenants in mind, paying attention to everything that some may say. When this nation enjoyed the solidarity it did in the October War, it established its presence and imposed its victory. If Arab solidarity such as that which was born with the October War were to continue, the Arabs would become the third, not the sixth power in this world. Naturally, not many of the powers in the world would accept such a situation, so conspiracies were planned. Some people fell into disputes with Arabs, and others failed to understand that a strong and capable Egypt which had regained its territory was more useful and better for its Arab nation than an occupied Egypt.

That is why I believe that as this major Islamic conference gets underway in Kuwait, Arab leaders will have to meet with President Mubarak. I also expect, God willing, that Egyptian-Arab relations will be restored to their normal, cordial course after those meetings.

8592

CSO: 4504/116

WOMEN COMMENT ON PROPOSED CHANGE IN ASSEMBLY SEATS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 2 Jan 87 p 58

[Article by 'Iman Ruslan: "The Women's Opinion Of the New Bill"]

[Text] The writer Dr Nawal al-Sa'dawi says, "The changes now being proposed are minor reforms giving greater freedom to the independents. I believe that this is a good step towards greater freedom for the citizens, because right now most Egyptians do not belong to any political party, and we can therefore say that they are independents. The proposed changes are positive, but in my opinion they do not address the crux of the matter, and do not fully entitle Egyptians to form their own parties in which any citizen would be able to nominate himself, or would be able to make a choice on sound grounds. This point would give the citizen greater scope in nominating candidates for the People's Assembly. However, I feel that the other proposal for abolishing the women's seat is negative. Abolishing this seat would prevent many women from nominating themselves, and would thus lead to the loss of an important voice and constituent of our society. In the proposed amendment, the reason being given for abolishing the women's seat is ambiguous and unclear."

In the opinion of the long-time parliamentarian Prof. Mufidah 'Abd-al-Rahman, "The measures now being proposed are imperative; in fact, we need them, because the independents are Egyptian citizens and are therefore entitled to having the election law apply to them just as it does to members of parties. The independent should have the right to nominate himself. Therefore, the state's proposals are obligatory, especially now that the state commissioner for the Supreme Constitutional Court has demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the existing law. As it is, the list of candidates might include someone the voter doesn't want, and therefore the entire list will not be elected, or if it is elected it will be a waste of the citizens' votes.

"The existing law thus deprives many voters of their freedom of decision and choice, and keeps many candidates from nominating themselves for many reasons, such as an unwillingness to join any of the existing parties. Therefore, individual voting is better for the voters and the candidates alike. There will be no type of sycophancy in the elections; on the contrary,

many of the results of elections by list have shown that they were not serious and were full of toadyism. For this reason I am against the existing law and also against any unfair amendments. I want to go back to the old system of individual voting.

"Women have made it to the People's Assembly whether they got many votes or only a few, and this does no honor at all to Egyptian women. Therefore, I am all for the proposed amendment calling for abolishing the women's seat. I have expressed this view for years. The existing law does not honor women; what will honor them is equality with men."

8559

CSO: 4504

NEW MUFTI DISCUSSES CALENDAR, EXTREMISM, ISLAMIC LAW

Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 18 Jan 87 pp 54-55

[Interview with New Mufti of Egypt Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi: "How Can We Extinguish the Fires Burning Throughout the Islamic World?" date and place not specified]

[Text] The position of Mufti remained vacant for a long time following the death of the previous Mufti, His Excellency Shaykh 'Abd-al-Latif Hamzah. On 28 October 1986, the President issued a decree appointing His Excellency Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi as Mufti for the Arab Republic of Egypt. The office of Mufti is an important position in Egypt. There are some important matters and pending issues which remain unresolved, such as determining exactly when each Arabic month begins, a matter over which opinions differ, cooperation among fatwa offices in Egypt and the Islamic world, the advisory nature of the Mufti's position, application of Shari'ah law, extremism, and other problems and concerns. UKTUBAR took all these issues to the new Mufti, who opened his heart and answered them all frankly and simply. He was enthusiastic throughout the interview, which lasted about 2 hours.

[Question] Your Excellency, we would like to start by getting to know you better.

[Answer] I was born in Sawhaj Governorate, and had memorized the Qur'an by the time I was 12 years old. I received my education at al-Azhar, where I studied until my graduation from the College of Religious Principles in 1958. I received a doctorate in exegesis and the Hadith in 1966; the subject of my dissertation was "the children of Israel in the Qur'an and the Sunnah." I was appointed a teacher at al-Azhar University in 1968, then dean of the College of Religious Principles at the Asyut branch in 1976, and then dean of the College of Islamic Studies until I was appointed Mufti of Egypt on 28 October 1986. Since then, I have been preaching in addition to my official duties.

Selection Of the Mufti

[Question] The selection of the Mufti was delayed because of many considerations. In your view, what was the reason for this delay?

[Answer] The office of Mufti is a serious position. Issuing fatwas is a trust, and the pious, intelligent, aware scholar never issues a fatwa unless it is based on God's book and the Sunnah of the Prophet, may God bless him and bring him peace, and unless he is certain of its correctness by referring to the sources which support his decision. I think that the reason the selection of a new Mufti was delayed for so long was in order to select someone who is characterized by a desire to issue fatwas in a correct manner pleasing to God Almighty and to follow the Sunnah of the Prophet, because, as I have said, this matter and this position is so serious.

The Mufti Is Not A Judge

[Question] Your selection as Mufti of Egypt raises an important question: you are the first person outside the judiciary to hold this position. Is this a new trend?

[Answer] It is not unusual for the Mufti to come from the Islamic judiciary, since knowledge is a blessing to those who hold it. The student of exegesis and the Hadith must study jurisprudence, just as the student of jurisprudence must study exegesis and the Hadith. Even though I specialized in exegesis and the Hadith, I love jurisprudence, have studied it extensively, and still read and study it. If something is hidden from us, there is nothing wrong in our asking someone else. The Qur'an teaches us to "ask the reputable people." As I said, there is no difference among al-Azhar students when it comes to studying religious matters; the difference is only in the precise area of specialization. Someone who did not specialize in one of the branches of knowledge can still become a specialist through research and study. Therefore, it is not important for the Mufti to come from a certain college--what is important is that he be a student of the Islamic Shari'ah who is aware of its principles. There is no conflict in the Mufti's being a graduate of the Shari'ah College, the Law College, or any other al-Azhar college. The important thing is for him to be a scholar.

The Position Of Mufti Is An Advisory One

[Question] Once the scholar assumes the position of Mufti, he is often surprised that this position is an advisory one. What is your comment on this?

[Answer] The fact that the Mufti's opinion is advisory does not mean that it is disregarded. It means that the authority requesting the opinion has made use of it, in the sense that a court which has issued a verdict of execution against a certain person sends the case documents to the Mufti, so that he can give his opinion from the standpoint of Islamic law. Viewpoints have differed from person to person, but I can say that in most of the cases referred to the Mufti's office, the courts have gone along with the Mufti's opinion.

Determining When the Months Begin

[Question] Now that you have assumed this position, Your Excellency, there is an important pending case which needs to be resolved quickly--the matter of determining exactly when the Arabic months begin, a decision which varies among most Islamic countries. How do you think this problem can be resolved?

[Answer] As I see it, the issue of determining the start of the Arabic months is already resolved, or is on the way to being resolved, since astronomical calculations carry more weight now, and with their bases and guidelines are a respected science which the various nations are putting to use. The Mufti's office will make every effort to utilize any modern science, be it astronomy or any other science which will help Muslims discharge their duties, until we are satisfied. Whenever we have been unable to make visual determinations, we have relied on astronomical calculations.

[Question] Your Excellency may have perhaps read the recommendation made by one of the committees of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, calling for the formation of a legal authority, headquartered in Mecca, which would determine and standardize the beginnings of the Arabic months. Why hasn't the Mufti's office adopted this important recommendation?

[Answer] In my estimation, this is a great recommendation. If this authority were to be formed, I would be ready to go there immediately if called, because, God willing, this excellent idea would be an appropriate start for unifying the Muslims. Likewise, I am ready to inform His Excellency Shaykh Ibn-Bazz, head of the senior 'ulema' of Saudi Arabia, that I am ready to come whenever called to finalize this important matter.

Differences Among the Countries

[Question] But how can we solve the problem of the various country's differing stands on this proposal?

[Answer] If the countries would stand in a single line, there would be no problem over fasting, for example. But if these countries cannot get together and stand in one line, the legists will see that every country will have its own starting point for the Ramadan fast.

[Question] This is a solution for fasting, but how can we solve the problem of the Muslim's pilgrimage duty when the day he observes it differs from the day it is observed in Saudi Arabia?

[Question] Since the pilgrimage takes place in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia should determine the date of its observance, and all Muslims should adhere to it.

Cooperation Among Mufti's Offices

[Question] In Egypt there is a Mufti's office and a fatwa office at al-Azhar, and there are mufti's offices in several Islamic countries. Don't you agree, Your Excellency, that coordinating these offices, be they in Egypt or abroad, would benefit Islam and the Muslims and help unify the ranks and achieve consensus?

[Answer] The Mufti's office is making every effort to cooperate with the al-Azhar fatwa office as well as with other Mufti's offices throughout the Islamic world, such as the Sudan, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and with other authorities involved in legal opinions in the Arab and Islamic world. Every day brings something new in this regard.

[Question] What forms does this cooperation take now, and what can be expected in the future?

[Answer] This cooperation has taken many forms, such as exchanging information and agreeing on unified points of view regarding some important issues which there is no need to go into right now, as well as exchanging books and scholarly references published by various Mufti's offices. The Mufti's office has also written to other such offices in the Islamic world, such as Saudi Arabia, for example, in order to consolidate scholarly cooperation by exchanging legal and scholarly books published by any such office.

The Issues of the Islamic World

[Question] If we might go back to the issues affecting the Islamic world, which of these issues take priority in your view?

[Answer] If we rank the issues of our Islamic world, the most important one, the one which must be resolved and decided, is that of the fires burning throughout the Islamic world. These fires must be put out, and those who are pouring gasoline on them ought to be ashamed of themselves and stop what they are doing. The fighting among Muslims in Lebanon and elsewhere must stop, for it rends the unity of the Muslims, imbeds its thorns deeper, and sows hatred in their hearts. The fire of civil strife blazes among them, and the nation is divided and its ranks dispersed.

[Question] What do you think of preaching? What is the al-Azhar scholar's role here?

[Answer] By my very nature, preaching is part of my blood and sinews. Ever since I was a first- and second-year student at the Alexandria al-Azhar Institute, I have delivered the Friday sermon at many mosques, and to this day I still give the sermon at the al-Ansar Mosque in the seventh quarter of Nasr City--a mosque which God helped us to build through our own efforts. I perform the Friday prayer there, and sometimes I lead the prayer.

Therefore, I urge the al-Azhar scholars to discharge their duty to preach, because preaching was one of the functions of the prophets, and is the primary function of the al-Azhar scholar well-versed in his religion.

The Concept of Extremism

[Question] What do you think of the widespread talk about "extremism" these days?

[Answer] Before we express any opinion on this issue, we must recognize the Islamic view of extremism--that it is obduracy, which is contradictory to what Islam is all about. Islam is based on easiness, not on hardness. There are many Qur'anic verses to that effect, such as "God intends ease for you, not difficulty," and "He did not place anything oppressive on you in religion." The Prophet said, "Be easy, not hard; be happy, not disagreeable." We don't want extremism, which oversteps the bounds which God has set. But if a man who performs his religious duties is accused of extremism, as the enemies of Islam are doing, then we don't approve of that at all.

[Question] What is the cure for extremism, which, as you have said, oversteps God's bounds?

[Answer] The cure is to return to the Book of God and to the Sunnah of the Prophet, since they are the cure for all such unexpected ills.

[Question] What is your view of the Islamic Shari'ah? There are two opinions, one which feels that it should be applied immediately, and the other which asks that it be applied gradually. Towards which view do you incline?

[Answer] I look upon the Islamic Shari'ah as does any intelligent Muslim--it is a religion, and its law ought to govern its adherents and prescribe laws for them. I hope that in its next session the honorable People's Assembly will take the blessed step of expediting the Shari'ah issue. As for its application, there are some matters, pertaining to doctrine, religious principles and religious observances, which cannot be postponed and which have been applied, thank God. There are other matters which can be applied gradually, since it might be better to proceed gradually. Some things cannot be decided in a single day and night, and there is nothing wrong in applying them gradually. There are many precedents for this in the life of the Prophet. For example, let us take the prohibition of usury, which was accomplished in stages, as was the case with the prohibition of alcoholic beverages. Therefore, I lean towards the point of view which calls for gradual progress in some matters pertaining to the Shari'ah. There is nothing wrong with that.

[Question] In closing, we would like to know how your day begins and ends.

[Answer] I start my day before dawn, so that I can get ready to pray and read my daily selection from the Qur'an. It is essential for a Muslim to read from the Qur'an every day. When I finish with that, I read the morning papers and decide which issues I want to look into. Then I eat breakfast. I go to my office at 0830 and start my work, which is interspersed with responding to every fatwa sent to the Mufti's office and studying and examining everything which concerns Muslims. I work until 1430, when I go home and perform the afternoon prayer, eat, and rest a bit. After that I go back to my office to do scholarly research. Then I pray the sunset prayer and sit down in the mosque to look into the problems of Muslims and answer their religious and scholarly questions. This goes on until the evening prayer. Then I go back home and read until bedtime, which is usually before 2300. This is my day, unless I have a lecture or meeting which might delay my bedtime.

[Question] With all this exhausting reading and studying, how many books have you written?

[Answer] I have written a commentary on the entire Qur'an, as well as two other books, one on prayer and the other on the children of Israel in the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

8559

CSO: 4504/111

BRIEFS

NEW RELIGIOUS CENTERS--Minister of Awqaf Dr Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub has announced the decision to establish several Islamic centers in foreign capitals and in areas where there are Islamic communities. It has also been decided to build and furnish several religious and cultural libraries in mosques in order to promote religious and cultural awareness, to complete or renovate 158 mosques in the governorates, and to place 400 local mosques under the ministry's supervision this year. This announcement was made at the plenary meeting of the People's Assembly Religious and Social Affairs Committee, chaired by 'Ali al-Shurayta, which met to study all aspects of Awqaf Ministry policy. The minister said that it has been decided to give more attention to mosques and to make an effort to promote their mission by diversifying their religious, social and cultural services and by continually improving the imams' qualifications and providing training classes for them to acquaint them with the scope of the country's development. The minister indicated that there are 7,145 government mosques in Egypt, employing only 50 percent of all the imams, and that there are 50,000 local mosques. [Text] [Cairo MAYU in Arabic 19 Jan 87 p 1] 8559

CSO: 4504/111

TUNISIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS, DOMESTIC CHANGES DISCUSSED

Tunis AL-SABAH in Arabic 23 Jan 87 p 6

[Interview with Hedi Mabrouk, minister of foreign affairs: "Mr He'ci Mabrouk Tells Abu Dhabi Newspaper, AL-BAYAN, 'Our Relations with the Emirates Are Strong; Our Evaluation of All Matters Is Similar to Theirs; An End to the Palestinian Military Presence Was Brought about by an Agreement with the PLO; Recent Changes in Tunisia Will not Affect Our Foreign Relations';" in the United Arab Emirates; date not specified]

[Text] Mr Hedi Mabrouk, minister of foreign affairs, whose visit to the United Arab Emirates was part of a tour in the Gulf, ended his visit to that country last Monday. Mr Mabrouk spent 2 days in the Emirates during which he conducted talks with a number of officials in the Emirates. These talks dealt with a variety of political issues and questions about bilateral cooperation.

While in the Emirates, Mr Mabrouk was interviewed by the Abu Dhabi Newspaper, AL-BAYAN. This comprehensive interview is printed below.

Results of the Talks in the Emirates

[Answer] The visit was fruitful and enjoyable, and I was pleased with the contacts I made with officials in the Emirates. I believe that the outcome of this visit will be positive because its first and principal objective was to make Tunisia's attachment to its fellow Arab states known. We wanted to express Tunisia's wishes that existing relations with fellow Arabs be strengthened and reinforced. What makes me optimistic about the future of relations is the agreement I found we shared with all state and government officials. We agree in our evaluation, analyses and views on all matters in the public arena or in the area of bilateral relations.

[Question] The recent changes in Tunisia took many people by surprise. Did these changes have any effect on your foreign relations?

[Answer] I cannot imagine that any country's domestic policy and domestic affairs would have repercussions abroad, because such domestic matters concern a sovereign state. Therefore, I cannot imagine that these changes would have an effect on foreign relations, particularly since what happened is neither extraordinary nor unusual. It was no more than an internal cabinet shuffle, and that

is something that all countries do according to each country's circumstances and needs.

Therefore, what happened in Tunisia was an ordinary change that is not the first of its kind. Nor is it the first such change in Tunisia or in any other country.

It was actually the European press that stirred up the matter, but it was the Arab press that played a positive role regarding what the western press said. The Arab press knows the facts; it knows that the change has no major significance.

When this outcry was stirred up in the western press, and that is something we regret because it distorts Arab affairs, a few Arab newspapers were influenced by it. Responsible circles in the Arab region, however, were not. I did not notice that they were influenced by it.

At any rate, we are working together as states. We have a head of state who manages matters in Tunisia, a country whose domestic and foreign policy is derived from principles that were set down scores of years ago by President Bourguiba. He has been making adjustments in those principles as needed and as called for by changes. It is therefore inconceivable that a small change in the cabinet would lead to change in Tunisia's foreign relations.

Reconciliation

[Question] After the recent cabinet shuffle in Tunisia there was talk about bringing about a reconciliation between Tunisian forces abroad. To what extent is what is being said about such a reconciliation true, and what are the aims?

[Answer] To put it clearly and simply, let me say that our politics does not in any way involve maneuvers, demagoguery and capers. We prefer that our policy be based on clear principles, and these principles are well-known. Our policy is one of growth and development; it is a policy for improving life and working on issues that are important to an Arab. It is also a policy that is based on the principle that our relations with other Arab countries involve no personal considerations or existing alliances between individuals.

Departing from those principles which are characteristic of Tunisia's policy would lead to changing and replacing policies.

With regard to that issue which has been referred to as the opposition, a term that makes too much of what is actually happening, let me first ask about the nature of the opposition forces abroad. And here one must note that the number of political figures living abroad was small. To us those people do not constitute an opposition because we do not consider people living outside Tunisia to be in the opposition. It may be better to say that we have differences of opinion with them; or we may say that they have interests which make it necessary for them to live abroad.

There are three persons who are now residing abroad illegally, and there are reasons that make it necessary for them to live abroad. These people are Ahmed

Ben Salah who was put on trial, but he escaped from prison. However, this is an old case, and its effect at the present time is insignificant.

The [other two persons] are Idris (Qayqah) and Mohamed Mzali. Except for these cases, it would be difficult to talk about an opposition abroad.

[Question] And Mohamed Masmoudi?

[Answer] Mohamed Masmoudi is a Tunisian citizen living in Paris. He has not been denied the right to return to Tunisia, and no decision has been issued to expel him from the country. He chose to live in exile. He recently returned to Tunisia; he traveled in the country; and then he went back to France without any problems.

[Question] And what about Mrs Wassila Ben Ammar?

[Answer] The subject of Mrs Wassila is personal, and we cannot talk about it. But she is abroad for medical treatment, and she may still be receiving treatment. Naturally, what happened impelled her to move away from the place where she used to live. Anyway, this is a private matter, and we may not talk about it. As Arabs we avoid talking about such personal matters.

Multiple Parties

[Question] Is any thought being given now, after the recent changes, to reducing the number of political parties that are now in Tunisia? Is any thought being given to measures that might be taken with regard to the amount of freedom available to the Tunisian press?

[Answer] Tunisia has a large number of parties that operate publicly without any government restriction. These parties have their free newspapers which express their opinions and severely criticize the regime. They have nothing to fear but the law. We think that the conditions we have, as far as multiple parties are concerned, are ideal. Our policy is changing; it is getting better; and there will be no going back. We are making progress, and we are becoming more democratic and more open.

It is nonsense, however, to associate that with the recent change. In fact, it may be said that if the possibility existed that our policy on multiple parties could be reversed, such a reversal would have happened before the recent cabinet shuffle.

The change that came about after the recent reorganization is moving us toward democracy. This change was planned. President Bourguiba used to say that it was necessary to observe caution in the conduct of affairs when the country became independent. He used to say that controls should be maintained until the agencies that took care of the country's affairs become disciplined and organized and developed principles and structures. After that the regime would gradually become more democratic. I think that what we have now is a democratic system that is based on pluralism and on the freedom of the press. When you visit Tunisia and sit in public gatherings, you will feel that people go somewhat beyond the proper bounds when they talk.

Mzali's Case

[Question] Do you believe that Mohamed Mzali's presence in France could be creating tension in Tunisian-French relations?

[Answer] We regret that Mzali is abroad. Had he stayed in Tunisia, he could have provided some explanation for some of his conduct. It is possible that he might have been able to vindicate himself, but he made a mistake when he fled from Tunisia. His flight from Tunisia was based on psychological reasons; he was somewhat shocked by the change.

Foreign countries should not grant someone who was placed on trial by the Tunisian state a right. That is why we find it inconceivable that either a fraternal or a friendly country with whom we have fraternal or cooperative relations would prefer a person to a state.

If there is such a country, then our attitude toward it will depend on its attitude. And our attitude then will not be one of approval, and that will have inevitable consequences.

Tunisian-Palestinian Relations

[Question] With regard to Tunisian-Palestinian relations, it's been said that the Tunisian government refused to allow PLO leaders and members to enter Tunisia. What does the Tunisian government have against a Palestinian presence in Tunisia?

[Answer] Actually, more has been said about this subject than it deserves. The facts are simpler than that. It is inconceivable to think that anyone in Tunisia--anyone in government or any young or old person, man or woman--does not support the Palestinian struggle and the Palestinian fighters.

But support for a brother's and a friend's position must be useful, beneficial and realistic.

Our fellow Palestinians do in fact need help and support in international forums, and we have to use all our diplomatic resources to work on their behalf.

We do not believe that we can offer our fellow Palestinians anything militarily, and we believe it would be a mistake to take part in helping them put their armed forces on hold in a country that is far from the front. That is why we came to an agreement with Palestinian leaders. We agreed to distinguish between actions that are feasible and useful and that Tunisia could help the Palestinians with, and all the other activities that would be useful only in the confrontation zone far away from Tunisia.

We agreed that all political and media organizations will be welcomed and supported. But the military organization was not to be located in Tunisia, but not because we fear its presence. We do not. Tunisia did welcome such a military presence all along its borders and in its capital city during the struggle of the Algerian people. At that time the Algerians carried out their actions while we endured the reprisals of the French. We were deprived of France's assistance,

and that was important for a country which had recently won its independence and whose economy was based on the French economy.

As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the situation is different. A Palestinian military presence in Tunisia would be useless. That military presence must be inside Palestine.

There is no doubt that any measure which involves any restriction has to have an effect on the movements of a few individuals who would receive no benefits beyond those that have been agreed to.

The Tunisian Economy

[Question] It is known that Tunisia has been affected by the worldwide economic recession. How are you dealing with this problem, and how are you confronting its consequences?

[Answer] We are dealing with this matter by letting people with experience and aptitude in the economic field take charge. We mention in this regard Mr Rachid Sfar, the head of government. He is a prominent economist and a man with political experience. People do not know about his political experience even though he is a veteran politician and an economist who has had experience in politics.

With President Bourguiba's leadership and Rachid Sfar's management--and Mr Sfar has a special aptitude in economics--we are dealing with matters wisely in a manner that depends on simple principles, including that of not taking economic risks which are not compatible with our resources.

We are also dealing with this matter with solidarity within our ranks in Tunisia. Suffice it to note that the Tunisian people have contributed enthusiastically and eagerly to the national debt. They gave more than they were asked to give. This means that the people have a strong sense of solidarity.

We are also trying to attract from abroad contributions from all those who are willing to help us in our economic effort either through joint projects or other means. It would be up to those who wish to work with us and share our responsibilities to decide.

We believe that the circumstantial reasons which caused the economic crisis are now being dispelled. The rainfall is promising a good farming season inside the country, and abroad the oil market has been invigorated. These are signs that call for optimism.

[Question] It's been said that Tunisia has been affected by the fact that Spain and Portugal have joined the European Common Market. Tunisia's agricultural products are no longer selling in that market as well as they used to. How are you dealing with this problem?

[Answer] It is true that that has created difficulties for us in the market. However, our contacts in Spain [have helped in this regard]. I made a personal, quick visit to Spain, and after the visit, we succeeded in winning the Spanish

government's understanding of the problem. We must realize, however, that we are dealing with an open market which is competitive and cannot be controlled. We wish we had an Arab market through which we could create integration, regulate trade and avoid the hassles of such problems.

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WEST BANK INDUSTRIALIST PROFILED

Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic 10 Oct 86 p 10

[Interview with attorney and industrialist Kamal Hasuna: "Establishing and Supporting Domestic Industries Is a National Priority; Graduates and Workers in the West Bank Need Industrial Projects"]

[Text] Attorney and industrialist Kamal Hasuna, manager of the "Electrode" Company in the city of al-Khalil, is among the leading businessmen in the field of industry and planned industrialization. A representative of AL-NAHAR, carrying a number of questions, went to meet with him in his office, located on the factory grounds.

As our readers are accustomed, the beginning of the interview will give some personal information about the "Personality of the Week," which is why our representative asked Mr Hasuna to talk briefly about his birthdate and place, his education, and his outlook on the future of industrial development and on the factory that he is managing, "al-Sharq Factory for Electrodes." The factory produces welding rods, brand-name "Electrode," of all different kinds. It is considered a pioneer in this field both on the local and the Arab levels.

The following is the outcome of the interview.

Study of law:

I was born in the city of al-Khalil in 1942. I went to "Ibn-Rushd" elementary school, and then to "al-Husayn Bin-Ali" secondary school, and completed my studies at Cairo University and earned a B.A. in Law in 1969. I was supposed to get the B.A. in 1967, but I was in Cairo when the occupation of the West Bank took place during final examinations. I had to leave the finals and come back to the West Bank. I couldn't travel to Cairo in 1968 because of the difficult political circumstances.

During that year, travel permits were issued for a limited number of days, 7 days or 40 days, no more. It was difficult for me to travel, and the university administration accepted the excuse that I submitted that year because of the occupation circumstances. I had spent every effort, in 1969, to travel to Cairo, where I completed the required courses and finals for the B.A., which I earned with the grade of "good."

Studying law has had a great impact on my success in life after I graduated. When you study law, you learn about different subjects concerning different aspects of life, such as international law, criminal law, business law, civil law, and so on. Other subjects concern the study of the foundations and organization of governments and states, international agencies, and relations between them. Also, other business' related subjects such as banking regulations, insurance, business agreements, correspondence, and other subjects that add to the general knowledge of the person.

After graduation I was trained for 2 years and received a license as a lawyer from the Lawyers Guild in Amman.

An Open Strike:

According to the guild's decision in Amman, and the Conference of Arab Attorneys, I went on strike. I specifically stopped pleading to the West Bank courts, because of all the changes and modifications made by the authorities, particularly the abolition of the court of appeals in Jerusalem. This open-ended strike still continues to this day. As a matter of fact the striking lawyers have sacrificed and suffered more than any segment of the people because of this strike.

The Pioneer:

Because this strike is an open one, and because of my enthusiasm for work, my interest in industry, and my legal experience in establishing firms and companies, I have established this company "al-Sharq Factory for Electrode." It was my idea and I was the pioneer founder of this company. I planned all of its legal, administrative, and financial aspects in accordance with the study conducted for this project.

It is considered among the first of its kind in the Arab countries. It is also among the most successful economic projects in the West Bank. It deals locally and externally and with the neighboring Arab and European countries.

The Cement Project:

During the same period I established, and contributed to the establishment of, some small projects in the West Bank. I made a great effort, along with my colleagues on the board of directors, to establish the cement project on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It was my idea to establish a company that produces this important substance (cement). It was the first company, founded in 1977, to include contributors from all the cities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The approval to establish this project was granted by the Jordanian government according to the cabinet's Resolution No 78/22, dated 24 August 1978, and by the authorities on the West Bank. The company was officially registered as No 23, on 4 January 1979. Dues were paid by the 212 shareholders and the net worth of the company was 15 million Jordanian dinars.

In 1979 and 1980, experts from Germany, France, and Austria visited the West Bank according to agreements with the company to explore the raw material needed which was found in a high concentration and at a high quality. The project's site was determined where the raw material was located, which is about 10 km outside al-Khalil.

The first and second stages of the economic and geological studies for the project have been completed, which included the process of deep drilling on location, the preparation of the technical plans, work stages and priorities, sources for financing the project, and other financial and administrative aspects. We hope that we will be able to accomplish this huge and very important project.

[Question] What is hindering the accomplishment of this project? And are there any obstacles?

[Answer] The obstacles that stand in the way of accomplishing this project and bringing it into existence can be summed up in two main points:

1. The Jordanian government should consider the importance of the project, especially to the people in the occupied West Bank and the Arab workers that will be employed.

We are also asking for the assistance of the company's board of directors in marketing some of the factory's production, if it is to begin work and production in the near future.

2. The Israeli authorities need to approve the completion of the project and to issue the required permits for building and for importing the necessary equipment for the project.

[Question] Back to al-Sharq factory, I would like to ask about the number of workers employed, the products, and future prospects.

[Answer] The factory employs 40 workers (men and women), who possess the experience and skills that helped produce high-quality electrodes and were the main factor for the success and continuity of the company.

Among the variety of products:

1. Regular welding rods used in ironworks and auto repair.
2. Steel welding rods used on bulldozers and for springs.
3. Nickel welding material.
4. Stainless steel.
5. Pipe welding material, in addition to other types produced to meet the demand of local and Arab markets.

Marketing Electrode Products:

The company's products are marketed as follows:

1. 15 percent in the West Bank.
2. 10 percent in Gaza Strip.
3. 5 percent in Israel.
4. 60 percent in the East Bank of Jordan, and then in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Competition:

As far as competition is concerned, we are facing competition on the local level, of course, by Israeli industry. In the Arab markets we are facing competition from Japan, Korea, and China.

Benefits:

It is worth mentioning that the company's workers receiving their salaries in Jordanian dinars. They receive good salaries compared to salaries in other businesses in the West Bank.

Thirteen Salaries per Year:

The workers also receive an extra salary every year. They are insured against accidents on and off the job. They, and their families as well, also have full-coverage health insurance paid for by the company.

The workers also have a savings plan where 10 percent of the worker's monthly salary is saved, in addition to 7 percent contributed by the company. These funds are invested and their returns belong to the workers.

[Question] What is your assessment of the industrial projects in the West Bank at the present time? Are you pleased with its magnitude?

[Answer] I would like to emphasize the importance of industrializing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. By that I mean upgrading existing facilities and opening more new factories. The people are in desperate need for a number of productive projects that are not in existence at the present. Industrialization is important to create jobs for the workforce and for the growing number of university graduates, also to meet the needs of the people, 90 percent of whose needs are met by the Israeli market, or by goods imported through Israel.

[Question] What is your assessment to the prospects of peace that are being discussed at present?

[Answer] I hope that all parties will work toward achieving a comprehensive and just peace for the whole Middle East area and that all the destructive wars will end.

As for our cause, I hope to see a unified strategy for all the Palestinian organizations and the Arab countries concerned, especially Jordan, in order to put an end to the occupation and to free the Palestinian people from all kinds of sufferings, and also to enable the Palestinian people to be free and independent and to assume their role in the world's affairs. That is what I hope for and look forward to seeing.

In conclusion, I would like to thank AL-NAHAR newspaper for designating a variety of informative sections, especially the "Personality of the Week" section.

[Box, p 10]

- Kamal Ibrahim Hasuna.
- Born in the city of al-Khalil in 1942.
- Received his elementary and secondary education in al-Khalil schools.
- Obtained a B.A. in law from Cairo University in 1969 with the grade of "good."
- The pioneer founder and manager of the "Electrode" company.
- Contributed to the establishment of a number of industrial and cooperative projects.
- Has been active in the field of social work and participated in a number of social activities.

In the Field of Social Services:

- Served as a secretary of the Red Crescent Society between 1971 and 1972 and as a vice president between 1973 and 1975.
- Served as treasurer of the Youth's Sports Club in al-Khalil for 2 years, between 1973 and 1975.
- Served as a treasurer of the University Graduate Association in al-Khalil between 1974 and 1977.
- One of the founders of the first housing cooperative in al-Khalil and served as its secretary since 1975, then served as a president for the cooperative since 1979, which is among the most successful cooperatives, run by its members and achieved 85 percent of its goals.

- Attended a number of national and international seminars in the field of economic studies.

- One of the founders of the Chambers of Industry in the West Bank, which was started in 1979. It was hoped that it will come into existence as the first chamber of industry in the West Bank. Unfortunately, because of the sensitive political circumstances at the present time, we ceased our activities in spite of the importance of the chamber in representing the industrialists and standing up for their rights, in addition to putting together studies and plans for developing industrial projects.

In Brief:

We bear the responsibility for the sake of public interest is the ground for continuity and success. The accomplishments of our Palestinian people, though limited, and their level of awareness had a great effect on the establishment of their legitimate rights.

It is indisputable that for every beginning there is an end. History, ancient and recent, have taught us that a nation's calamity may last for a long or short time depending upon the sacrifices of the people.

A new generation armed with education and a strong will is the best thing that we can hope for.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

GULF SUMMIT TO REVITALIZE ECONOMY

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 6-12 Dec 86 pp 44, 45

[Article: "Gulf Summit to 'Revitalize' UAE Economy!"]

[Text] The United Arab Emirates has postponed the discharge of large numbers of Asian workers employed in that rich oil producer. Employment applications flooded service and contracting concerns which have been seriously hurt since the beginning of the year because of the drop in UAE revenues as a result of the collapse in world oil prices.

The state was keen to complete a series of large project in Abu Dhabi in order to provide good housing for the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman who were there for the Gulf summit.

UAE revenues for the year have declined by one half, forcing Abu Dhabi to tighten the belt by abandoning a number of large projects and scaling down others. Abu Dhabi's general expenditures were originally pegged at more than the combined allotment for all the remaining emirates.

Official circles partly attribute the economic recession to the end of major construction, most of which was completed during the oil boom years between 1970 and 1980.

A representative of a Japanese public works firm employed by the municipality of Abu Dhabi says he has not received one contract for 1987 but that the recent flurry of projects "caused us to work incessantly."

Thousands of Asian foreign workers who faced expulsion a few months ago, mostly Indians and Pakistani, were asked to stay over for a short while to complete those projects. They represent 80 percent of all human resources in the UAE whose population is 1,600,000.

Public works concerns hired between 700 and 1,000 workers to lay 250,000 tons of paving asphalt, 25 kilometers of sewers, and plant hundreds of thousands of square meters.

Parenthetically, an official Abu Dhabi source said the UAE reduced its general budget for 1986 by about 6 percent. The council of ministers resolved to cut budgeted general expenses to within 14.02 billion dirhams (about \$3.8 billion). This is 800 million less than estimated 1985 expenditures of 3.6 billion dirhams (approximately \$1 billion).

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

SHIPPERS ATTRACTED TO DUBAYY BY LOW CUSTOMS DUTIES

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 5 Jan 87 p 16

[Article by Wajdi Ratib: Dubayy Ports Handle 92 Percent of UAE Exports; Customs Duty Exemptions Encourage Growth of Foreign Trade]

[Text] Dubayy ports handled 67.7 percent of all UAE imports in 1985. Abu Dhabi handled 23.3 percent and Shariqah 9 percent of all such imports that year.

A recent report by the Dubayy Chamber of Commerce and Industry reveals that 92 percent of all UAE exports were shipped from Dubayy ports and the remaining 8 percent from Abu Dhabi. Dubayy handled 85 percent of all reexports, compared to Abu Dhabi's 15 percent. Thirty-nine percent of all transit trade was shipped through Dubayy, 37 percent through Al-Shariqah, and 24 percent through Abu Dhabi.

Low customs duties in Dubayy are considered one of the main reason for the growth of foreign trade. Customs duties frequently do not exceed 4 percent of value (CIF) and are calculated on the basis of importers' invoices as follows:

- articles exempt from duty because of the importer's position;
- all articles imported by or on behalf of government agencies in Dubayy;
- all government agencies in the emirates;
- all official entities of the UAE or of members of the Gulf Cooperation Council;
- Diplomatic and consular missions;
- accredited non profit hospitals and medical missions in GCC members;
- Oil exploration and production companies working in behalf of GCC members;
- Firms and agencies exempted from duty for certain reasons by order of His Highness the ruler of the country;
- owners of factories granted industrial licenses by the UAE Ministry of Finance provided the imports are for the industrial purposes specified in the license.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

IMPORTS RISE, EXPORTS DECLINE--Dubayy's non-oil trade in the first seven months of last year logged a volume of 3,594 billion tons valued at 12.62 billion dirhams, compared with 3,535 billion tons valued at 12.58 billion dirhams in the same period of 1985. This is a 1.7 percent increase in volume and a 0.3 percent increase in value. The Dubayy chamber of commerce and industry reported that imports in the same period totalled 3,064 billion tons valued at 10,024.72 million dirhams compared with 2,905.8 tons valued at 9,746.42 million dirhams compared with 2,905.8 tons valued at 9,746.41 million dirhams in the same period of 1985. This is a 5.4 percent increase in volume and a 2.9 percent increase in value. Exports totalled 230,507 tons valued at 674.31 million dirhams compared to 258,985 tons valued at 694.08 million dirhams in the same period of 1985. This is a decline of 11 percent in volume and of 2.8 percent in value. Reexports totalled 299,890 tons valued at 1,918.35 million dirhams compared with 370,871 tons valued at 2,137.47 million dirhams in the same period of 1985 for a decline of 19.1 percent in volume and 10.3 percent in value. [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 6 Jan 87 p 6] 12945

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CONFEDERATION IDEA ELABORATED, DEFENDED

Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu 19-25 Nov 86 pp 8-13

[Interview With Murtaz Bhutto Convener of Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtoon Front,
by Asif Bhalli]

[Excerpts] [Mr Murtaz Bhutto's name is well known among the country's political circles. He originally gained fame when the late Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called him "my talented cousin" during the course of a speech after coming into power. During the government of the People's Party, Mr Murtaz Bhutto exhibited his abilities as the federal minister and the chief minister of Sind. Despite his close companionship and association with the late Mr Bhutto, he did not give up his views and ideas about political and regional problems, and these finally brought about his separation from the People's Party. He formed the Sindhi-Baluch-Pashtoon Front during his self-imposed exile in London and he is the convener of the Front. When he became highly active in his capacity as the convener of the Front, he was arrested for making objectionable speeches. HURMAT correspondent Asif Bhalli's detailed and special interview with Mr Murtaz Bhutto is particularly remarkable because he did not give any other interview before he went to jail.]

[Question] Could you please enlighten us in detail about your position with respect to the confederal system you talked about?

[Answer] That will take a long time. The whole night will pass and the topic will still remain unfinished. We have said a lot about the confederal system but newspapers with a national standing have ignored us completely. For one thing, the government put pressure on them, and secondly journalism is not the same any more. They have all become business minded. For their subsistence they depend on government advertisements and in order to please the government they have become much more obedient. For the 6-7 months that I have been here I have put in a lot of effort and done a lot of talking from practically every platform, but the newspapers have not reported my views correctly. However, despite the unfair attitude of the newspapers, people have become acquainted with our position. We want a confederation because the federal system could not be implemented in this country. For 39 years we tried in vain to implement a federal system in this country. Our efforts failed because small nationalities like the Sindhis, Baluch and Pashtoons were not given their rights. They were told that if they opted for Pakistan

they would be independent and become their own rulers. These facts were stated in the Pakistan Resolution which was passed on 23 March 1940 in Lahore. They were told that if they remained in India they would be subjected to the Federal system, which advocates the rule of the majority, and that they could not expect justice. They were therefore advised to come to Pakistan where they would be independent and gain self-determination. But since the establishment of Pakistan, the independence and self-determination that was promised has not been realized. Small nationalities have been exploited a great deal. Particularly under martial law, Sind was subjected to different kinds of suppression. Even the dignity and honor of the people were not spared. We then said that the time had come to demand our rights and privileges which were promised under the Lahore resolution, remind everyone about their promises and thus put an end to exploitation.

[Question] What you are driving at is that when Pakistan was established, a confederal system was already included in the agenda; in other words, the federal system was not envisaged at all by the forces that formed Pakistan?

[Answer] The idea of a confederation was in the Pakistan Resolution. The Resolution says that the various nationalities and provinces joining Pakistan would be independent and autonomous, and that the center would be in charge of only defense, foreign affairs, currency and communications. The cabinet mission which came later presented the confederal program which was accepted by the Muslim League but was rejected by the Congress, which insisted on the federal system of government. Quaid-e Azam and the Muslim League said that they would be willing to live with India under the confederal system. Mr Jinnah also said that he had knowingly given up the idea of Pakistan because confederal India would be in their interest, but when Congress did not accept the confederal system Mr Jinnah rejected the federal system of government and said that their goal was an independent Pakistan. What I am trying to say is that the Muslim League had full confidence in the confederal system and that the Pakistan movement was also based on the protection of the rights of the minorities. When the British were prepared to give self-government [to India], at that time too the Muslims protested, saying that the federal system they were introducing did not protect the rights of the minorities, and wanted to know how the rights of the Muslim minority would be guaranteed. This led to the formation of the Muslim League and a well-organized movement was started for finding the system of government that would fully guarantee the rights of the Muslim minority. When no other solution could be found, the Muslims demanded the establishment of Pakistan. But here in Pakistan the situation is much the same. The federal system of government was tried out in Pakistan but the rights of smaller nationalities could not be protected; their rights and privileges were violated. We have now suggested that we should unanimously accept the confederal system, which will protect the rights of the smaller nationalities, and the country will also survive. If this plan is not accepted, then it will be difficult for this country to survive any longer.

[Question] A presidential system of government was also established in this country, and this system calls for a much stronger center than the parliamentary system. During the period in which the presidential system was accepted in this country, no slogans were ever raised for separation or a confederation. And now that the federal system of government is in force, the provinces are autonomous to a large extent. The 1973 constitution was willingly accepted by the representatives of the small provinces too. In view of the fact that the smaller provinces enjoy their rights to a greater degree, there is no ground for demanding a confederation.

[Answer] The presidential system of government ruined the country. One unit was bestowed upon this country, various kinds of autocratic governments were imposed and it was the federal system that dismembered this country. There is no need to try something which has already been tried. If the federal system continues, this country cannot be saved at any cost. Under the federal system of government the country will be ruled by the army and smaller nationalities will continue to be exploited. In the end, the solution sought when conditions become worse will be extreme. From past experience we have seen that East Pakistan continued to press its demands for its rights. First of all it demanded the right to its language. It made this demand five months after the establishment of Pakistan. It's demand was rejected, the army was sent to East Pakistan and the students were made targets of their bullets. East Pakistan then demanded a loose federation and when this too was rejected, they presented a six-point plan which was met with violence once again. Finally they demanded independence and the country was divided into two parts. The same experience is being repeated here. We have been demanding provincial autonomy. No one listens. We demanded confederation for the restoration of our rights. If this demand is rejected, we will demand independence. No one can stop us. If this opportunity is lost, then the people of smaller provinces will not accept even confederation as a solution to their problem. Negotiations are now being held with Bangladesh to form a confederation but it is of no avail. In the past, its six-point plan was not accepted; now a confederation cannot be formed with it.

[Question] The Awami League succeeded in the elections on the basis of its six-point demand. At the time the Awami League was also the majority party in the assembly. But it was your party that opposed the transfer of power to the Awami League. Do you mean to say that you now acknowledge the fact that the country would not have been divided had its six-point demand been accepted?

[Answer] Mr Bhutto did not say that we would not accept the six-point demand. When Mr Bhutto was Ayub Khan's minister and when the six-point demand was first made, he said that some political solutions should be found for the problem. As for his threat to break the legs of members [who attend the Assembly in Dhaka], his stand really was that if we were to go to the assembly and the Awami League decided to break away from Pakistan—declare that it was finished and they were independent—when we came back the people would hang us upside down at the Mochi Gate and ask why we went to the Dhaka session when we knew that the Awami League wanted to break away from Pakistan. Mr Bhutto's point

of view was that it was necessary that some sort of understanding be arrived at before the assembly meeting. If some such understanding could not be reached and if Awami League were to announce the separation of East Pakistan on the basis of its overwhelming majority, we too would be considered a party to the crime. At that point the issue was not limited to the six-point plan alone; the straightforward problem was that of Bangladesh. Yahya Khan said that we would not allow the establishment of Bangladesh. To save the country Mr Bhutto had to make such a statement.

[Question] When the picture of East Pakistan's separation had become clear, was it proper to take military action?

[Answer] Whatever I might say about military action does not make any difference at all, but of course the consequences of military action are before you. Pakistan broke into two parts because of the military action. I do not believe that it is possible to dominate or keep anyone in captivity by force or with weapons. Such actions are bound to result again in the break up of Pakistan.

[Question] You stated that the fundamental elements necessary for a federation are not present in Pakistan. But there are small and big provinces in India and yet the federal system has proved to be successful in that country. Why shouldn't it be successful here too?

[Answer] In India no one region controls the whole country. But here Punjab dominates the whole country. Punjab has a say in everything. This is not the case in any other country in the world. Whenever such things happen the country cannot survive. Let me give you an example from the last century when, except for France and Britain, practically all of Europe was one big Germany. Prussia was a very big territory in Germany. It dominated the whole country, it had power and authority, the military was under its control and so was the administration of the country. The result of this domination was that Germany was dismembered. In other words, Belgium, Holland and Eastern Europe all separated from Germany, which today is comprised only of Prussia. Under these conditions when there are different nationalities and one powerful nation dominates them all, let alone the federation, even the country cannot survive. You mentioned India. There is a balance between the provinces in that country. The main reason for the success of the federation in India is that the country does not have a large army. The Pakistani army consists of one million men, whereas the Indian army too has one million soldiers or a little more. India is ten times bigger than Pakistan but the strength of the Pakistani army is the same as that of India. In other words, compared to its size, Pakistan has a large army. Our army is so large that to expend its energy it has to turn to politics. Now the army has become a kind of political party. Under the prevailing conditions, how can you get rid of the army? Under a federation it is impossible to get rid of them.

[Question] You referred to martial law. Practically all the political parties in the country are against martial law, but none of them is against federation. Why are you so frustrated about federation?

[Answer] These political parties are not against martial law. Most of the parties are responsible for the imposition of martial law. Didn't they write letters to the army? Didn't they celebrate when the army came into power? They wanted to get rid of the People's Party. They accepted the army rule. They remained in the martial law government. They cooperated with them. Even today they are not against the military government. They wanted a role in the government. What is surprising is that even the People's Party, which promised it would fight to the last and said that its [the army's] hands were red up to the wrist with Bhutto's blood has joined in this fray. Now the People's Party says only that General Ziaul Haq should resign. They do not have anything against the army. They do not object to the military government; they only want a change of faces. Since the People's Party cannot share power with General Zia, it is opposing only General Zia. It does not oppose the military government.

[Question] Whenever the People's Party or the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy opposes General Zia, it in fact opposes the military government. Now it is General Zia who is representing the army. If there were another military general in his place, wouldn't the People's Party and the Movement for Restoration of Democracy oppose him too?

[Answer] I know the whole background. You do not know it, but the People's Party is only against General Zia, it is not against the military government. These people are awaiting for General Zia to die because he has to die some day. Some other general will take his place and you will see them cooperating with him.

[Question] If the People's Party is not against military rule, why didn't they choose to share power with the army by participating in non-party elections?

[Answer] The People's Party didn't participate in the elections because they were under the impression that this way they would bring about pressure and thus acquire a bigger share in power. But the people did not boycott the elections according to the decisions of the People's Party and Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. People took part in the elections due to [networks of] personal relations and some other reasons. The People's Party was ignored. It wanted to blackmail the government because the people did not take part in the referendum and it thought that the government had become weak. But when the people cast their votes, the government became bold and undaunted. Boycotting the elections was another way of gaining power and authority, but the People's Party did not succeed in this tactic either. I say that the People's Party and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy do not have any agenda other than gaining power and authority.

[Question] Gaining power and authority in the capacity of a politician is not considered a crime, but it is a criminal act to seize power in an unconstitutional, undemocratic or immoral way. Now if on the basis of the program you present the people decide that you deserve their confidence and vote for you, won't you take over power and authority?

[Answer] The MRD only wants to gain power. It also talks of federation because under this system all power and authority will be in its hands. It will continue to exploit smaller nationalities while enjoying the advantages of power and authority in Islamabad.

[Question] You talk of confederation as a nationalist leader while Wali Khan in the North-Western Frontier province, Bizenjo in Baluchistan and Paleejo in Sind, all of whom are also nationalist leaders, believe that a federation protects the rights of small provinces. What do you have to say about them?

[Answer] The people whose names you mentioned are not nationalists. Anyone who talks about the 1973 constitution is not a nationalist. They are all worshippers of power and authority. If they get power and authority today, they will forsake the rights of the provinces.

[Question] The People's Party even today supports a federation. Besides, it is the party that enjoys the confidence of the Sindhi people and is most popular with them. Doesn't this prove that even small provinces do not approve of your program?

[Answer] People in Sind still support the People's Party, but their relationship with the party is only emotional. They are with the party because of Bhutto's sacrifice and the victimization of his family. If the followers of the People's Party were asked about their views, they too would voice their support for confederation.

[Question] In your opinion if mid-term elections were to be held in the country, would the People's Party not win the elections by a majority of votes?

[Answer] If the elections were held soon, then the People's Party might win them, but if the elections were delayed, people would leave it and come over to our platform. We have had the opportunity of working for only six months. If we could work for another 2-3 years, our Front would become more popular with the masses than the People's Party.

[Question] If as a result of the next elections, the People's Party came to power and under Benazir Bhutto's government, small provinces were able to get their rights, wouldn't your movement ultimately come to an end?

[Answer] Mr Bhutto couldn't protect the rights of small provinces; how can Benazir do it? Don't talk about suppositions.

[Question] If you come to power and the small provinces too are able to secure their rights, is it possible that you might move from confederation to a federation system of government?

[Answer] Why not? If the grievances of small provinces were redressed and their suspicions were removed, Pakistan could once again be transformed into a federation and we would have no objection at all.

SBPF LEADER MAKES SCATHING ANTI-PUNJAB, ANTI-BENAZIR REMARKS

Islamabad HURMAT in Urdu 10-17 Dec 86 pp 8-12

[A sensational interview with a distinguished politician, Abdul 'Hafiz Pirzada, by Ibrahim Jatoi: "The PPP's Manifesto Is Merely a Pamphlet Now"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The name of Karachi's young and handsome lawyer, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada came to the forefront in the national politics during the final phase of the 1960's decade, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto set up a political front in the form of the Pakistan People's Party against Ayub Khan. Pirzada was among the people who fanatically and with frenzy entrenched himself on this war front. When the party gained power after an arduous and intense struggle, Pirzada, one after the other, received charge of several ministries. However, it was only as a minister of justice and parliamentary affairs that he got the opportunity to demonstrate his real hidden talent. He was among the deceased Bhutto's extremely close, trustworthy and beloved comrades, so much so that once Mr Bhutto before a full audience in a loud voice called out Pirzada as a "handsome boy." After that, this phrase became a part of Pirzada's name and identity. He was Bhutto's right hand during the talks with the PNA [Pakistan National Alliance]. Again, he made continuous attempts to gain Bhutto's freedom. However, when Bhutto was executed and the leadership of the People's Party was restricted to the Bhutto family only, Pirzada collaborated with Mumtaz Bhutto to pursue a different course which clashed with the party's basic ideology and manifesto. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the voice and thinking of Pirzada is behind whatever Mumtaz Bhutto states from the platform of the Sindh-Baluch-Pukhtun Front. Pirzada went underground after Mumtaz Bhutto's arrest. Ibrahim Jatoi of HURMAT's Karachi bureau completed this interview with him in three different sittings by visiting him at secret locations. The completion of this interview, too, is an interesting story, however it is not appropriate to mention it at this time. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada himself admitted that this was the most interesting interview of his life.

[Question] How would you comment on the present situation in the country?

[Answer] My comment would be the same as that of a Lebanese concerning Beirut, that of an Iraqi or Irani regarding the Iran-Iraq war and that of a person befallen in a region struck by an earthquake.

[Question] In your opinion, is there any solution for this situation?

[Answer] Yes, indeed! The solution is that the provinces should be granted their rights, and they should be granted those in such a manner that no one feels to be getting charity or alms.

[Question] Who will grant these rights? From whom do you demand rights?

[Answer] It is obvious that the bigger province, i.e., Punjab enjoys the monopoly. As a reaction to its domination, all three provinces today are united against it, and they are demanding their rights. In the army, the bureaucracy, commerce, the police, customs, P.I.A. everywhere there are more people from the Punjab. We desire equal rights.

[Question] But, what is the measure of the equality of rights?

[Answer] The same one that exists in a democratic and civilized society.

[Question] [In a democratic setup] Punjab according to its population will be able to acquire more rights?

[Answer] We do not wish that Punjab should not obtain its due. What we mean to say is that it should get as much as is its fair share. It is unfair that from a railway-guard to F-16 pilots, everywhere you see Punjabis only.

[Question] Why are you allergic to Punjab and Punjabis? Punjab holds no prejudice or any such feelings against other provinces?

[Answer] We are not allergic. In fact, we say it repeatedly that if Punjab is suffering any oppression, it should bring it out to the limelight. We will cooperate with it. However, what name would you give to the fact that Punjab always welcomes the leaders from outside and then complains that it does not possess leadership. The Punjabis are very wily and shrewd, while the Pathans, Sindhis and Baluchis are simple and sincere people.

[Question] Why did you not realize such things when you were in power?

[Answer] A person learns a great deal with the passage of time. Time is a great teacher. Nevertheless, when we acquired power, the issue at that time was to reconstruct Pakistan right from the start. Bhutto Sahib used to work for 20 hours at a stretch, and he kept us also busy with him. Many times in those days we did not have time even to go home. One day at a reception my wife Sadia [jokingly] said to Begum Nusrat Bhutto: "First Lady! My husband has disappeared. Could you please help me in this regard." She smiled and replied, "If I find my lost husband, I shall present a strong request to him on your behalf." When Bhutto Sahib learned about this matter, one day in a cabinet meeting he said in a very solemn tone: "We have to build. We have to create. We have to justify. Let us move jointly and rapidly. Doesn't matter if we are lost. History will not make us, if we don't make history." So, Sir, during those days, we worked for Pakistan and Pakistan alone. Again, Bhutto Sahib's magical personality played a major role in that. He

was like a banyan tree, he was like a castle whose awe and splendor fascinates the onlookers. I assure you that if Bhutto had more time, he would have definitely resolved the issue of provincial autonomy.

[Question] This issue was, nevertheless, resolved in the form of the 1973 constitution, which was unanimously agreed upon.

[Answer] The constitution was unanimously agreed upon, but despite that certain people were not satisfied with it. Especially after the disturbances in Baluchistan and [Hayat Mohammad] Sherpao's murder, Bhutto had decided that the issue of provincial autonomy must be resolved.

[Question] Did Bhutto Sahib wish for the same thing that you are doing now?

[Answer] It is not essential that we do what Bhutto desired, or that our mission should be what Bhutto's wish was. Circumstances change with the lapse of time. At one time we were together, now at another time we are separate. There are ups and downs in politics.

[Question] Did you part with him after his execution or upon the termination of his administration?

[Answer] That is a long story. What can I say about it now. We will talk about it at some other time. But, I will definitely say that if Bhutto were alive today, first of all he would have shut up Benazir. The deceased Bhutto's soul would have trembled to witness the manner in which Miss Bhutto treated his comrades. We were the ones who decided to endanger our lives in order to save Bhutto's life. We wanted to initiate a movement, but Begum Sahiba said, "No, we have proposed some other methods." No one paid attention to us. Begum Bhutto is alive, may God grant her long life. You can inquire from her as to what proposals Pirzada made and what planning he suggested to save Bhutto's life.

[Question] So, did you prepare some plan for Bhutto's release?

[Answer] I did not prepare that plan, nor would I tell you as to who did that. However, I certainly will point out the fact that I was aware of that plan.

[Question] I think you should reveal it now.

[Answer] No, Mr Khar is still in jail. Let him be released.

[Question] What connection does that have with Mr Khar?

[Answer] It has a very deep connection. Please trust my word.

[Question] Was this plan prepared in a foreign country?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] For this plan were the services of a notorious smuggler also acquired?

[Answer] It is amazing that you are aware of so much detail, and you still want to ask more.

[Question] The words from your mouth would be regarded more credible.

[Answer] Yes, but in my opinion the circumstances themselves now are more favorable [for revelations]. May God bless everyone with a long life. As I see it, if by 1990 this country still exists, all falsehoods will surely be exposed. Leave aside the plan of Bhutto's release, people will also learn as to who were responsible for Bhutto's execution.

[Question] In your opinion, who are those people?

[Answer] His own people.

[Question] You too were one of his own people. He used to call you 'the handsome boy'?

[Answer] Shall I tell you one thing. Bhutto himself was intelligent, but he did not tolerate smart people. Whenever he got a chance, he would insult or ridicule them. Once when the assembly session ended, we all came out together. By chance, I moved one step ahead of him. My purpose was to clear the way for him, because he was always surrounded by a group of 40 to 50 people. I had hardly moved 3 or 4 steps ahead of him that Bhutto yelled at me from behind,

"Pirzada! You want to be Prime?
In my presence its [sic] crime."

I do not say this in my own praise, but history bears witness to the fact that Bhutto trusted me the most. I took charge of the most important departments and jobs. However, he disliked my friendship with Mumtaz Bhutto. Once he had said to Sadia, "Both of us like Pirzada. Let us join together to protect him from Mumtaz. You can teach him to love, while I can teach him to govern. Mumtaz, however, can only teach him to breed hunting dogs." As far as the matter of the "handsome boy" is concerned, one day when he was in a good mood he said that merely to tease Mustafa Khar.

[Question] But why?

[Answer] Actually, Mumtaz Khar had said at a gathering that I was more popular among the ladies and that I was even smarter and more handsome than Bhutto. When Bhutto knew about this, he made that remark 'just to make realize...[as published]

[Question] You got married just a few days before Bhutto's execution, as a result of which quite misleading rumors were spread about you. Why did you do that?

[Answer] This is just Kausar Niazi's propaganda. The arrangements for my wedding had been made beforehand. [I could not trust the administration], I feared that after Bhutto, it would be my turn and Zia Sahib would arrest me. I regard my present life as a bonus to me. I got married instantly, because there was no other way out of it.

[Question] I would like to ask you a personal question. In the presence of Begum Sadia, why did you feel the need for a second marriage?

[Answer] I reserve my comments.

[Question] Will your second wife involve herself in active politics just as Tahmina Khar has done?

[Answer] Right now, nothing can be said. At this point I cannot even assure myself whether I will live or not. You are well aware how the administration is blocking our path with oppression and violence. Tahmina Khar's situation is different. Khar is a Punjabi, and so is Zia. What danger is there [for the Khars]?

[Question] But, Junejo Sahib is a Sindhi?

[Answer] He is not a Sindhi. He owns to Sind, but Sind does not own him. If he were a Sindhi, he would not have moved to Islamabad after being tricked by the Punjabis. Instead, he would have stayed in Sind and worked for its rights. The trouble is that the Muslim Leagues always like short-cuts, and they look for short-cuts.

[Question] President Zia and G.M. Syed heap praises on each other?

[Answer] Both are well aware that whatever they say is not from their hearts, but merely a formality.

[Question] How has Mumtaz Bhutto's arrest affected the SBPF activities?

[Answer] There has been no specific difference. Our workers are performing their duties. It is indeed regrettable that on the one hand the administration talks about democracy and freedom of citizenship, while on the other hand Mumtaz has been arrested for allegedly making objectionable speeches. Up to now he has not been brought to any court of justice.

Through you I demand that the administration either honorably free Mumtaz and all those people arrested in the recent riots in Karachi, or else try them in a federal court; they should be granted a legal opportunity to prove their innocence. What kind of justice is this? What kind of Islam and what kind of democracy is this that people are arrested and locked up in jails?

[Question] Do you believe that the solution to the problems of Sind is only provincial autonomy?

[Answer] Yes, I am doing some research work also on this subject. I plan to write a book on it so that the future generations would get an opportunity to

study this issue in depth and apprehend it. They should know that our decision was not wrong and unrealistic. The main thing is that this was the demand about which promises were made. If the provinces were not to be granted autonomy, the Muslims had problems living under a strong center [in India]. Under certain circumstances or at certain stages, this strong center could also have come under the control of the Muslims. Anyway, this is a lengthy discussion for which there is no time right now. The sole solution of the problems of today's Sind is provincial autonomy. Along with the prosperity of Sind, we regard it to be the path to Pakistan's security and existence. I will definitely say that history is once again repeating itself. The actions, the circumstances, the environment, the military role and Punjab's stubbornness are all those very same. The only difference is that now a Sindhi is standing in place of a Bengali.

[Question] How will you be able to combat the PPP in the political arena?

[Answer] Sir, no PPP remains now. Do you consider the fun-seeking crowds that appear to see a glimpse of Miss Bhutto to be her political workers? Do you believe that those who shout slogans are the votes for the PPP? Do you think that the magnificent reception accorded to Benazir by the administration by sending its own people has not turned her head? We regard Benazir as nothing.

She is nothing.
She is not a sky.
She is a butterfly.
Let her fly.

[Question] Did you say that the administration sent people for Miss Benazir's reception?

[Answer] Yes. According to my information, the administration, under a highly secret and organized scheme, sent thousands of people to Miss Bhutto's processions so that she could be misled. That was why after her reception in Lahore Miss Bhutto said, "If we wished, we could have occupied the Governor House, but we refrained from that." However, when it was time to enter the arena, everything was a flop. You just watch. Very soon, the matter will clear up. The administration has very cunningly caught Benazir in its net. Now Mustafa Khar has of his own will walked into that net even though Jatoi warned him.

[Question] In your opinion, why cannot the PPP truly become an organized and effective political force?

[Answer] Honestly and frankly speaking, for the last 9 years the PPP has not had an opportunity for that. Not a single day has passed when it was not attacked from this side or that. Now, it does not even have the right to rebut the NPP. The official media does not give its news. Its leaders cannot go on tours, clause 144 [to restrict assembly] is enforced before the leaders arrive. It is almost the same situation with other political parties. In my view, in order to promote democracy we will have to continue the

political process, a political process whereby all political parties and elements can work with full freedom. If the PPP is given an opportunity, it can function, but it will be unable to become an effective political force now. Now it does not have Z.A. Bhutto, Jatoi, Khar, Mumtaz, Sherpao, J.A. Rahim, Rasool Bakhsh, Talpur, Haneef Ramay and ---

[Question] Hafiz Pirzada?

[Answer] (Laughing) If you say so. Thanks.

[Question] But the PPP does possess a real manifesto?

[Answer] The manifesto is merely a pamphlet, good only if it is acted upon. Who sees that it is acted upon? Evidently a leader ---

[Question] Who is a bigger challenge for you, Miss Benazir Bhutto or the present administration?

[Answer] If one is a Knight Rider, the other is a Six Million Dollar Man.

[Question] I think that my question is still unanswered.

[Answer] Leave it. Next question, please.

[Question] Do you regard your deceased chairman Bhutto a martyr or not?

[Answer] To some extent.

[Question] Could you explain a little bit more?

[Answer] I call Bhutto a martyr to the extent that he faced death boldly. He did not compromise on principles and remained firm on his stand like a hero and a brave man. However, I do not believe him to be a martyr to the extent that he should be politically mourned, that there should be political lamentation and that the party should portray itself as oppressed and beg for votes as charity. This in fact is a sort of bargaining for his blood. Bhutto was a martyr in that he gave up his life for the people. Therefore, he is a martyr of the people, and I regard this Bhutto alone to be a martyr. I do not believe the Bhutto to be a martyr who was just Murtaza and Benazir's daddy, or who was just Nusrat's husband. Martyrs are above family trees.

[Question] Have you ever visited Bhutto's shrine?

[Answer] I feel that this question has no bearing. This is a matter between me, my God and the deceased.

[Question] But, you should still say something.

[Answer] If you insist. I will say that Bhutto's tomb is not unknown to me.

[Question] What about Shah Nawaz's shrine?

[Answer] He was very dear to me. Yes, I did visit his grave once. I was passing by from there. Oh! that angel soul. My wife was with me. She reminded me about the grave, and I just stopped there. It was a very sad moment. Believe me, for a long time I stayed motionless there.

[Question] Have you ever been in contact with Begum Nusrat Bhutto?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Is there a possibility for that?

[Answer] Not for the time being.

[Question] In other words, it is possible?

[Answer] It does not seem so.

[Question] Why are you so very cautious to talk about this matter?

[Answer] Because the issue is such.

[Question] Do you consider it to be an issue on which we should talk cautiously?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] What is the reason?

[Answer] If we are not careful, many problems could arise which have no justification, and which both of us, that is Mrs Bhutto and I, could not afford. I respect her even now, and I pray for her health and long life.

[Question] Haven't you prayed for her success?

[Answer] If in response to my prayer she prays for my success, I shall pray for her success.

[Question] If Jatoh Sahib offers you to join the NPP, how will you respond?

[Answer] Thank you without thanks.

[Question] May I know the reason for that?

[Answer] Jatoh Sahib has been duped by the Punjabis just as Benazir has been.

[Question] Perhaps you have imposed Punjabis on your nerves?

[Answer] No, it is my bitter experience and the observation of history.

[Question] If Jatoh Sahib wishes to join with you, what will you do?

[Answer] Most welcome, but he should be alone!

[Question] When fortune was opening up the doors of power upon you, why did you refuse?

[Answer] This critical occasion is not appropriate to discuss whether I refused or not, and whether I was offered the opportunity. If I remain alive, I shall tell you as to who planned the entire drama. I will only point out here that if you wish to be acquainted with the true facts and events, you should join with me to pray that may God grant life to Gen Ziaul Haq, Maulana Kausar Niazi, Gen Chishti, Rao Farman Ali, Gen Fazal, Sawar Khan, Gen Iqbal, Brig Sadiq Salik, Mumtaz Bhutto, Prof Ghafur, Jatoi Sahib and Begum Nusrat Bhutto as long as democracy is not restored in the true sense in Pakistan, or at least, as long as the press is not granted freedom.

[Question] For the time being, could you please tell us as much as you can under the allowable democracy and freedom of the press?

[Answer] In this way the entire matter will be separated from the context, and there is a danger that its meaning might get mixed up. God willing, we shall soon witness better days, then we shall come out in the open and talk. I promise you that I will certainly talk with you in detail.

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LACK OF REAL CHANGE POINTED OUT IN NEW CABINET COMPOSITION

Karachi AMN in Urdu 24 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial "New Federal Cabinet Change Superficial and Administrative Stagnation Evident As Before"]

[Text] The new federal cabinet has 16 full ministers and 4 ministers of state. But all these belong to the former cabinet, more than half of whom were dismissed. Some of the ministers who were dismissed are likely to return to the cabinet. Prominent among them is Dr Mahbubul Haq, who is abroad and so could not take the oath of office. Although most of the ministers of the former cabinet were dismissed as a result of the struggle between various factions, serious charges of nepotism and embezzlement of government funds have been made against most of the ministers. According to reports, an investigation into the charges has started and some of the ministers will be tried on these charges. These reports fool nobody. We have had many examples of this before. During martial law, a minister was charged with making billions of rupees by importing reconditioned cars; he was dismissed from the ministry, but there was not a whisper of investigation or a court case. A second case concerns the so-called democratic period when Prince Mohyuddin Baluch was dismissed. Ever since, he has demanded that the charges against him be proved by conducting a public trial in a court of law. There has been no response, however. This is because a top-level official whose voice carries weight has made this minister the scapegoat for his own crimes. Under these conditions, to believe that a case will be brought against a dismissed minister is living in a fool's paradise.

If anyone is to be tried, it should be General Ziaul Haq and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo. The general is responsible for the present situation, and Junejo is making things worse. If these two gentlemen did not have the protection of the military, they could not remain in office for even a few minutes.

Many ministers in the new federal cabinet are occupying their old positions, while the portfolios of other ministers have been changed. Contrary to popular impression, no new face has been brought into the cabinet. It has been reported that some members of parliament who are large industrialists were offered a ministerial post, but possibly because they preferred their honor and life over such a post, they turned down the offer.

Following the formation of the new cabinet, it is claimed that the official Muslim League will now emerge stronger. But this appears to be a pipedream. The formation of the new cabinet was meant to end the internal infighting and the factionalism, but they are still present. The induction of ministers into the cabinet and the dismissal of some ministers was partly the result of factionalism and partly because of interference from General Ziaul Haq. For instance, Khaqan Abbasi was dismissed because in the 1985 general elections he defeated the general's "opening batsman," Raja Zafasual Haq.

This is one side of the picture. On the other hand, law and order are in shambles. Human beings are being killed mercilessly. No one heeds the cries of the oppressed. In this terrible situation, Mohammad Khan Junejo's five-point program, on which work was not even properly begun, has got ten lost somewhere. According to one report, the annual development program is facing an annual deficit of 732 million rupees, and the deficit is likely to grow. Under these conditions, the five-point program can well be considered a non-starter. There is little chance of its success.

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GOVERNMENT CLEANUP EFFORT AT SOHRAB GOTH CRITICIZED

Karachi AMN in Urdu 21 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial: "New 'Sohrab Goths' Seen Coming Into Existence Soon"]

[Excerpts] What the government has done in Sohrab Goth and the way it has done it, far from allaying people's fears has increased them. Efforts are being made to assure us that by moving the population of Sohrab Goth to a different location, they are being dispersed. The government believes that by doing so, the objectives of Operation Cleanup will have been realized. It is reported that all the businesses of the Bara bazaar and its nearby residential areas will be razed to the ground. In this area, nearly 90 acres of land was under illegal occupation. One person, Haji Jannat Gul, had illegally built shops and residences and by renting them, received an annual income of 2.8 million rupees. Now the plan is that in place of Sohrab Goth, a road parallel to the superhighway and a grand park will be built.

The way residents of Sohrab Goth have been moved is an interesting story. In this area, 200 families of white washers and painters used to live on 10 acres of land. On 30 acres, 1,500 families of Pakistani Pakhtoons had their homes, and on 48 acres lived 30,100 families of Afghan refugees. Under scheme number 33, each Pakistani Pakhtoon family will be settled on a 60-yard plot. The 200 families of white washers will be settled in the town of Surjani north of the Aurangi hills. The 30,100 Afghan refugee families will be settled in Deh Bajar Buti, which is 8 kilometers from Sohrab Goth. There, they will be allowed to build their own homes. Their settlement will not be enclosed within walls and or fenced with barbed wire. They will be allowed to live there until they are transferred to a regular Afghan refugee camp in the north or a new camp elsewhere.

It is noteworthy that the places they will be moved to are not far from either Sohrab Goth or from the superhighway. Thus, the two big cities of Sind, Karachi and Hyderabad, will remain within easy reach. To look after Afghan refugee affairs, the office of traffic magistrate has been abolished and the position of assistant commissioner for refugee affairs created. We do not believe that this kind of relocation of the Sohrab Goth population can realize the objectives of Operation Cleanup.

As far as the recovery of arms and ammunition is concerned, people will not be misled by claims that all the arms and ammunition in Sohrab Goth have been recovered. The general impression is that the digging is not yet complete in Sohrab Goth and that hundreds of tons of ammunition and a vast quantity of arms are still buried there. What is more, having received advance information of Operation Cleanup, hundreds of tons of ammunition and a large amount of arms moved to other parts of the city. Of this, what amount of arms and ammunition has the government recovered?

It is clear that even after the loss of so many lives, attempts are being made to mislead the public. But the government should be aware that the people will not be misled. If their full protection is not ensured and if the curse of arms and ammunition is not removed, the people will be forced to take matters into their own hands.

It is said that the whitewashers have played a key role in the illegal trafficking in arms and ammunition. At one time they used to go to a warm climate every winter, but now for years they have remained in Pakistan. It is they who started trading in arms and ammunition and later persuaded some Pakistanis and a large number of Afghan refugees to join in. Mostly it is they who after Operation Cleanup roamed around in vehicles, armed, during curfew and killed or wounded people by firing on them. If these were hard-working people, they would have settled in a city. Karachi has been called a mini-Pakistan, but these people had made a mini-Yaghistan [land of milk and honey] in Sohrab Goth. And now after being dispersed, they have been officially permitted to create three more mini-Yaghistans close to the superhighway.

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